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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RIGHMOND. 
I Record No. 2047 
MARION AYRES, 
ve·rsus 
HARLEYSVILLE ·~fUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, 
GARNISHEE OF D. A,RONOVITCH, DOING 
BUSINESS AS lUNG'S DISTRIBUTORS. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorr;1-ble J~tstices of the S'ltpreme Co'ltrt of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner1 Marion Ayres, respectfully represents 
unto your Honors that he is greatly aggrieved by a final judg·-
ment of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, rendered on 
the 28th day of .July, 1938, in a certain garnishment proceed-
ing therein pending "rherein petitioner was plaintiff and Har. 
leysville Mutual Casualty Company, Garnishee of D. Arono-
vitch, doing business as King's Distril>utors, was defendant. 
Petitioner presents herewith a copy of the Record in the said 
case from which the follo,ving facts appear. 
PROCEEDINGS, PLEADINGS AND ISSUES. 
Petitioner, having on May 14, 1936, obtained a judgment 
for $20,607.00 with interest, ahd $126.75 costs ag·ainst D. 
Aronovitch doing business as l{:ing 's Distributors ( 169 Va. 
308), upon which payment of $8,599.10 was made on January 
,.--
I 
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20, 1938, and upon which judgn1ent an execution 'vas issued 
from thP. Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Amherst 
County on the 25th day of January, 1938, and upon a sugges-
tion that there was liability of the Harleysville Mut. Casualty 
Company of Harleysville, Pennsylvania, had a summons is-
sued on January 28, 1938, and served upon both the Harleys-
ville lviutual Casua1ty Con1pany and the said Aronovitch re-
turnable to the 14th day of ~,ebruary, 1938, requiring the 
said Casualty Con1pany to disclose in what an1ount, if at all, 
it was indebted to the said .Aronovitch or what sums it had 
in l1and subject to the lien of the said execution (R., pp 1-5). 
On the return day of the summons the defendant Casualty 
Con1pany filed its petition verified by oath, (not denying that 
it was indebted to the said Aronovitch but averring that the 
matter in controversy involved over $3,000.00) setting· out 
the fact that it was not a resident of the State of Virginia, and 
praying for the reinoval of the case to the United, States Dis-
rict Court for tho vVostern District of Virginia (R., pp. 11-13), 
and filing what purported to be a removal bond signed by 
V. P. Randolph, Jr., its attorney-at..:Law (R., p. 20), which 
petition your petitioner resisted upon the ground, among 
others, that the so-called ren1oval bond was insufficient in 
that it was no bond at all (R., p. 16) but the said Court over-
ruled your petitioners objections and entered an order re-
moving the said case to the United States Districf Court for 
the Western District of Virginia on the 14th day of ·February, 
1938 (R., p. 7). Subsequently, said United States Court, on 
motion of petitioner ren1anded the said cause to the Circuit 
Court of Amherst County (R .. , p. 22). 
Thereafter, on n1otion of the garnishee, petitioner was re-
quired to file a bill of particulars and the defendant garnishee 
was required to file its grounds of defense (R., p. 24). 
PetitionP.r's bill of particulars avers that petitioner's said 
judgment was for personal injuries inflicted upon him by a 
motor vehicle of defendant Aronovitch while covered by an 
insurance policy of said Casualty Company insuring said 
Aronovitch ag-ainst: 
First. Liability in1}JOsed by law upon the said Aronovitch 
' for bodily injuries inflicted by said motor vehicle upon any 
one person (with certain exceptions hereinafter pointed out) 
not exceeding $10,000.00; and · 
Second. Furthermore agreeing in addition, to defend any 
action or suit broug·ht against the said Aronovitch alleged 
to be covered by the insurance policy and to pay all costs and 
' expenses incurred in the defense of such claim, to pay all 
taxed costs and all interest accruing on any juclgn1ent. The 
bill of particulars claimed a liability on the Casualty Com-
:1\iarion Ayre~ v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 3 
pany to A.ronovitch of $10,000.00 under the first branch above 
mentioned and $84,596.72 under the second branch. The 
Casualty Company denied any liability 'vhatever under the 
said policy (R., pp. 32-35). · 
By stipulation filed and n1ade a part of the record, it was 
agTeed that the instant proceeding should be limited to the 
question of liability under the first branch of the policy as 
above outlined without prejudice to either party in any fur-
ther proceeding·s to enforce liability ut'tder the second branch 
of the policy (R., pp. 37-39). 
Tl1e issue thus having- been limited to the question of the 
Casualty ·Company's liability upon a single branch of the 
policy it filed its grounds of defense as follows : 
No. 1. ''The said plaintiff, ~Iarion Ayres, was an employee 
of the said D. A.ronovitch and at the time of the accident was. 
eng·aged in his duties of such employment and was engag·ed 
in operating and caring for the vehicle covered 'by the policy 
in question; that by reason of sub-section (d) of the excep-
tions in the insurance policy in question,'' ................ . 
and there was no liability under the policy (R., p. 32) ; and 
No. 2. "That 1\faryon Ayers, the plaintiff herein, at the 
--- -time.-he sustained the injuries con1plained of recovered his 
juclgTnent against D. A.ronovitch, doing· business as King's 
Distributors by reason of obligations assluned or imposed 
( _ upon it by reason of a workmen's agreen1ent, plan or loan, 
I which is expressly excepted by clause (d) of the insurance 
policy in question" (R .. , p. 36). 
The pertinent parts of the insurance policy 'vhich will be 
found at p. 53 et seq., of the record are as follows: 
By an endorsen1ent attached to the policy it was agreed 
that the word ''indmnnify" used in the policy should be 
changed to read "insured" (R., p. 54). 
The Casualty Con1pany insured Aronovitch ''ag-ainst loss 
by reason of the liability imposed upon the assured by law 
for damages on account of bodily injuries, and/or death ac-
cidentally sustained by any person or persons not hereinafter 
excepted by reason of the ownership and maintenance and/ot• 
use of the 1notor vehicle ( s) herein described, limiting the 
liability to $10,000.00 for any one person" (R., p. 55). 
The juclgn1ent in question was recovered for injuries caused 
by one of the vehicles covered by the policy (R., pp. 57, 73, 74). 
''VI. The Company agrees under any policy to indemnify 
the assured named therein against l9ss by reason of the lia-
bility imposed upon him by law for damages on account of: 
r~ ~ --~~- ~ 
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''PERSONAL LIABILITY. 
"(A.) Bodily injury and/or death accidently sustained by 
any person or persons not hereinafter excepted by reason of 
the ownership, maintenance, and/or use of the motor ve-
hicle ( s) described therein, including claims or bodily injuries 
and/or death, through the loading or unloading of merchan-
dise carried on motor vehicle ( s) covered hereunder and sp~ci­
fied herein'' (.R., p. 601. 
''EXCEPTIONS. 
''Providing the Company shall not be liable under any 
policy issued for loss resulting· or arising· from any of the 
following causes or while said motor vehicle is being used o:r. 
'maintained under any of the following conditions: (a) while 
operated or manipulated in any race or speed test, (b) while 
driven by any person prohibited by law from driving any au:.. 
tomobile, (c) while being used for towing or propelling any 
trailer or other vehicle. used as a trailer, (d) while being 
\ rented or being used to carry passengers for consideration 
! expressed or implied~_il¥JJL.0:!YLP9.l.i.cy_qover indu,ry tp any 
1 employee or ~~p~oy~~~ . 9_! __ the lnsur~E. ... '!~i!g_ e11gaged in_ o_:e~. _ 
! ~a~iii'g or car1ng _tor .~;!.Y oflhe _ aufom~olle§_ coverei!_12Y__:tlJ!.~­
; _Eohcy, nor any obligations assumed or Imposed upon the in- ' 
\ i surP.Cfoy any workmen's agreement, plan or law, * • • (R., pp. 
l: 61, 62). 
Thus, it being admitted that the plaintiff recovered a judg-
ment for bodily injuries sustained by the use and operation-
of a truck covered by an insurance policy of the said Casualty 
Company so as to impose a liability upon the Casualty Com-
pany which could be enforced by garnishment in this pro-
ceeding·· unless the liability came within one of the specific 
exceptions contained in the policy, and ail 9..uest.ion of the 
liabilty of the ·Casualty Company for additional coverage 
under clause No. ·7 having been eliminated by a stipulation 
filed in the record, the sole issue for determination. by the 
Court in this case was whether or not the Casualty Company 
had excepted itself from liability by the above quoted pro-
visions of its policy. 
A.t the conclusion of th~ evidence the Court struck out all 
the evidence and directed the jury to bring in a verdict in 
·favor ofthe Casualty Company, which verdict was accordingly 
returned and the Court overruled a motion of petitioner to 
set aside the verdict and enter up a judgment against the 
Casualty Company for the $10,000.00 in issue under the 
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pleadings and stipuiation, which motion was overruled and 
exceptions noted by petitioner to the action of the Court in 
striking out the evidence and in refusing petitioner's mo-
tion to enter up final judt,rment in his favor for $10,000.00 
(1-t., pp. 216, 217) ~ . 
THE FACTS. 
There was practically no conflict in the testimony as to 
the controlling facts in this case; such conflict as appeared 
in the testimony related to details which are n1ore or less im-
material, but even as to those details, since the Court struck 
out all evidence, and refused to permit the jury to pass upon 
the conflict of the testimony, all such conflicts in the testi-
mony should, under principles too well established to require 
citation, be resolved in favor of petitioner. Consequently, 
the recitation of the facts hereinafter g·iven is based upon the 
evidence offered by petitioner. 
At the time petitioner sustained the injuries for which he 
recovered the judgment against Aronovitch he was an em-
ployee of Aronovitch who was in the wholesale beer business 
___ __in the City of Lynchburg·, hauling the beer to his Lynchburg 
plant for distribution by trucks from the breweries in New 
York state. These trucks, including· the truck involv~d in 
this litigation, were owned and operated by Aronovitch: It 
required three days and three nights to n1ake the trip to New 
York and return. lie put two men on each truck for each 
trip,-one he laced in exclusive control of the management 
and o Je · fl. .. r.uc r, re erred. to in the evidence as file 
~ river",-and the other, desigilate(fastlie -nnerper,,.., was-
under the supervision and direction of the DriVer, perform-
ing such duties in connection with· the operation and repair 
of the truck as might be ordered by the Driver, but being 
charged with no duties of inspection, maintenance or repair. 
of the truck. 
On the morning of the accident Aronovitch sent the truck 
in question on a trip to New York in charg·e of one, Tom · 
~ggs. •. )vith .petitioner as JJglp~_r .. Scruggs took charge of 
the truck in Lynchl)urg and drove- it until the accident oc-
curred and the injuries were inflicted upon petitioner about 
eight or ten miles outside of I.1ynchburg. During tbis t.cip and 
on the da of the ac · _IJ.Q.t.itio~~}lid n~.9~~l1-.t<l.. tMin.l..<lk =-· . 
a a a~cl. a~ no dtl_!y_!q...nerfqrPl;-l~l-.§9!!P~~~ion wit_h~-~!!.!!!.!8". ~-· 
'ior or aiding 1n any W~.!_n reuauing_t!le truck:- ~th fact, the 
'truck was provided by Aronovitch with aoeaorcot and so far 
as petitioner's duties on the day of the accident .. were con-
cerned, he was at liberty to sleep on the cot, smoke, read a 
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book or do anything he pleased. He was, of course, subject 
to be called upon by Scruggs, the Driver, but as a matter of 
!
, fact he was not called upon to do anything nor was he en-
gag·ed at any time during the day of the accident in doing 
any act connected with the operation or caring for the truck 
I in question (R., pp. 148-1.56). Ayers v. Aronov·itch, 169 Va. 
I! 308. -At the time of his injuries, petitioner was not working 
under any W orkn1en 's Agreement or Plan for Compensation 
of his injuries (R., p. 156). 
And at that thne Aronovitch \Vas not employing a sufficient 
nurnber of regular employees to bring l1in1 within the terms 
of the vVork1nen's Con1pensation Laws (R., pp. 93, 94). 
The evidence as to what your petitioner was engaged in 
doing at the tilne of and iininediately before the injuries wer9 
inflicted upon hin1 is very brief and n1ay be quoted in full as 
follows: 
Petitioner testified as follows : 
"Q. What were you engaged in doing at the time of the 
accident and injury to you? 
''A. I was working; for "Nir. Aronovitch as a helper on his 
truck, under Ton1 Scruggs. 
"Q. As a helper under Tom Scruggs? 
''A. 1Ces, sir. 
"Q. V\That were you engaged in doing at the time of the 
accident and injury f 
''A. I was just riding along. 
'' Q. Were you engaged in the operation of the truck) 
''A. No, sir. 
"Q. At that time? 
''A. No, sir. 
"By ~ir. l\iay: We n1ove that the answer be struck-that 
the word 'operation' in this case has a legal significance that 
this witness cannot give. 
''By the Court: I think that question was leading. 
''By J\tir. Coleman: They don't object to it on that ground. 
He objects because he said the w·ord has a legal meaning. I 
do not understand that it does. 
"By 1\{r. May: He can say what he was doing. \Ve don't 
object to that at all. 
"By the Court: I think it is an objectionable question be-
cause it is leading·. It directly puts in the mouth of the wit-
ness the very thing- in controversy here. 
"By Mr: May: We object to it on that ground, too. 
"'" 
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''By J\llr. Coleman: 
'' Q. \Vho was, at the time of the accident, operating the 
truck in which you were riding Y 
''A. Tom Scruggs. 
'' Q. \:Vhere did you and Tom Scruggs start on your trip 
that day-fron1 what point ul 
"A. We started froni lung's Distributors in L~nchburg. !'J,·~-·rl 
"Q. Who took charge of the truck at that pointY . 
''A. 1\{r. Scruggs. 
''By the ·Court: 
'' Q. You left from what place' 
"A. 2603 Fort Avenue, Lynchburg, Virginia-J{ing's Dis-
,tributors. 
''By ~ir. Coleman: 
''Q. I will ask you if anybody-else had charge of that truck 
from that thne until the time of the accident Y jl 
"A. Nobody but 1\'Ir. Scruggs. f/ 
'' Q. vVithout waiving our objections to the evidence intro-
duced with reference to the duties of 1\tfr. Ayers, we want to 
ask hin1 this question: vVhat were your duties in your em- )). 
Ployment by Mr.· Aronovitch f 
"A. l\fy duties was to relieve the driver, or helper on the 
truck, to drive under :Nlr. Scruggs. 
· '' Q. W:4_<> h~_d _!~~~~x~__gJ_fu~ J!!l~k 1 ., · 
''By the Court (Interrupting·) : I want him to read that 
answer. 
' ' (The answer is reacl.) 
"By 1\tir. Coleman: 
'' Q. When was it your duty to drive, Mr. Ayers? 
''A. Whenever he told me. 
'' Q. When who told you~ 
''A. [1om Scruo·e.·§._ 
'' Q. Who had tYie care of the truck? 
' 'A. :rvrr. Scrugg-s. 
~·---..=.....-.~~ 
.1/ 
Ji. 
"By lVIr. 1\Iay: We object to that and move that the last 
answer be stricken out, because in this case the word 'care' 
is subject to legal construction, and we don't think this wit-
ness is in a position to do that. We move that the answer 
be struck from the record. 
''The foregoing motion is overruled and the Defendant, 
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. . 
by counsel, excepts to the ruling of the Court for . reason.~ 
heretofore f:?tated. . 
''By the Court: I thin~ it is a proper answer. 
''By Mr. Coleman: 
''Q. Had you been told at any time during that day to drive 
l
l ~,·: the truck by Mr. Scruggs 1 
''A. vVe started out and I ·asked Scrug·gs who would drive 
II the first trick, he or I, and he said 'I will drive it'. 
I
I '' Q. Did you know when your time to drive on that particu-
lar day was to arrive 1 
''A. The one usually who drove the first trick 'vould drive 
to Harrisonburg or Winchester and the other would take it 
over then. 
''By the Court: 
"Q. Do you mean that your first 'trick', as you call it, was 
from Lynchburg to Harrisonburg? · 
i ._i. "A. Yes, sir, or Winchester, and then ihe other would 
'· take it.·------~- -· - ------
11--
. 
1 
"By Mr. Coleman: 
"Q. What were your duties while Mr. Scruggs was driv-
J 
i ing· the truck Y · 
· _! "A. I didn't have any duties at all. I laid down and would 
IJ go to sleep or I would read a magazine or smoke a cigarette, i or do anything I 'vanted. 
, "Q. What were you actually doing at the time of this acci-
dent? · 
''A. I was just smoking a cigarette and talking to Tom: 
'' Q. He was the driver and you the helper Y 
''A. Yes, sir. · 
'' Q. Was there any difference in the duties of the driver 
and the helper? 
''A. Yes, sir, the driver is responsible for the truck. He 
got the expense money and everything. 
. )) '' Q. And the· helper's duties 'were what? 
. "A. To drive whenever he told him or do·whatever he told 
h1m·to do. 
"Q. What truck was this that you were riding on that 
))
; caused the injury? 
~ "A. A 2-ton Dodge tractor, with Black Diamond trailer 
hooked on to it. 
"Q. Did you have any kind of Workman's agreement or 
plan for your compensation for any injuries while employed 
by :h{r. Aronovi tch? 
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-"A. No, sir." (R., pp. 148-156.) 
' 
The defendant Aronovitch testified with respect to whether 
petitioner came under any Workmen's Agreement Plan or 
Laws, as follows: 
"By Mr. Easley: . , 
'' Q. There is another question I want to ask you: I want 
to ask you this-:-in your business-the beer business,-how 
many men at this time did you have regularly employed Y 
''A. Eight. 
'' Q. Eight men? 
''A .. Entirely,-eight employees altogether. 
"Q. Eight employees altog·ether f 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. Was that the maximum number employed at any one 
timeY 
''A. That was the maximum i1umber. 
'' Q. How many of these eight were regularly employed Y 
''A. Six. 
'' Q. In that business, I n1ean Y 
____ ,'A. Six. 
'"'Q. Were you at that time operating your business under 
any vV orlunen 's ag-reement, plan or law? 
''A. I don't quite understand what the '\Torkmen's agree-
ment, plan, or law, might mean. 
"By :.Mr. May: We object to that, because it is entirely 
a matter of law, which the Court will determine on the evi-
dence before it. We think that the question asked is purely 
a leg·al one. -
"By the Court: How can the Court know anything about· 
it unless it is stated that there was some agreement or plan 7 
''By Mr. Easley: I will frame it differently. Instead of 
using the very language of the policy, I will ask you: Did 
you have with ~Ir. Ayers any agreement for paying com- ~· 
pensation for his injuries in· this particular case? 
"A .. No, sir. 
"Q. Was there any plan formulated for the payment by 
you of any compensation for the injuries that he sustained j n: 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Under the Workmen's Con1pensation Law of Vir-
ginia, where the operator of a business comes under that-
within the terms of that law-he is required to post with the 
Compensation Commission either a compensation insurance 
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
or a bonu. I will ask you if any such bond was required or 
filed by you with the Compensation Comn1ission? 
"A. Not at that time." ( R., pp. 93 and 94.) 
....__----~, 
The defendant; over the objection of petitioner, intro-
duced evidence as to the general duties of petitioner on these 
trips and especially ~vidence showing: or tending· to show 
that at times, or from tin1e to time, it was his duty to aid in 
making minor repairs to the truck, such as tig·htening lugs, 
changing· tires, etc. The ground of objection of course was 
that under the language of the policy propedy construed the 
issue was not what the duties were generally, but whether 
petitioner was at the time of the accident '' engag·ed in caring 
for or operating· the truck." 
It appeared fron1 the uncontradicted evidence that on the 
day of the accident petitioner was at no ti1ne, either before, 
at or after the accident, engaged in any duties appertaining· 
to the operation of or caring for the truck in question. 
Petitioner testified as follo':'lS: 
"Q. Did you have anything to do with looking after the 
fixing· of the brakes 1 
"A. No, sir. . 
'' Q. vV ere any of these things-the changing of the tire, 
the tightening .of the lugs, the buying of gas and the oil-
were any of those things done at the time of the accident or 
immediately before? 
''A. No, because when Vle started out-we gassed up be-
fore we left the plant. 
"Q. That is, at Lynchburg? 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. After you gassed up, was there anything else needed 
for the truck from that time until the tin1e of the accident 1 
"A. 'V e needed a jack; we stopped at Barker-Jennings and 
got a jack. 
!:· "Q. That was at Lynchburg. Who stopped for the jack? 
II "A. Mr. Scrugg·s. 
:/ "Q. Atter--yol.l-got the gas and the jack, was anything else 
needed for the truck at that time? 
''A. V\TI1a t do you mean 'needed'? 
,. ' ' Q. Was there anything for you to do? 
"A. No, sir. 
'' Q. Was there anything for anybody to do at that time-
at tl1at particular tin1e, at the time of the accident? 
''A. Nothing except to drive the truck. 
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''Q. And that was done by 1fr. Scruggs, was it¥ / ·/ 
"A. ~-:ir." (R., pp. 164, 165.) ( / 
There was renlly no conflict in the evidPnce as to what pe-
titioner was actully engaged in doing from the time the truck 
left Lynchburg to the m01uent of the accident and it shows 
that he not only performed no act pertaining to the operation 
or caring for the truck, but that his duties did not at that · 
time require him to perforn1 any such act. The defendant's 
'vitness Scruggs testified on that point as follows: 
'' Q. \Vl1o had the money on this trip on the clay of the ac1 . 
ciden t to pay expenses? 1 1 
''A. I did. I .' 
"Q. Wiio.-was operating the truck at the time of the acdi~ 
dent? '1 
''A .. !_was. /) 
'' Q. Wliorcpairecl the truck after the wreck f I I 
"A. The John P. Hughes l\!Iotor Co. I think. 
"Q. Did you or ~ir. Ayres have anything to do with re-
pairing it or do anything· to the truck at the time the accident 
_ _llilppened f 
"A. I carried it by John P. Hughes Company and had it 
checked. 
'' Q. I mean after the accident 1 
''A. No, sir. 
''Q. Neither you nor ~fr .. A.yres did anything to the truck 
or about the truck after the accident about having it fixed 
up1 
"A. No, sir, I never did. 
"Q. ~r r. Ayres didn't either, did he~ 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. \Vas anything done to the truck by you or Mr. Ayres I 
after you left the John P. fiughes ~Iotor Company in Lynch- . 
burg and before the accident? 
"A. No, sir." (R., pp. 196, 197.) 
Thus it appears that petitioner at no time during the day 
of the accident was actually eng·aged in doing any act what-
ever pertaining to the operation or care of the truck in ques-
tion and there is no conflict in the evidence on this point. As 
stated before, the Court over petitioner's objection admitted 
evidence as to the general duties that petitioner was expected 
to perform in the course of these trips, the purpose of such 
evidence obviously being· to show that petitioner jointly and 
equally with Scruggs was charg·ed generally with the care 
of the truck. Without waiving his objections, petitioner i~-
--~ 
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troduced evidence directly conflicting with the evidence of the 
.defendant on this point, and if such evidence was admissible 
; · at all petitioner was entitled to have this conflict of the evi-
; 1 dence rP.solved by the jury. Since the Court took this ques-
; \ tion from the jury by striking out the evidence, then under 
II.J well settled principles petitioner on this. appeal is entitled to I have the Court consider as established facts his evidence on that point. Petitioner testified on that point as follows: . . . 
'' Q. What were your duties while 1\{r. Scrugg·s was driving 
l , the truck? 
; 1 ''A. I didn't havH any duties at all. I laid down and would j j go to sleep or I would read a magazine or sn1oke a cigarette 
; i or do anything· I wanted. 
I ; "Q. vVhat were you actually doing at the time-of this ac-
.' cident? 
"Q. He was the driver and you were the helper? 
. · "A. Yes sir. 
· \ ''A. I 'vas just smoking a cigarette and talking to Tom. 
'' Q:--w' a~ tnere any difference in the duties of the driver 
d 
. and the helper? 
. 
·j "A. Yes, sir. The driver is responsible for the truck. He 
got the expense money and everything. 
''Q. And the helper's duties were what? 
- · "A. To drive whenever he told hin1 or do whatever he told 
him to do.'' (R., p. 152.) 
Petitioner's witness 1\icBride testified on that point as 
follows: 
l
r "Q·. When a driver was not driving did he have anything 
I to do at all-any responsibility or anything to do? "A. He was subject to call from the driver of the truck. '' Q. Until he was called did he have any duty to perform 
, . at allY 
:j ' 'A. No, sir. 
; . "Q. In the care of the truck or operating the truck at all f 
II 
"A. No, sir. He would have been a back-seat driver if he 
had done that. He just sat there.'' (R., p. 203.) 
' 
· As before pointed out, the uncontradicted evidence showed 
that Scruggs, the driver, operated the truck from Lynchlnu·g 
to the time of the accident and at no time called upon peti-
tioner as helper to do anything whatsoever. 
(_ 
-
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ASSIGNI\fENTS OF ERROR . 
. 
Petitioner assigns the following errors: 
(1) The 1;1ction of the Court in admitting evidence as to 
duties generally of petitioner and of what other drivers and 
helpers did at other times while working· for Aronovitch, and -
in not limiting the evidence to the actual occupation or action 
of petitioner at the time of the accident. · 
( 2) The action of the Court in striking out all of the evi-
dence and in effect directing a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant. 
( 3) The action of the Court in overruling petitioner's mo-
tion to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter up a judg-
ment in favor of petitioner for $10,000.00. 
'THE LAW~ 
The defendant company denied liability under its policy 
of insurance upon two grounds : 
___ (1) That at the time of the accident petitioner "was en-~ 
gaged in operating and caring for the vehicle covered by the 
policy in question" (R., p. 32); and · . 
(2) That petitioner "recovered his judgment against D. 
Aronovitch, doing business as I<:ings Distributors, by reason 
of obligations assumed or imposed upon it by reason of a 
Workmen's Agreement, Plan or Law which is expressly ex-
cepted by clause (d) of the insurance policy in question." 
(R., p. 36.) . 
The Court apparently was not in1pressed with the second 
ground of defense but based its action in striking out all of 
the evidence and directing a verdict for the defendant upon 
the first gTound above n1entioned only (R., pp 212, 216). We 
will, therefore, devote this discussion principally to that de-
fense. · {,! 
It might be said in passing·, however, that there is no ;1: 
va.lidity in the second defense, nan1ely, that petitioner's judg- ( 
ment against Aronovitch was a liability imposed upon him 
by a "vYorlrmen's law.'' 
It is conceded, and the record shows, that at the time of _. 
the accident Aronovitch did not come within the terms of 
thP. Virginia W orlrmen 's Co1npensation Law, as he 'vas then 
employing regularly only six men in the business and the 
pleadings in the case of Ayres v. Aronovitch clearly show that 
the judgment against or liability -of Aronovitch was not based 
upon the Workmen's Compensation Act. It was argued by 
-····· . .:_, 
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the defendant's counsel that the phrase "vVorkmen's Law" 
used in the policy n1eant the connnon law covering the rela-
tion of master and servant. The contention for such a con-
struction of this phrase selected and put in the policy by the 
Company we submit is absurd. If this phrase had been in-
tended by the Con1pany to exclude all injuries to all mn- I 
ployees it cTuld easily have said so in plain andunmnbig_ug_p.s .I, 
language. IiiSit did not elect to do but instead inserted in itsf i 
pui'f&y a phrase which we sub1nit is unknown either in conunon / 
parlance or in legal tern1s and definitions. No such phrasfr' 
can be found in the standard works Corpus Juris or Ruling 
Case Law, and no such phrase is found in \Vebster's Un-
abridg·ed Dictionary nor in the New Century Dictionary. The 
nearest to the phrase in question that can be found in any 
standard work is W orkn1en 's Con1pensation Law, and it is 
submitted that an ordinary n1an would construe the phrase 
''Workmen's Law'' as 111eaning the· workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. 
To permit an insurance company to sell to the general 
public its policies of insurance purporting to furnish ample 
protection and then when called upon to perform, to be al-
lowed to escape liability because it had inserted in its policy 
a mongrel phrase of uncertain and n1isleading 1neaning, would 
be to sanction wholesale fraud upon the public. 
As the Court said in Bitzm· v. 8o·uthern Surety Co., 245 
TIL .A.pp., 295 : 
''It would not be difficult for the insurer to use language 
which in respect to the question here under consicleratioi1 
would be free from doubt.. A policy of insurance should not 
be so framed as to be susceptible of one construction in the 
hands of the soliciting· agent and quite a different one in the 
hands of the adjuster." 
-.. \(. Coming now to the first ground of defense, that being the /j ground upon which the Court specifically based its action in 
I '/ striking out the eviden. ce and directing· a verdict for the de-l!/ f'endant, we submit, in the. fi. rst place., .that the clause in the (; policy in question is plain and unan1biguous. ·The general 
1 .[, purpose and. obJectOf-tlie ·y>oHey-is to protect Aronovitch 
1 
1'\ against liability and to impose a liability upon the insurance 
\\ company. By the clause in question the insurance company 
1 underta1res to make an exception and escape liability. The 
I pertinent parts of the paragraph of exceptions from liability, including the clause invoked in this case, are as follows: 
I 
''Providing the company shall not be liable under any 
f 
I-
, 
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policy issued for loss resulting or arising· from any of the 
following· causes or while said motor vehicle is being used 
or 1naintained under any of the following conditions: (a) 
while operated or maintained in any race or speed test, (b) 
while driven by any person prohibited by law from driving 
any auton1obile, (c) while being used for towing· or propelling 
any trailer or any vehicle used as a trailer, (d) while being 
rented or being used to carry passengers for consideration, 
express or implied, 1wr sll:.Q]f. a!1JL-J2EJiQy_ __ t;_Qp~r i?zi'IJ,ry jQ,_an'!l. 
e1n 'Jl01 ee or em.· loyees ofJJii.:lJZS~tre([' while enga,ge.d. ~'11, .. pp-
. e'ra ~nfL2_!_.f!!!:!!,1!g . ~ .}fd::Pl. ~h(3-:_~~~il,?J!les covered b.y t~is. 
,.-pol~cy nor any 01511ga1tons assumed or 1m posed upon the .. In-
-stt'Ped-by any workmen's agreement, plan or law. * * * (R., 
pp. 61, 62.) 
The clause involved in this case is indicated above by 
italics. 
From the quotations of the evidence hereinabove given it 
would seen1 to be too clenr for argun1ent that petitioner was 
not injured "while engag·ed in operating or caring for" the 
truck in question. The words quoted are not technical or 
_l~gal words and phrases but are con1mo~every-day 'yords, 
simple and easy to understand. If they wer.; not, reference 
n1ight be had to smne standard dictionary. ·Webster's Un-
abridged Dictionary gives the following definition of 
"vYhile": n. 1. "A space of time especially 'vhen short and 
marked by son1e action or happening"; 2. Tiine used in do-
ing· something; labor; conj. 1. (See while, n.) During the 
time that; as long as; whilst; as, vVhile I 'vl'ite, you sleep." 
Thus this word clearly hnports a limited time and especially 
'vhen ''marked by son1e action or happening.'' . 
The next word is ''Engaged'', wl1ich also is a word implying 
action or occupation. 
Webster's Dictionary also defines the transitive verb "Op-
erate" as follows: '' 1. To produce an effect; To cause an 
effect; To bring about; To work. 2. To put into or to con-
tinue in operation or activity; To n1anage; To conduct; To 
carry out or through; To 'vork; as to otJerate a machine.'' 
And the san1e authority defines "Care", when used in con-
junction 'vith "for", as follows: ''To watch, foster or guard; 
To be charged with care; To be heedful." 
Thus in order for petitioner's injuries to come within the 
terms of the quoted exception of the policy it would be neces-
sary for it to appear that the injuries were inflicted at a 
definite and limited time, defined and limited by action on the 
part of petitioner, and that action must have been in operat-
ing the truck or in caring for it. Now the evidence clearly 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
showed that petitioner on the mo1~ning of the accident per-
formed no ~ act _i11_a~y way pertaining ~to the operatjp~ 
·~nor J~_its mire. vVliile it is-true that petitioner 
rn~ght" have been, calletllrpon either to operate the truck, or 
in case of an accident to perform some labor in repairing 
. the truck at son1e time during· the trip in question, he was not 
i )in fact called up<?n to do so and it_ 'Y!!J§_..!!:.t2L q'!!e1~ his ~~-l~'!l_.otr, 
.. 1'.~!!_.at day at an'!L"l.Jn~.~ t9 p'}_rf9J;1?J__ (J/ny act or du!y 1/Ji-_connectzon ,: ,w1,'th the truck. He was at hberty to sleep, read a novel, or / Cro whatever he pleased, during· the entire trip up to the mo-~ · ment of the accident, and he did not in fact do any act or per-form any duty in connection with the truck. 
It is submitted that if there is any ambiguity in the lan-
guage of the policy or any uncertainty as to the application to 
the facts in this case, then under well recognized principles 
such ambiguity or such uncertainty must be resolved in favor 
of petitioner so as to accomplish the essential purposes of the 
policy which were to protect Aronovitch and impose liability 
upon the Insurance Company. 
Ewan v. lnsura1~ce Co., 156 Va. 825; 
Home Ben. A.ss'n. v. Cla.rk, 152 Va. 715; 
State Farm 1J1utual, &c. ·Co., v. J~tstis, 168 Va. 158; 
12 Am. Jur., page 795, §252;; 
14.R. C. L., page 926, §103; 
32 C. J., page 1152, §265. 
We have been able to find no,vhere any authorities for the 
proposition that the clause in question, or any similar clause, 
should be so construed as to relieve the Company ·of liability 
under facts similar to those disclosed by the record in this 
case. The trial Judge, as shown by his opinion, held that the 
truck in question was being· operated by petitioner within the 
legal definition of the word "operate" ~s used in the policy. 
If we assume that the word "operate'' has a legal mean_ing 
different from the dictionary meaning, then we may refer to 
the Virginia statute as showing when a person is the operator 
of an automobile. The word ''to operate" and the word 
"operator" are both used throughout the 1\iotor Vehicle Law. 
Code, Section 2154, and subsection 170, actually defines the 
word "operator" of an automobile as follows: 
"Every person, other than a chauffeur, in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle on a highway,'' 
and the same section defines a "chauffeur" as a person op-
erating a for-hire or public carrier motor vehicle. 
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In this connection attention is called to the fact that the 
policy in question, though issued by a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, does not purport to he a contract mane in Pennsylvania, 
nor does it contain any stipulation, such as is sometimes found 
in insurance policies, that it is to be construed according· to 
tllf~ law of any particular state. It was issued in Virg·inia to 
a resident. of Virginia, and the liability involved in this case, 
arose in Virginia and the policy ~as to be performed in Vir-
ginia. Consequently, we submit that it is only fair, in con-
sidering whether or not petitioner was operating the truck in 
question at the time of the accident, to adopt the definition 
contained in the Virginia statute governing the operation of 
motor vehicles on the Virginia highways·. 
But independently of the general definition of the words 
given by the dictionary and the .Virginia statute, we find that 
the courts liave occasionally been called upon to determine 
the rneaning of the word ''operate'' as used in the insur-
- ance policies. 
Thus in Charles J. Witherstine v. Employers' Liability As-
swra·nce Corporation, 235 N. Y. 168, 139 N. E. 229, 28 A. L. R. 
1298, the New York Court of Appeals was called upon to de-
-termine the meaning of the word "operate", as used in an in-
surance policy, in a suit to require the insurance company 
to pay a judgment recovered against the insolvent policy-
holder under the New York statute, and the decisive ques-
tion ·was whether or not the policy-holder (judgment debtor) 1 
was operating the car at the time the injuries were inflicted 
upon the plaintiff. The policy contained the following clause: 
"It is further agreed that this policy shall apply only while 
---- the said automobiles are being driven by Charles Dunn." 
Charles Dunn was the judgment debtor and policy-holder. 
On the day of the accident a man named Ridell was driving 
the car and Dunn was sitting by hiln directing him when, 
where and how fast to drive the car, and it was contended 
that as Dunn, policy-holder and owner of the car, was sitting 
in the car by the driver, having complete control of the move-
ments of the car by reason of his control of Ridell, the "driver, . 
he was, in effect, operating the car at the time of the acci..: 
dent. The Court said : 
''The word 'operate', standing alone doubtless has more 
than one meaning. A surgeon 'operates' when he amputates 
a patient's leg; a railroad company 'operates' its railroad. 
Escher v. Buffalo <t L. E. Traction Co., 220 N. Y. 243, 115 
N. E. 445. The W orlrmen 's Compensation Law (Con sol. 
--r~ 
I \~ ~ 18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia .~ 
) ~ Laws, chap. 67) provides compensation for injuries sustained J'$· 
l . \ by an en1ployee of those who are engaged in the business ~ 
/: ~~of operating vehicles on the street. Costello v. Taylor, 217 
-;. •'t N.Y. 179, 111 N. E. 755, 11 N.C. C. A. 320. Under the Labor ~ 
:' 1- Laws (Consol. Laws, chap. 21) the words 'to operate a n1a- 1 
_,· \r~h.ine' n1ean 'to res·ul~te and control its mo:ren1ent or oper- i 
· ··f , 'at1on'. Ingrahmn, .J., Ill GallenkantlJ v. Garv~n Mach. Co., 91 'd \.~' App. Div. 141, 86 N.Y. Supp. 378, reversed on his dissenting t 
· ' opinion in 179 N.Y. 588, 72 N. E. 1142. .."'-
J ~ ~ ''In connection with the use of n1otor vehicles, the word ~ { 
. t ~~ 'operate' semns to have acquired a definite 1neaning. The ~~ 
l ::t~ Highway Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 25) §281, proVides: 'The ~ ~~"' tern1 "chau~eur" shall mean an)hperso.n ope1'ating or driving J 
, "\ C a motor vehicle, as an en1ployee.;Jror lure. The term '' oper- '-.l 
.:~ !~ ator" shall mean an~ person, olher than a chauffe~r, .. who ~ 
,~ \~ \ - operates a motor vehicle.' (Laws 1921, chap. 580.) :j(: '~~' * ·' ~~ ~ ''.Section 286 provid~s that the person operating U: motor ~~ 
~; .. 1• vehicle shall comply w1th the rules of the road. Section 287 '' . • •t provides that a person operating a 1notor vehicle shall drive ~ ~ in a careful and prudent manner; and finally ~290, subd. 3, j t,~J provides: 'vVhoever operates a Inotor vehicle while in an in- J'i 
-~ ' toxicated condition shall be guilty of a n1isdemeanor.' ~). 
:-<:i -~~ "The word 'operate' is used throughout the statute as \'\ ':~'\\-signifying a personal act in working the n1echanism of a car. t 
t1~ '(! The driver operates the car for the owner, but the owner 
~ ... 1 does not operate the car unless he drives it hin1self. If the l ':- · 
,! , J\1 meaning was extended to include an owner acting either by ''\1 ,f.~ ~ hin1self or by agents or employees, the provisions of the High- ~ ...... 
~~ ' · way Law would be repl~te with repetitious jargon. ~ \. ~I~ 1 ''Obviously the word is used in the policy in the same sense tf'; 
... ~~ in which it is used in the Highway La,v. Otherwise it is in- l~ ~1 explicable why the policy should refer to owner operating for \ : ~ ~ 
private purposes only, or to operation by a. person connected . \.1\ ~· ~ ~ with a repair shop or garage, etc. The entire enclorsen1ent on , ~l~ ~!\t the policy should, if possible, be given a n1eaning, and a con- \ ~~ ~ sistent meaning. vVords n1ay in themselves be ambiguous, yet'\,.. d l. 
~ have a clear n1eaning ·when read in the light the context af- ~~ ~ 
· fords=*"* * It follows that the owner was not operating the _'1 
· car at the time of the accident. * • * . '' ~}I What the Court said in the Witherstine case about the statu-
. tory definition of the 'vord ''operate'' is peculiarly applicable 
to the case at bar. Our Motor Vehicle Act likewise contains 
innumerable provisions with reference to the operation of 
motor vehicles and many of these provisions would oe ren-
/ dered utterly senseless if the words "operate'' or "operator" 
I 
should~:r:::~~~:; :~ :::::::l~:~:~~::8~h~0;e::c~n und~: \ ~
the wheel and in physical control and managc1nent of the motor 1, 
vehicle. See particularly sub-sections 176, 179, 182, 187, 205 ·~ 
and 206, in addition to sub-section 170, giving definition of . 
the word "operate". · 
In Willia'ntS v. Nelson. (.J\iass.), 117 N. E. 189, the plain-
tiff having recovered a judgn1cnt for personal injuries in- ~ 
flicted by an automobile covered by a public liability insurance 
policy, brought a statutory proceeding to compel the insur- I 
ance company to pay the judgn1eut. The insurance company 
disclaimed liability by reason of the following provision of 
its policy: 
''(b). This policy does not cover loss from liability for, . )' 
or a:Q.y suit based on, injuries or death caused by any auto-
Jnobile (1) while driven or manipulated by any person under 
the age fixed by la'v or under the age of 16 years in any 
event.'' 
The facts were that, although imrnediately prior to the acci-
dent the autmnobile was being operated by the insured's son,. 
who was under 16 years of age, the father (the insured) "sud-
denly leaned over to the left and took the wheel from his son, 
telling him to get out of the way". Apparently the father at 
this mmnent apprehended im1ninent danger, and developments 
fron1 this point on are described by the Court as follows: 
''The son shrunk hack in the seat, and the father thereafter 
guided the course of the automobile and entirely controlled 
its operation so far as possible so to do in the position in 
which he was, a.nd the son thereafter did nothing except blow 
the horn. The auto1nobile crossed both street railway tracks, 
passed in front of the street car, and then, turning to the 
right, proceded between the street car and the sidewalk and 
hit Rose Williams, who was on the street for the purpose of 
taking the street car. The operation of the car was entirely 
controlled by the father 'vhile crossing both street railway 
tracks, and while passing in front of the street car and turn-
ing to the right on ~Iassachusetts A. venue, and while pro-
ceeding on 1\'Iassachusetts Avenue for a distance of at least 
the lengih of the street car, but Nelson (i. e., the father) was 
not in a position in the automobile at the time of the acci-
dent so that he could properly drive or manipulate the auto-
mobile, and he was not in a position in which he could readily 
prevent the accident by applying the levers or pedals pro-
vided for stopping the automobile.'' 
20 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia· 
Under these facts the Supreme J udicia.l Court of Massa-
chusetts held that the insura.nee company was liable under its 
policy as a 1natter of law. That is to say, the Supreme Court 
held that the automobile was being operated at the time of 
the accident by the father and not by the son. The Court 
said: 
''This finding· of fact is amply supported by eviclence, and 
need not be reviewed. It must be accepted as true. As a nlat-
ter of law it supports recovery under the policy. The doini-
nating 1nind in control of the operation of the auton1obilc 
and regulating its nwvement at the n1mnent of tho ilnpact with 
the plaintiff was that of the father and not of the son. Al-
though the distance traveled after the father took 1nanual 
guidance of the automobile was comparatively short, pecllaps 
not more than 50 or 75 feet, and the conditions of his driving 
unfavorable to complete and skillful direction of its course, 
yet his initial choice was to drive on rather than to stop or 
· pursue some other line of action. That the son blew· the 
horn and had brought the machine into an improper position 
does not derogate from the paramount control of the father 
'over it, nor prevent him from being·, at the time of the injury 
to the plaintiff, the one by whom it was 'driven or tnanipu-
lated' within the n1eaning of those words in the policy. 
"The :finding that the father's position was such that he 
could not readily prevent the accident by stopping the car 
is not decisive. That is not equivalent to a finding that it was 
impossible in reason for him to have stopped the car after he 
assumed control of its movements and before the plaintiff 
was injured. Moreover, the fundamental fact is that he 'vas 
driving and that he elected to drive under the conditions which 
confronted him.'' 
In the case of 0 'Connell v. N. J. Fidelity, &c., Co., 193 N. Y. 
Supp. 911, the plaintiff sued Froud, the insured, for negli-
gently killing her intestate, with his auton1obile, whic.h was 
covered by a public liability insurance policy. Froud having 
become bankrupt, this action Wf!S instituted against the in-
surance company, which disclaimed liability under the follow-
ing provision of its policy: 
"Not Covered.-3. This policy does not cover loss on ac-
count of injury or death suffered by any person or persons 
caused by any automobile (a) while driven by or in charge of 
any person in -violation of la'v as to age, or in any event under 
the age of 1? years.'' 
:· 
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The Supreme Court of New York states the facts as fol-
lows: 
''On the day aforesaid (July 29, 1920) the said Froud took 
his granddaughter, 14 years old, into his car, the car men-
tioned in the insurance policy, and was teaching her how to 
drive it. She sat in the driver's seat (left-hand drive), and 
under the directions of her grandfather 'vas driving the auto, 
her grandfather in the seat beside her, toward ~Ialven Bridge 
in the town of Chathmn, Cohunbia. County, Ne'v York. This 
bridge was. 167 feet long, and crossed the IGnderhook Creek 
in a northerly and southerly direction. ··The car approached 
this bridge fron1 the east toward the west, the granddaughter 
driving, and was on the right-hand side of the bridge, and the 
car was on its proper side of the road. Two-thirds of the dh;-
tance over, men were repairing the right-hand side of the 
bridge, and had n1ade an opening 10 or 12 feet. As the car 
approached the girl tu111ed her car to the left to avoid the 
opening on her right. As she did so, and when the car was 
20 feet from the opening, Froud, her grandfather, grabbed 
the wheel, turned it to the right, applied the emergency brake, 
and, although the car 'vas going very slow, did not stop, but 
collided with plaintiff's intestate, knocked him through the 
opening to the bed of the stream below, and he received in-
juries fron1 which he died. 'Vhen the grandfather grasped 
the wheel the girl let go, and for the 20 feet aforesaid did 
not exercise any further control, or lack of control, over 
the operation of the car.'' 
The Court held that the burden of proof was upon the de- · 
fendant insurance company to prove the defense set up by 
it, and concluded its opinion as follows: 
"While there 'vas some confusion in getting in the evidence, 
from the _whole case a cause of action 'vas n1acle out. It ap-
peared beyond cavil that 20 feet before any accident happened 
the owner of the car was operating it, and that the girl did · 
not exercise any control over it for that distance. That he 
operated negligently has been found; that by -reason thereof ' 
the accident oc~urred. ~.-likelihood of' such an accident is 
comprehended 1n the pohcy. If S'Iiontd-pa:y..,.,---= -
--------..,..____--- - -
This decision and opinion of the Supreme Court of New 
York was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals of New 
York, in 139 N. E. 744, where the Appellate Court, after quot-
ing· the policy prGvision, ·summarized the controlling facts as· 
follows: 
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''The assured's autornohile 'vas being driven by his grand-
daughter, a 14-ycar old girl. In crossing a bridge where re-
pair work was going on, she atten1pted to turn out around 
the repair work, and in so doing· headed the automobile for the 
bridge railing. The assured, who was sitting next to her, act-
ing in this sudden mnergency, seized the wheel and turned 
the car sharply to avert plunging over the side of the bridge, 
and in so doing swung the car against the deceased, who was 
working on the bridge, throwing hhn therefrom.'' 
In both of these cases the Court was construing and apply-
ing the provision in an insurauee policy wherein the liability 
of the company depended upon who was operating the car 
at the time it inflicted the injuries. In both cases the Court 
held, without hesitation, that the car was being operated by 
the person who had hold of the wheel and was guiding the 
car at the time of the injury, although another person was 
sitting under the wheel and had been operating the car only 
a few seconds prior to the injury. · 
This holding by these courts not only gives the legal in-
terpretation to the clause inserted by the insurance con1pany 
in its policy, but it also gives a connnon sense interpretation 
such as any ordinary layn1an reading the policy would give . 
. ·. In Juskiewicz v. N. J., &c., ln8ttranoe Co., 206 N. Y. Supp. 
,·: 566, 210 _App. Div. 6'75, the Court held that in construing 
· ·' such an insurance policy it must be construed as the ordi-
nary man· 'vould understand it. 
In GallenkG.1np v. Garvin JJ1ach. Co., 86 N. Y. Supp. 378, the 
Court was called upon to define or construe the word "oper-
ate'' as used in a statute prohibiting the en1ployment of a 
1ninor to "operate or assist in operating dangerous machines 
of any kind''. The n1inor was put to work tending a con-
veyor belt on the fourth floor of an eight-story factory. 
The conveyor belt was in continuous motion from top to bot-
tom of the building in a shaft, having openings on each floor. 
The Supreme Court held that the conveyor belt was dangerous-
machinery and that the 1ninor was assisting in the operation 
thereof within the n1eaning of the statute. · The case was re-
versed by the Court of .Appeals, which adopted the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Ingraham of the Supreme Court, where-
in he said: 
'''Operate' is defined by Standard Dictionarv as 'to put 
in action and supervise the 'vorking of, as to operate a. ma-
chine'; and in the Imperial Dictionary, 'to put into or con-
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tinuc in operation; to work, as to operate a machine'. Thus (\ \ 
by a strict definition of the meaning of the phrase, 'operating ,.; ) 
· a n1achine' would be to work a machine, or, in other words, \ j 
to regulate and control its n1a11agement and operation." J 
The Suprenw Court of the United States recently had oc-
casion to consider the meaning of the term "being operated'~ 
when used in an insurance policy covering an autmnobile. See 
State Farrn lJtlut·ual, &c., Co. Y. Coughran (decided l\farch 28,. 
1938), 58 S. Ct. 670, in which the insurance policy excluded 
liability for personal injuries "caused while the said auto-
mobile is being driven or ope1~ate dby any person whatso-
ever either under the influence of liquor or drugs or .violating 
any la:w or ordinance as to age or driving license". At the 
time of the accident the auton1obile in question was in charge 
of the assured's wife, who had put under the wheel a minor 
who had no driver's pernlit and was prohibited by law from 
operating an autmnobile. :1\;foreover, she had been expressly 
forbidden to operate the car by the assured. Just before the 
accident the assu1:ed 's wife seized the steering wheel and by 
neglig·ent 1nanipulation thereof caused the collision. However, 
at the time of the accident all of the instnunentalities for 
operating the autmnobile except the steering wheel were being 
physically actuated by the said n1inor. Under these circum-
stances, the Snpren1e Court of the United States, reversing 
the judgment of the lower courts, held that the automobile 
was not being operated by the assured's wife, but was being 
operated within the n1eaning of the insurance policy by the 
minor, who was prohibited by law from operating a motor 
vehicle within the state. · 
Thus we see that when the trial court so construed the in-
surance policy in this case as to rr1ake it exempt the Insur-
ance Company fron1 liability on the ground that the auto-
mobile in question was being operated by Ayres when in 
fact, according to the undisputed evidence, Ayres at no time 
during the day of the accident had his hand on any of the 
Instrumentalities controlling tl1e propulsion, direction or stop-
ping of the automobile, the Court not only departed from the 
ordinary common sense n1eaning of the clause used in the in-
surance policy, but decided, contrary to all the decisions of the 
highest courts of" tl1e States and of the United States wherein ( 
that question or the definition of the phrase in question had { 
been considered; and, contrary to the universal rule of all \ 
courts anywhere, put a strained and unusual construction on 1 
the language of the policy in favor of the Insurance Company i 
and to the prejudice of the insured. J 
i 
l 
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Even if by some strained construction of the language of 
the policy Ayres might have been considered as operating the 
c.ar at the time of the accident, because he might have been 
called upon to do so; nevertheless, there is another principle 
of la-w equally well established which would prevent the In-
surance Company fro1n eRcaping liability in this case. lt is 
well settled in this State, and in all ot1;ter jurisdictions so far 
as we have been able to find, that where an insurance conl-
pany undertakes to escape liability upon the ground that it 
· arose from an excluded risk, th<} burden rests upon the insur-
ance company to show that there was a causative relation be-
tween the accident and liability of the insured and the ex-
cluded risk. In other words, the insurance company must 
show, in order to escape liabilty on its part, that the cause 
of the liability was a risk which the policy clearly and ex-
pressly excluded. 
Thus in llfarylG~nll Casualty Co. v. Hoge, 1.53 Va. 204, this 
Court held that where an insurance company sought to escape 
liability upon the ground that at the thne of the accident 
the insured car in question was being operated by. a person 
driving without a permit as required by law, that it was proper 
for the trial court to exclude evidence offered by the insu1:ance 
company to show that the driver was operating without a 
permit and contrary to law, on the specific ground tha.t the 
operator of the auto1nobile was shown to have been a com-
petent driver~ and that the lack of pennit in no way cau,sed or 
contributed to the accident. This Court quoted with approval 
the following statement of law in Ro~ve v. United Com,.meroia.l 
Travelers of .Anterica, 186 Ia. 454, 172 N. W. 454, 4 A. L. R. 
1235-6: 
I j 
. ; : 
''Under a provision of an accident insurance policy that it 
shall not extend to or cover any death, disability or loss re-
sulting from the ·violation of any law, the mere fact that at 
the time of injury the insured was driving an automobile a.t 
a speed 'vhich the statutes declares to be presutpptively neg-
ligent, for which it provides punishment, does not prevent 
recovery. It must, in addition, he established that the in-
jury was caused by or resulted fro~ such violation of la:w. '' 
Hossley v. Union Indemnity Co. (:Niiss.), 102 Southern 561, 
also ~olds that unless the insurance company bore the burden 
of proof that there was a causal conneqtion between the ex-
cluded risk and the injury, it could not escape liability. 
And in the recent case of Ba.iley v. U. 8. F. <t ·G~ Co. (de-
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. ~------....zs 
~-.._--- '· 
cided November 11, 1937), 193 S. E. 638, the Supreme Court --------~ 
of South Carolina held that in order to defeat recovery under 
policies excluding or liiniting liability where death or injury 
results from an unlawful net on the part of the insured, there 
must be shown, in addition to a violation of the law, some 
. causative connection between such act and the death or in-
jury. There was no dispute as to the fact the insurance policy 
excluded liability of the company incurred "while any dis-
closed automobile was being driven by any person under ·the 
age fixed by law or under fourteen years in any event''. The 
accident occurred while tho disclosed or insured automobile 
was being driven by a boy under fourteen years of age, but 
the evidence disclosed that the age of the driver had nothing 
to do with bringing about the accident which would have 
happened if the most careful and efficient adult driver had 
been operating the machine. The Supreme Court of South 
Carolina cites the Hossley case as authority and succinctly/ 
states the reason for the rule as follows: 
"The rule established by the Reynolds case (Reynol~s v. 
Life <t Casualty Ins. Co., 166 S. C. 214, 164 S. E. 602), is . 
obviously founded upon the reasonable view that, when the 
parties made the contract of insurance, they ·were not insert-
ing a mere arbitrary provision, but that it was the purpose 
of the insurance con1pany to relieve itself of liability from 
accidents caused by the excluded condition. And there is 
no more reason. that the parties to the contract of insurance 
would arbitrarily exclude liability under a certain condition 
than that they would arbitrarily exclude liability under the 
commission of a certain act. This case is controlled by the 
Reynolds case.'' 
. In the Reynolds case above cited the holding of the Court 
is stated in the syllabi of the case as follows: · 
"(1) Insured violating ordinance when accident resulting 
in death occurred would not alone defeat recovery under poli-
cies excluding liability for losses sustained 'vhile violating 
law. 
"(2) To defeat recovery under policies excluding .or limit-
ing liability for death or injury from unlawful act, direct 
causative connection behven such act and death or injury 
must be shown.'' 
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In the course of its opinion the South Carolina Supreme 
Court quotes with approvai the following statmnent of the law 
in Insu1·ance Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 267, 16 S. W. 723, 25 
Am. St. Rep. 685: 
"In order to defeat a recovery because of such provision, 
there must appear a connecting link between the unlawful 
act' and the death. It is not sufficient that there 'vas an un-
lawful act co1nmitted by the insured, and that death occurred 
during the tin1e he was engaged in its conunission. There 
must be some causative connection between the act which con-
stituted a violation of the law and the death of the insured. 
The provision of the policy excluding· liability for injury re-
ceived by the insured while comtnitting an unlawful act re-
fers to such injuries as may happen as a necessary or natural 
Ponsequence of the act.'' 
And also from the case of Braclley v. btsurance Co., 45 New 
York 422, 6 Am. Rep. 115, as follows: · 
"Whatever be the nature of .the violation of la'v alleged by 
the insurance company, as avoiding the policy, it seems to 
be clear that a relation 'must exist between the violation of law 
and the death, to make good the defense; that the death rrtust 
have been caused by the violation of law to exen1pt the com-
pany from liability.'' 
So in the case at bar the burden was upon the Company 
not only to sho,v that Ayres was at the time of the accident 
operating or caring for the truck, but must go further and 
show that such operation or care for the truck by Ayres was 
the cause of his injury. Even if by some strained and dis-
torted construction of the exclusion clause it could be said 
that because, forsooth, at some other time and upon some 
other occasion, it had been the duty of Ayres to operate the 
truck, or to tighten the lugs or check the tires, he was, there-
fore, by construction, doing those acts at the time of his in-
jury ,vi thin the meaning of the policy; nevertheless, there is 
a total lack of any evidence that such constnwtive operation 
of or care for the truck by Ayres caused or had any relation 
whatsoever to the accident. On the contrary, the evidence 
showed affirmatively that no act or duty of Ayres whatsoever 
had the slightest relation to the accident and injury to him. 
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THE INSURANCE CO NIP ANY IS CONCLUDED AS TO 
ITS DEFENSES IN TIIIS CASE BY THE FINAL 
JUDG~fENT IN THE CASE OF AYRES v. ARONO-
VITCH. 
The pleadings in the suit in which judgment was rendered 
against Aronovitch, as well as the instructions given in that 
case, are made a part of the record iu this case (R., pp. 96-
129, 179-190). The opinion of this Court deciding that case 
upon appeal was offered in evidence, but not admitted, the 
trial Court saying that it would take judicial notice thereof 
and, of course, was necessarily considered by the Court in 
sustaining the motion to strike out all the evidence and in 
refusing petitioner's motion to enter up final judgment in his 
behalf (R.,·pp. 145-7). 
It further appears that when Aronovitch was sued the In-
surance Con1pany was given notice, and not only g·iven every 
opportunity to defend the suit, but was expressly requested 
to do so (R., p. 72). 
Under these circumstances it is well settled that the In-
surance Company is bound by the decision of the issues in 
that case so far as they relate to the issues raised in this 
case. See I-Iuddy's Enclopedia. of Automobile La,v, 9th Ed., 
Vols. 13, 14, page 431, §324, where the rule is stated as fol-
lows: 
"\Vhere the insurer has timely notice of the action against 
the insured and elects not to defend, the judgment recovered 
is conclusive as to the insurer's Iiabilitjr on the policy, unless 
sueh judgn1ent ·was obtained by fraud or collusion. But such 
judg1nent is conclusive only as to the issues of law and fact 
thereby established. The estoppel created by the first judg-
ment cannot be extended beyond the issues necessarily deter-
mined hy it.'' 
There is no pretense or suggestion that there 'vas any 
fraud or collision in the obtaining of the judgment by Ayres 
against Aronovitch. Indeed, the case was bitterly fought by 
Aronovitch throughout. 
One of the very issues raised by the pleadings in that case, 
upon which instructions were asked and given, was whether 
or not Ayres was himself in any 'va)1 responsible for the acci-
dent and injuries to him. It was contended by Aronovitch 
that Ayres was guilty of contributory negligence, in that it was 
his duty to see to the safety of the brakes on the truck and 
to assist in the driving, as to 'vhich it "'as contended Ayres 
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was a fellow-servant with Scruggs, the driver. It was con-
tended that it was the duty of Ayres to watch or supervise 
the driving of the truck by Scruggs and to warn him of any 
dangers. All these issues, however, were decided adversely 
to the contention of .Aronovitch and liability 'vas imposed 
upon him upon the very issue that such a state of facts did 
not exist. This _Court said, in deciding the main case upon 
appeal: 
"Each in shifts drove the truck, and each helped to load 
and unload it. But, as we have seen, its care was in terrns 
put upon~ Scruggs alone; to him Ayt'es was directed to report 
and did report. Upon hin1 was placed the burden of seeing 
that it was kept in condition. He was, quoad this duty, vice 
principal." (Italics supplied.) 
The Court further held that the jury was warranted in be-
lieving and in finding as a fact that the cause of the accident 
was the defective brakes; that the duty of seeing that the 
brakes wer~ in proper condition was placed upon Scruggs 
alone as vice principal of Aronovitch, and that no duty rested 
upon Ayres to care for or see that the brakes were in proper 
condition. Hence the Insurance Company had ample notice 
of the issues raised and to be determined in. that ct;tse, with 
ample opportunity to make any defense it saw fit, and since 
the question whether or not Ayres 'vas charged with the care 
of the truck was a vital issue in :fixing liability upon Arono-
vitch, the final judgment of this Court in that case is binding 
upon the Insurance Company in this case. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully but confidently submitted that the trial 
Court erred grievously, to the prejudice of petitioner, in strik-
ing out the evidence and. directing a verdict for the defendant 
Insurance Company, and in refusing to sustain petitioner's 
motion to enter up a judgment for the Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) to which this case was limited by stipulation of 
counsel. 
The trial Court, it is subn1itted, refused to give to the exclu-
sion clause that meaning which its woTds clearly import in 
cominon parlance. The trial Court, contrary to universally 
accepted rules of construction, refused to give to words hav-
ing more than one meaning in the. exclusion clause that mean-
ing most favorable to the insured. On the contrary, the Court 
put a strained, unusual and unheard of. construction upon the 
.Marion Ayres v. Harleysvil~e lv'Iut. Cas. Co., etc. 29 
. . 
exclusion clause in order to relieve the Insurance Company of 
liability and in order to defeat the prime and fundamental pur-
pose of the policy, which was the protection of the insured. 
The trial Court erroneously refused to hold that the issues 
decided in the case of Ayres v. Aronovitch were binding upon 
the trial Court in this case, and, in effect, reversed the finding 
of the jury and the holding of this Court in the case of Ayres 
v. Aronovitch. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the trial 
Court should be reversed and that final judgment should be 
entered by this honorable Court in favor of petitioner against 
the Harleysville ~[utual Casualty Company for Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00) and his costs. 
The petitioner states that he desires to present oral argu-
ment by his attorneys in support of his petition for a writ 
of error, and that he has mailed a copy of this petition to Sin-
nott & 1\{ay, attorneys for the Harleysville Mutual Casualty 
Company, Richmond Trust Building, Richmond, Virginia, on 
August 18th, 1938; and, further, if the said writ be granted 
petitioner desires to treat this petition as his opening brief. 
Respectfully subll!itted, 
JOHN D. EASLEY, 
J. T. COLE1IAN, JR., 
Attorneys for Marion Ayres, Petitioner. 
We, the undersigned attorneys practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that we have 
read the foregoing· petition, and, in our opinion, the judg-
ment therein complained of should be reviewed by the said 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
JOHN D. EASLEY, 
J. T. COLElVIAN, JR. 
Received August 19, 1938. 
M. B .. WATT~, Clerk. 
Sept. 6, 1938. Writ of error awarded by the Court. Bond, 
$500. 
M.B. W. 
I 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
PLEAS before the Honorable Edward ~leeks,. Judge of 
the Circuit Court of the County of An1herst, at the Court 
!louse of the said County, on the 17th day of ~:lay, 1938. 
BE IT REMElVIBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: on the 
28th day of January, 1938, came ~{arion Ayers, and sued out 
of the Clerk's Office for said Court a garnishee summons 
against D. Aronovitch, doing business as l{ing's Distributors, 
and Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co1npany, Harleysville, 
Pennsylvania, garnishee, requiring the said Harleysville 
~Iutual Casualty Co1npany, Harleysville, Pennsylvania, to ap-
pear before the judge of the Circuit Court for the County of 
Amherst, Virginia, mi tho 14th day of February, 1938 (that 
being the first day of the February term, 1938, of said Court), 
to answer the suggestion, and sa.y on oath whether it really 
be the debtor of the said D. Aronovitch, doing business as 
King's Distributors, and if so, in what an1ounts, which gar-
nishee sum1nons went . into the hands of the Sergeant of the 
City of Lynchburg·, and into the hands of the Sheriff of the 
City of Richmond, and was returned duly executed; which gar-
nishee suiDinons is in the follo,ving words and figures, to-wit: 
COlVIl\iONvVEALTH OF VIR-GINIA: 
To the Sergeant of the City of Lynchburg, Greeting·: 
"THEREAS, it has been suggested to us on the part of 
~{arion Ayers, that by reason of the lien of his writ of fiwre 
facias against the goods and chattels of D. Aronovitch, doing 
business as King·'s Distributors, for the su1n of $20,607.00, 
with interest fron1 the 14th day of ~lay, 1936, and $126.75 
cost, subject to a credit of $8,599.10 as of January 
page 2 ~ 20th, 1938, which issued fron1 the office of the Clerk 
of the Circuit Court of the County of Amherst, Vir .. 
ginia, on the 25th day of January, 1938, and was returnable 
to First April Rules, 1938, and which went into the hands of 
the Sergeant of the City of Lynchburg· on the 25th day of 
January, 1938, there is a liability on Harleysville :Mutual 
Casualty Company, liarleysville, Pennsylvania, as the debtor 
of the said D. Aronovitch, doing business as King's Distribu-
tors: 
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Therefore, we command yo~, in the name of the Common-
wealth, that you summon the said Harleysville ~futual Cas-
ualty Company, Harleysville, Pennsylvania, to appear before 
the Judge of the Circuit Court of -the County of Amherst, 
Virginia, at the Court IIouse thereof, on the 14th day of Feb-
ruary, 1938 (that being the first day of the February, 1938, 
term of said Court), to answer the suggestion and say on oath 
whether it really be the debtor of the said D. Aronovitch, doing 
business as King's Distributors, and if so, in 'vhat amounts; 
and that you serve a copy thereof on the said D. A.ronovitch, 
doing_ business as ICing's Distributors. 
And have then there this writ and make return how you 
shall have executed the same. 
GIVEN under my hand, a.s Clerk of our said Court, at the 
Court House of said County, this 28th day of January, A. D. 
1938, and in the 162nd year of the Commonwealth. 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
JOHN D. EASLEY, p. q. 
page 3 ~ Executed in the City of Lynchburg, Va., on the 
. 28th day of January, 1938, by delivering a true copy 
of within summons to D. Aronovitch, doing business as King's 
Distributors, in person. 
J. C. STINSON, 
Deputy for F. S. Tyree, S.C. L. 
Filed in the Clerk's Office Amherst Circuit Court, January 
31st, 1938. 
W1YI. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
page 4 ~ CO~I~IONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: 
To the Sheriff of the City of Richmond, Greeting: 
vV!IEREAS, it has been suggested to us, on the part of 
lVIarion Ayers, that by reason of the lien of his writ of fiere 
facias against the goods and chattels of D. Aronovitch, doing 
business as King's Distributors, for the sum of $20,607.00, 
'vith interest from the 14th day of J\{ay, 1936, and $126.75 
cost, subject to a credit of $8,599.10 as of January 20th, 1938, 
which issued from the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of the County of Amherst, on the 25th day of Jan nary, 19-38, 
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and was returnable to First April Rules, 1938, and which went 
into the hands of the Sergeant of the City of Lynchburg on 
the 25th day of January, 1938, there is a liability on Harleys-
ville Mutual Casualty Company, Harleysville, P.ennsylva.nia, 
as the debtor of the said D. Aronovitch, ·doing business as 
King's Distributors : 
THEREFORE, we command yon, in the nan1e of the Com-
monwealth, that you summon the said Harleysville Mutual 
Casualty Company, Harleysville, Pennsylvania, to appear be-
fore the Judge of the Circuit Court of the County of Am-
herst, Virginia, at the Court House thereof, on the 14th day 
of February, 1938 (that being the first day of the ~.,ebruary, 
1938, Term of said Court), to answer the suggestion, and say 
on oath whether it reallv be the debtor of the said D. Arono-
vitch, doing business as iCing's Distributors, and if so, in what 
amounts; and that yon serve a copy thereof on the said D. 
Aronovitch, doing business as ICing's Distributors . 
.And have then there this writ and make return 
page 5 } how you shall have executed the same. 
· GIVEN under my hand as Clerk of our said Court, 
at the Court Honse of said County, this 28th day of January, 
A. D. 1938, and in the 162nd year of the Commonwealth. 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
JOHN D. EASLEY, p. q. 
Executed in the City of Richmond, Va., Jany. 29th, 1938, 
by delivering in duplicate (with a fee of $2.50) a copy of the 
within Garnishee Summons toT. D. Young, the acting Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the person in 
charge of said office, and as such Statutory Agent for the 
Harleysville l\tiutual Casualty Company, of Harlevsville. 
Pennsylvania. .. 
J. HERBERT MERCER, 
Sheriff of the City of Richmond, Va. 
Filed in Clerk's Office, Amherst Circuit Court, January 31, 
1938. 
W~L E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
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page 6 ~ COMJ.\!ION"\VEALTH OF VIRGINIA: 
To the Sergeant City of Lynchburg, Greeting: 
WE COl\1:MAND YOU, in the name of the Commonwealth, 
that of the goods and chattels of D. Aronovitch, doing business 
nuder the name of l{ing 's Distributors, in your bailiwick, you 
cause to be made the sum of Twenty Thousand Six Hundred 
Seven Dollars and No cents ($20,607), with interest thereon 
to be computed after the rate of six per centum per annum 
from the 14th day of May, 1936, until paid, subject to a credit 
of $8,599.10, as of January 20th, 1938, which 1\{arion Ayers 
recovered against him by judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virg·inia, rendered on the 11th day of November, 
1937, for damages in automobile accident; also One Hundred 
Twenty-Six Dollars and Seventy-Five cents, which to the said 
plaintiff were "adjudged for his costs by him about his suit in 
that behalf expended; whereof the said D. Aronovitch, doing 
business under the narne of l{ings Distributors, is convict 
as appears.to us of record. 
And that you have the same at Rules to be holaen in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the County of Amherst, 
at the Courthouse thereof, on the First Monday in April next, 
to render to the said plaintiff the debt and costs aforesaid. 
And have then there this writ, and make return how you shall 
have executed the same. 
WITlESS, Wm. E. Sandidge, Clerk of our said Court, at 
the Courthouse of said County, this the 25th day of January, 
A. D. 1938, and in the 162nd year of the Commonwealth. 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
JOHN D. EASLEY, p. q. 
Judg. Lien Docket No.5, page 98. 
page 7 r At a Circuit Court of the County of Amherst, COll· 
tinued and held at the Court House thereof, on Mon .. 
day, the 14th day of February, in the year of our Lord nine .. 
teen hundred and thirty-eight. 
Marion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Distributors and Har-
leysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
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ORDER. 
This day can1e the defendant garnishee, Harleysville Mutual 
Casualty Company, by its attorney, and filed its petition pray-
ing that this suit be removed from this Court to the District 
Court of the United States for the vVestcrn District of Vir-
ginia, sitting· at Lynchburg, and at the same tin1e filed there-
'vith a bond in the penalty of :b.,ive I-:Iundred ($500.00) Dollars, 
the same being signed by I-IarleysYille 1\iutual Casualty Com-
pany us principal, by its attorney at law, and the Fidelity & 
Deposit Company of l\Iaryland, as surety, by its attorney in 
fact, conditioned according to law for its entering in the Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the Western District of 
Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, within thirty days from the 
date of the filing of said petition, a certified copy of record 
in this suit, and for paying all costs that may be awarded 
by the said District Court of the United States for the Western 
District of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg·, if the said District 
Court shall. hold that said suit was wrongfully or 
page 8 ~ improperly ren1oved theroto. And at the same time 
the said defendant, by its attorneys, filed therewith 
a written notice of said petition and bond to the plaintiff with 
due service thereof prior to the filing of said petition and 
bond; and the plaintiff, at the san1e tin1e, moved the court to 
refuse and reject the said petition and bond for reasons stated 
in writing, which writing is hereby n1ade a part of the record 
in this cause, which motion of the said plaintiff the Court cloth 
overrule, and the plaintiff thereupon excepted to the action 
of the court in overruling said motion. 
And it appearing to the Court that ·written notice of said 
petition and bond was given prior to the filing of same, and 
it further appearing to the court from said petition and bond 
that said defendant is entitled to have this suit removed on 
account of diversity of citizenship to the District Court of 
the United States for the vVestern District of Virginia, sitting 
at Lynchburg, and that the surety in said bond is good and 
sufficient surety, the court doth accept said petition and bond, 
and doth proceed no further in this suit, and doth order that 
the same be removed to the District Court of the United States 
for the Western District of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, 
Virginia. 
And it is further ordered that the Clerk do forthwith make 
up a certified copy of the record in this suit and-deliver the 
same to the said defendant upon the payment of proper 
charges therefor. 
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In the Circuit Court of Amherst County. 
J\IIarion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as IGngs Distributors and Har-
leysville J\IIutual Casualty Company. 
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REMOVE. 
To: Marion Ayres and D. 1\ronovitch, doing business as Kings 
Distributors : 
You are hereby notified that on or before the 14th day of 
Feb1·uary, 1938, on behalf of the defendant, I-Iarleysville 
Mutual Casualty Company, a petition praying for the re-
moval of this cause fron1 the Circuit Court of Amherst County 
to the District Court of the United States for the Western 
District of :virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, which petition will 
be accompanied by proper bond (a copy of the petition and 
bond being attached hereto), will be filed in the above entitled 
cause, and on that day, or the first day tliereafter upon which 
the Court will be convened, said petition will be called up 
for hearing and disposition, at which time and place you may 
be present if you so elect. 
SINNOTT AND 1\fA.Y, 
Counsel for Harleysville lVIutual 
Casualty Company. 
page 10 ~ 1\IARION AYR.ES, plaintiff herein named, could 
not be found at his usual place of abode, to-wit, 
No. 1310 Rivermont ..A venue, Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 8th 
day of February, 1938, so the within Notice of Petition to 
Hemove, Petition to Rernov·e, this cause to the District Court 
of the United States for the vVestern District of Virginia at 
Lynchburg, Bond and Order, "rere were executed on the said 
8th day of February, 1938, within the City of Lynchburg, by 
delivering true copies of the same, in writing, and giving in-
formation of its purport to Nellie M. Ayres, the wife of Marion 
Ayres, who was found at 1\farion Ayres' usual place of abode, 
and who is a member of 1\farion Ayres' family, and above the 
age of 16 years. 
F. S. TYREE, 
Sergeant of the City of Lynchburg, 
Virginia. 
By M. C. BRANDT, 1st Deputy. 
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EXECUTED in the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 8th 
day of February, 1938, by delivering true copies of the within 
Notice of Petition to :remove, Petition to Remove this Cause 
to the District Court of the United States for the vVestern 
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg, V a., Bond and Order to 
D. Aronovitch, in person, doing business as King's Distribu-
tors, 920 Commerce St., Lynchburg, Va. 
F. S. TYREE, 
Sergeant of the City of Lynchburg. 
By ~I. C. B.RANDT, 1st Deputy. 
Amherst Circuit Court. 
Filed by leave of Court Feb. 14, 1938. 
WM. E. SANDJDGE, Clerk. 
page 11 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Amherst County. 
Marion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Distributors and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
PETITION TO REMOVE THIS CAUSE TO THE DIS-
TRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
AT LYNCHBURG. 
To the Honorable Edward Meeks, Judge of the Circuit Court 
of Amherst County: 
Your petitioner, Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company, a 
foreign corporation organized and existing by virtue of the 
laws of the State of Pennsylvania, comes and enters its special 
appearance in the aboYe styled cause in this honorable court, 
for the purpose of filing its petition, praying for the removal 
of said suit to the District Court of the United States for· 
the Western District of ,Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, as 
hereinafter set out, and expressly disclaiming any and all in- · 
tention of entering an appearance to this cause in this court, 
and, without waiving any errors or insufficiency in and to the 
notice of suggestion or garnishment filed by the plaintiff in 
this cause against your petitioner, and made returnable by the 
plaintiff on the 14th day of February, 1938. 
Your petitioner respectfully represents that the matter and , / 
1 
I 
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amount in dispute in this cause exceeds the sum of Three 
Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs; 
that the suit instituted by the plaintiff against your petitioner 
herein is a suggestion of garnishment between the 
page 12 ~ plaintiff and your petitioner, the garnishee, and D. 
Aronovitch, doing business as King's Distributors, 
the judgn1ent debtor; that the said plaintiff was at the com-
mencement of this suit, and still is, a citizen of the Common-
wealth of Virginia; that your petitioner, Harleysville 1\{utual 
Casualty Company, was at the time of the institution of this 
suit, and stil~ is, a corporation organized and existing by vir-
tue of the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, and the judgment 
debtor, D. Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Distributors, 
was at the time of the institution of this suit, and still is, a 
citizenof the Commonwealth of Virgini.a, and that there are 
no other interested parties to this suit; that said suit has not 
yet been tried, and that the time at or before which the de-
fendant, your petitioner, is required by the laws of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, and/or any other rules of this honor-
able court to answer or plead to the notice of motion for 
judgment, has not elapsed; that your petitioner has not 
pleaded therein; that by reason of the premises, your pe-
titioner, the garnishee, desires and is entitled to have said 
suit removed from the said Circuit Court of Amherst County 
to the District Court of the United States for the Western 
District of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg. 
Your petitioner has made and filed herewith a ·bond with 
good and sufficient surety for its entry into the District Court 
of the United States for the ·vvestern District of Virginia,. 
sitting· at Lynchburg, thirty days from the date of the filing 
of this petition, a certified copy of the record in 
page 13 ~ this suit and for paying all costs that may be 
awa.rded by the District Court of the United States 
for the Western District of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, if 
said Court shall hold that this suit was wrongfully or im-
properly removed thereto; and, 
Your petitioner prays that this honorable court proceed ·no 
further herein except to make the order of removal required 
by law, and to accept the record herein to be removed to the 
District Court of the United States for the Western District 
of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, and it will ever pray, etc. 
HARLEYSVILLE 1\1:UTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
By SINNOTT AND MAY, 
Counsel. 
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Comn1onwealth of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, To-wit: 
Personally appeared before me, Loretta 1\-I. Sarti, a Notary 
Public in and for the Cormnonwealth of ;virginia, City of 
Richn1ond, V. P. R.andolph, Jr., who being first duly s'vorn, 
deposeth and saith that he is one of the attorneys for the 
petitioner in the foregoing petition, and as such is the duly 
authorized agent of the petitioner for the purpose of making 
this affidavit, and that he has read said petition and is familiar 
with the statmnents contained therein, which, on inforn1ation 
and belief, he verily believes to be true. 
V. P. RANDOLPH, JR., 
Affiant. 
page 14 ~ Subscribed and s"\vorn to before me this 7th clay 
of February, 1938, in my Comn1on,vealth and City 
aforesaid. 
LORETTA J\11. SARTI, 
Notary Public. 
l\£y c01nmission expires April 27, 1940. 
I, V. P. Randolph, ,Jr., an attorney duly qualified and prac-
ticing in the Circuit Court of A1nherst County and the United 
States District Court for the Western District ·of Virginia, 
do certify that the foregoing petition ought to be granted. 
GIVEN u~1der my hand this 7th day of February, 1938. 
V. P. RANDOLPH, JR. 
Amherst Circuit Court. 
Filed by leave of Court Feb. 14, 1938. 
Wl\tl. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
page 15 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Amherst County. 
Marion Ayers 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as IGng's Distributor, and 
Harleysville 1\tlutual Casualty Company, Garnishee. 
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The plaintiff, 1\iarion .Ayers, objects to the filing of the 
petition of the I-Iarleysville 1\iutual Casualty Con1pany pray-
ing the removal of this cause to the District Court of the 
United States for the 'Vestern District of Virginia and moves 
the Court to refuse to accept and to reject the said petition 
and to refuse to remove this cause as therein prayed for upon 
the following grounds : 
1. The said petition for removal is not offered and filed 
within the time prescribed by law. 
2. The said petition shows on its face that the petitioner 
is sued jointly with D. Aronovitch, a resident of the Comi:non-
\vealth of Virginia, and does not show that there is a separable 
suit or controversy between the plaintiff and the said pe-
titioner, Harleysville ~{utual Casualty Company. 
3. That this proceeding is not such a suit or controversy 
as is contemplated by the la\v relating to ren1oval of causes 
from a State Court to the Federal Court in that it is not a 
ne\v, independent and original action or suit brought against 
the said petitioner; but in fact is merely an ancillary pro-
ceeding in this court for the purpose of carrying out executing· 
and enforcing orders, judgments and '\vrits heretofore regu-
larly and properly entered and issued by this Court 
page 16 ~ and in full force and effect. 
4. This proceeding· is not a controversy between 
citizens of different States within the meaning of that term as 
used in the law relative to the removal of causes; it is in 
fact merely a summons to the saitl petitioner to answer a sug-
gestion and thereby sho'v what, if anytl1ing, is due from the 
petitioner to the judgment debtor, D. Aronovitch, trading as 
l{ing's Distributor; and until such answer is filed no issue or 
controversy has or can arise bet"reen the plaintiff and the said 
petitioner; and even after such answer bas been filed a con-
troversy may or may not arise between the plaintiff and- the 
said petitioner; and even if such controversy should arise, 
the answer of the petitioner and subsequent pleadings and 
proceedings_ 1night and properly should show that the amount 
in controversy between the plaintiff ~nd the petitioner is not 
over $3,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 
5. The rmnoval bond tendered ·with the petition is not in 
fact a bond at all or is not a proper and sufficient bond be-
cause not sealed 'vith the corporate seal of the pet~tioner cor-
poration and is not executed by any agent or attorney there-
unto authorized under the seal of said petitioner and is not 
accompanied by any proper power of attorney and there is 
no evidence that the Board of Directors or other proper au-
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thority has ever authorized the execution of said bond by 
its officers or any agent or attorney. 
6. The said petition is insufficient on its face, because it 
does not show or purport to sho'v that it is filed at or before 
the time petitioner is required by the writ and order of this 
court to file its answer to petitioner's suggestion; but merely 
avers that the tin1e has not passed for it to "answer or plead 
to the notice of motion for judgment". No motion 
page 17 ~ for judgment against the petitioner has been made 
herein nor has any notice of any such motion been 
given or served upon the petitioner. 
Amherst Circuit Court. 
J. T. COLE~IAN, JR., and 
JOHN D. EASLEY, 
Attorneys for 1\-Iarion Ayres. ; 
Filed by leave of Court Feb. 14, 1938. 
W~I. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
page 18 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Amherst County. 
~!arion Ayres, 
'IJ. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as I\::ings Distributors and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
BOND. 
1\::NOW ALL MEN BY TI-IESE PREf?ENTS: That we, 
Harleysville l\{utual Casualty Company, a foreig·n corporation 
organized and existing· by virtue of the laws of the State of 
Pennsylvania, as principal, by its attorney at law, and Fi-
delity & Deposit Company of Maryland, a corporation char-
tered and existing under the laws of the State of 1Iaryland 
and having· its principal office in the City of Baltimore, ~ifary­
land, and authorized to do business in the Commonwealth of 
Virg·inia, as surety, are jointly and severally held and firmly 
bound unto l\Iarion Ayres and D. Aronovitch, doing business 
as Kings Distributors, in the just and full sum of ·Five Hun:.. 
dred ($500.00) Dollars, to the payment whereof well and truiy 
to be made, unto the said Marion Ayres and D. Aronovitch, 
doing business .as 1\::ings Distributors, their representatives 
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or assigns, firmly by these presents, and jointly and severally 
waive the benefit of their homestead exemptions as to this 
obligation. The condition of the foregoing obligation is 
nevertheless : 
That, whereas, the above-named Marion Ayres has hereto- ' 
fore brought a suit of a civil nature in the Circuit 
page 19 ~ Court of Amherst County, Virginia, -against D. 
Aronovitch, doing business as King·s Distributors, 
a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Harleysville 
Mutual Casualty Company, a foreig·n corporation organized 
and existing by virtue of the laws of the State ·of Pennsyl-. 
vania, and, 
Whereas, the said Harleysville :.M:utual Casualty Company, 
a foreign corporation organized and existing by virtue of the 
laws of the State of Pennsylvania, shnultaneously with the 
filing of this bond, intends to file its petition in the said suit in 
the said County for the removal of said suit to the District 
Court or the United States for the Western District of Vir-
ginia, ~itting at Lynchburg, the District in which said suit is 
pencling, in accordance with the provisions of the Acts of 
Congress in such cases made and provided : 
Now, therefore, the condition of the obligation is such that 
if the said petitioner, Harleysville ~iutual Casualty Com-
pany, a foreign corporation organized and existing by virtue 
of the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, shall enter in the 
District Court of the United States for the vVestern District 
of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, within thirty days of the 
filing of said petition, a certified copy of the record in said 
suit, and shall well and truly pay all costs ·that may be 
awarded by the District Court of the United States for the 
Western District of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, if the 
said District Court of the United States for the Western Dis-
trict of Virginia, sitting at Lynchburg, shall hold that such 
suit was wrongfully or improperly removed thereto, and shall 
do and perform all acts required by the laws of 
page 20 ~ the United States to be done by it in _the removal 
of the said suit as aforesaid, then this obligation 
to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue. 
In testimony whereof, the said Harleysville Mutual Cas-
ualty Company has caused this bond to be signed in its own 
behalf by V. P. Randolph, Jr., its attorney at law, and the 
Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland has caused its cor-
porate seal to be hereto affixed and attested by T. Wallace 
Stevens, its attorney in fact, all of whom being bound and 
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duly authorized and empowered this 7th day of February, 
1938. 
HARLEYSVILLE I\1:UTUAL CASUALTY 
CO~IPANY, . 
By V. P. RANDOLPH, JR., 
Its Attorney at Law. 
FIDELITY & DEPOSIT COJ\1:P ANY OF 
J\IIARYLAND, 
By T. WALLACE srrEVENS, 
Seal of 
Fidelity & 
Deposit Com-
pany of ~Iary-
land 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
Its Attorney in Fact. 
Personally appeared before me, Loretta M. Sarti, a No-
tary Public in and for my Commonwealth and City aforesaid, 
V. P. R-andolph, Jr., and T. Wallace Stevens, 'vho, being first 
duly sworn, depose and say that the foregoing signatures 
are theirs and that they are the duly authorized agents for 
the purpose of executing this bond. Given under my hand 
this 7th day of February, 1938. 
page 21 ~ Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day 
of February, 1'938, in my Commonwealth and City 
aforesaid. 
LORETTA. I\L SARTI, 
· Notary Public. 
1\{y commission expires April 27, 1940. 
Seal of 
Loretta M. 
Sarti, 
Notary Pub-
lic, 
Richmond, Va. 
Amherst Circuit Court 
·Filed by leave of Court Feb. 14, 1938. 
WM. E. S.A.l~DIDGE, Clerk. 
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page 22 ~ In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit :Court of the 
County of Amherst, on the 2nd day of April, 1938. 
The following order from the Records of the District Court 
of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, 
at Lynchburg, Virginia, is certified by the Deputy Clerk of 
said Court: 
In the District Court of the United States for the Western 
District of Virginia, Continued and Held at Lynchburg on 
the 31st day of J\iarch, 1938. 
Marion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Distributors and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty :Co. 
This case, having by an order of February 14, 1938, en-
tered in the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, been 
removed to this Court; 
And the plaintiff having submitted a motion to remand 
thP. said case to the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Vir-
g·inia, for reasons set out in its written motion therefor; 
Now, upon consideration of said motion and of the argu-
nlents of counsel thereon, and for reasons which have this 
day been stated in a 'vritten memorandum of the Court filed 
with the papers as a part of the record therein, it is 
ORDERED 
that this case be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the 
Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia. 
The Deputy Clerk of this Court at Lynchburg will forward 
an attested copy of this order to each of the fol-
page 23 ~ lowing: John D. Easley, Esq., Attorney-at-Law, 
Lynchburg, Va., J. T. Coleman, Jr., Esq., .A.ttor-
nP.y at Law, Lovingston, Va., 8inn9tt & May, Attorneys at 
Law, Richmond Trust Building, Richmond, Va., and will like-
wise send a. copy of the order to the Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of Amherst County,· Virginia. 
Enter: 
JOHN PAUL, Judge. 
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Seal of 
United States 
District 
Court for the 
Western Dis-
trict of Va. 
A Copy, 
Teste: 
LOUIS H. PRICE, 
Deputy Clerk. 
page 24 ~ And on another day, to-wit: At a .Circuit Court 
of the County of Amherst, begun and held at the 
Court House of said Court, in said County; on ~Ionday, the 
11th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine 
hundred and thirty-eight and in the 162nd year of our Com-· 
monwealth. 
Marion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Distributors, and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys, and 
. the defendant, Harleysville JM:utual Casualty Company, ten-
dered and asked leave to file its answer in this case, which 
leave is granted and said answer is filed accordingly. And 
it is ordered that this case be continued to, and set for hearing 
on, the 16th day of May, 1938. 
And it being sugegsted that the garnishee has not fully 
disC'harged his liability or indebtedness to the judgment 
-debtor, it is ordered that the matter be inquired into as pro-
vided by law . 
.And on the motion of the said garnishee, it is ordered that 
the plaintiff do file in writing, by the 26th day of April, 1938, · 
the particul~rs of his claim or suggestion of the liability or 
indebtedness of the said garnishee to the judgment debtor. 
And on the motion of the plaintiff it is ordered that the said 
·garnishee do fil~ in writing·, by the 5th day 'of May, 1938, its 
grounds of defense thereto. 
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page 25 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Amherst County. 
Marion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as l{ings Distributors, and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
ANSWER. 
Comes now tlie garnishee, Harleysville Mutual Casualty 
Company, and says that there is no liability on the Harleys-
ville Mutual Casualty Company as the debtor of D. Arono-
vitch, doing business as Kings Distributors. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
SINNOTT & }fAY, 
Counsel. 
Personally appeared before me, Loretta M. Sarti, a. No-
tary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia, City 
of Riclunond, V. P. Randolph, Jr., who being first duly sworn, 
deposeth and saith that he is one of the attorneys for the 
garnishee, Harleysville ~iutual Casualty Cmnpany, and as 
such is its duly· authorized agent for the purpose of making 
this affidavit; that he has read the foregoing answer and 
statement of the garnishee and is familiar with the state- · 
ments contained therein, which, on information and belief, he 
verily believes to be true. 
V. P. RANDOLPH, JR., 
Affiant. 
page 25lh ~ Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th 
day of Jlebruary, 1938, in my Commonwealth 
and City aforesaid. 
Seal of 
Loretta J\L 
Sarti, Notary 
Public City 
of Richmond 
LORETTA ~L SARTI, 
Notary Public. 
J\!Iy commission expires April 27, 1940. 
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page 26 ~. And on another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
of the County of Amherst, continued and held at 
the Court House thereof, on 1\1:onday, the 16th day of May, 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-eight. 
Marion Ayres 
v. . 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as J{ings Distributors, and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
ORDER. 
It is hereby ordered that the bill of particulars of the 
plaintiff, heretofore lodged with the Clerk, and the grounds 
of~ defen$e of the defendant, Harleysville Mutual Casualty 
Company, heretofore lodged with the Clerk, be filed, and it 
is further ordered that the aforesaid bill of particulars and 
grounds o~ defense be, and hereby are made, part of the rec-
ord in this cause. 
It is further ordered that the amended and supplemental 
grounds of defense tendered by the defendant, Harleysville 
Mutual Casualty Company, be filed and made a part of the 
record in this cause. 
It is further ordered that the stipulation dated 1\{ay 16, 
1938, tendered by all parties to this ca11se, be filed · and be 
made a part of the record in this cause. 
page 27 ~ In the Circuit Conrt of Amherst County, Virg-inia. 
Marion Ayres 
v. . 
Harleysville 1\:Iutual Casualty Company, garnishee of David 
Aronovitch, trading as Kings Distributors. 
BILL OF P ARTICU·LARS. 
The plaintiff, .for Bill of Particulars and in amplification 
of his suggestion that the garnishee, Harleysville 1\iutual 
Casualty :Company, has not fully disclose_d its liability to D. 
Aronovitch, trading as Kings Distributors, says: 
That said garnishee issued to the said D. Aronovitch under 
the name of ''Kings Distributors and/or David Aronovitch' ', 
a certain policy of insurance with riders thereto attached, a 
copy of which is hereto attached as a part of this bill of par-
ticulars, whereby the said Harleysville Mutual Casualty Com-
pany, in consideration of a certain premium to it paid by the 
said garnishee, insured the said garnishee against loss by 
I -
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reason of liability by law imposed upon the said D . .Arono-
vitch for damages on account of bodily injuries sustained by 
any person (unless expressly excepted in the policy) by rea-
son of the ownership, maintenance or use by the garnishee 
of certain motor vehicles designated in the said policy, within 
the lhuit of ten thousand dollars ( $10,000.00) for one per-
son; that while the said policy was in full force and effect, 
one of the motor vehicles covered by the said policy, to-wit: 
thP. Dodge Tractor and a Black Diamond semi-trailer, while 
owned and bP.ing· used by the said D. Aronovitch, caused 
serious personal injuries to the plaintiff, who asserted and 
prosecuted against the said D. Aronovitch, a claim 
page 28 ~ and suit for damag·es by reason thereof, of which 
claim and suit the said garnishee was promptly 
and fully informed; that- in _the said suit a final judgment 
was r.endered against the said D. Aronovitch for twenty thou-
sand six hundred and seven dollars ($20,607.00), with inter-
est from May 14, 1936, and cost and that, by virtue· of the 
said policy of insurance and riders thereto attached as a part 
thereof and paragaq)hs numbered one (1) to six (6) in-
clusive of the by-laws of the said company, which are made a 
part of the said policy, and as modified by the said- riders at~ 
tached to the said policy, the said garnishee is indebted to 
the said Aronovitch in the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,-
000.00) with interest thereon .from the 11th day of Novem-
ber, 1937, the day upon w·hich the final judgment aforesaid 
was rendered. 
The plaintiff further states that the said Aronovitch has 
complied with all of the terms, conditions, and provisions of 
the said insurance policy on his part to be perform~d; and 
has violated none of its provisions or conditions; and that 
the liability of Aronovitch under said judgment comes within 
! • none of the exceptions contained in the said policy of insur-
ance. 
The plaintiff further avers that, in addition to the fore-
g·oing liability under the said policy of insurance, the said 
garnishee is liable or indebted to the said Aronovitch under · 
paragTaph VII of the by-laws (which are made a part of the 
policy of insurance) for the cost and expenses incurred by 
the said Aronovitch in defending said suit and all costs and 
expenses of the said Aronovitch in connection therewith and 
for all taxes costs therein (in addition to the aforesaid in- .. 
debtedness of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) and inter-
est) amounting to $. . . . . . . . . . . . . The plaintiff 
page_ 29 ~ states the following items or particulars of his in-
debtedness under the aforesaid paragraph vn of 
the by-:-laws : · 
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1935 
November 7 To paid G. E. Walker, 
13 To paid C. J. Mays, 
1936 
~fay 
1936. 
~1ay 
7 To phone call to Dr. Ware at .Alnherst, 
8 To paid W. E. Sandidge, Clerk of the 
Circuit Court of Amherst County, for 
subpoenas for witnesses, 
To paid Sheriff of Amherst County 
to execute one subpoena, 
To atnount due Sergeant of the City 
of Lynchburg for executing sub-
poenas, 
25 To paid De~Iott & ~Iagrnder, En-
gineers, 
June 
July 
• 18 To paid ,J. H. l\iorris, Court Reporter, 
24 To postage on brief to ,Judge 1\{eeks 
in connection with motion to set aside 
verdict of jury, 
1937 
January 
March 
April 
pag·e 30 ~ 
August 
Sept. 
13 To paid H. H. W ayt, Clerk of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, 
To paid vV. E. Sandidge, Clerk, for 
transcript of record, 
To long distance telephone n1essage 
to W. E. Sandidge, Clerk, 
12 To paid H. H. W ayt, Clerk, 
15 To paid Asa Dowdy, witness, attend-
ance fees, etc., 
To expenses in connection with H. T. 
Scrug·gs as witness, 
To transportation and incidental ex-
penses incurred for witnesses during 
trial of case in Circuit Court of Anl-
herst County, 
9 To paid H. H. W ayt, Clerk, $450.00, 
for printing, less refund of $139.47, 
April 14 To paid De].fott & ~fagruder 
for twenty copies of plat to forward 
to H. H. W ayt, Clerk, 
30 ·To phone call to Sinnott & 1\iay, At-
torneys, at Richmond, 
7 To paid Lawyers Publishing Com-
pany, Inc., for printing, 
9 To phone call to Sinnott & 1\{ay, 
$ 13.50 
35.00 
.25 
5.00 
.50 
4.50 
·60.00 
179.09 
.59 
1.40 
17.25 
.25 
6.50 
4.50 
65.00 
75.00 
310.53 
3.00 
1.00 
54.63 
1.00 
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Novr. 
1937 
Deer. 
1938 -
Jany. 
15 To phone call to same, 
29 To paid Brown-Morrison Company, 
for printing, 
11 To fp,e due R. Jester, Jr., Attorney, 
for services to date, $1,500.00, and 
expenses, $54.64, 
11 To paid Lawyers Publishing Com-
pany, for printing, 
16 To phone call to Sinnott & May, 
17 To phone call to same, 
To expenses incurred in connection 
'vith obtaining loan for the payment 
of s~tpersedea.'> bond, 
25 To bill paid vY. H. Irvin for investi-
gations subsequent to November 11, 
1937, in connection with petition to 
rehear, 
To loss suffered by David Aronovitch 
in connection with investigations, 
conference§ and consultations, 
To loss on sale of ''Wigwam Farm'' 
to D. H. ·Dillard by reason of ina-
bility to obtain bank loan on account 
of judgment. (Land cost $13,200.00 
and sold for $5,400.00) 
To loss sustained in harvesting and 
marketing 193~ apple crop by reason 
of inability to complete crop loan 
with Eastern Central Fruit Growers 
Credit Association of Hagerstown, 
1\<Iaryland, because of existing judg-
ment docketed upon the records in 
page 31} 
the Clerk's Office of Amherst County, 
To loss of pr0fits in wine business by 
reason of failure to complete nego-
tiations with Bisceglia Bros., Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania, January 20, 
1937, because of judgment being 
docketed in the aforesaid Clerk's Of-
fice, 
To loss of credit and normal profits 
in the operation of the business 
known as Kings Distributors, Lynch-
burg, Virginia, by reason of failure 
1.00 
25.00 
1,554.64 
1.8.53 
1.00 
1.00 
632.26 
25.00 
1,200.00 
7,800.00' 
10,000.00 
8,500.00 
I I 
'l 
I 
50 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
to complete financial arrangements, 
on account of existing judgment, 25,000.00 
To loss of physical value of orchard 
property in An1herst County by rea-
son of failure to properly finance the 
normal operations and maintenance 
thereof because of such judgment be-
ing docketed. (Property had a bid 
value of $75,000.00 in 1935 as against 
$36,000.00 as of this date) 39,000.00 
Interest on judgment $20,607.00 
from l\fay 14, 1936, till paid, 
Taxed costs $126.75 
$94,596.72 
J. T. COLEMAN, JR., 
JNO. D. EASLEY, p. q. 
Filed In Clerk's Office Amherst Circuit Court April 26, 
1938. 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
(See copy of Insurance Policy, Harleysville 1\tiutual Cas-
·ualty Company, · filed with Plaintiff's evidence, page 53 of 
this record.) 
page 32 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia. 
1\!Iarion Ayres, 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as l{ings Distributors, and 
Harleysville J\tiutual Casualty :Company. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defendant, Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company, 
garnishee, for grounds of defense comes and says: 
That the said defendant does not owe D. Aronovitch, do-
ing business. as Kings Distributors, the sums alleged in the 
said plaintiff's bill of particulars or any other sun1 or amount 
of money by virtue of the insurance policy set forth in the 
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plaintiff's bill of particulars; that at the time of the acci-
dP.nt in which the said plaintiff 'vas involved, and by reason 
of which the said plaintiff obtained a judgment in the sum 
of Twenty Thousand Six Hundred Seven Dollars ( $20,607.00) 
against the said D . .Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Dis-
tributors, the said plaintiff, l\{arion Ayres, was an employee. 
of the said D . .A.ronovitch, and at the time of the accident was, 
engag·ed in his duties of such employment and was engaged 
in operating and caring for the vehicle covered by the policy 
in question; that by reason of subsection (d) of the excep-
tions in the insurance policy in question, the said insurance 
policy does not indemnify nor insure the said D . .Aronovitch, 
doing business as Kings Distributors, by reason of the said 
plaintiff being an employee while engaged in operating or car-
ing for the vehicle covered by the said policy. 
page 33 ~ The said defendant further, and in addition to the 
_ reasons heretofore set out, denies tliat it is liable 
or indebted to the said D. Aronovitch for the following items 
of indebtedness as alleged in the plaintiff's bill of particu-
lars: 
1938 
January 17 To expenses incurred in connection 
with obtaining loan for the payment 
of supersedeas bond, $ 632.36 
25 To bill paid \V. H. Irvin for investi-
gations subsequent to November 11, 
1937, in connection with petition to 
rehear, 25.00 
To loss on sale of '' Wig·wam Farm'' 
to D. H. Dillard by reason of inability 
to obtain bank loan on account of / 
judgn1ent. (Land cost $13,200.00 and 
sold for $5,400.00), 7,800.00 
To loss sustained in harvesting and 
n1arketing 1937 apple crop by reason 
of inability to complete crop loan 
with Eastern Central Fruit Growers 
Credit Association of Hagerstown, 
l\iaryland, because of existing judg-
Inent docketed upon the records in the 
Clerk's Office of Amherst County, 10,000.00 
To loss of profits in wine business 
by reason of failure to cmnplete ne-
gotiations with Bisceglia Bros., Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania, January 20, 
1937, ·because of judgment being 
5~ Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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docketed in the aforesaid Clerk's Of-
fif3e, 8,500.00 
To loss of credit and normal profits 
in the operation of the business 
known as l{ings Distributors, Lynch-
burg, Virginia, by reason of failure 
to con1plete financial arrangements 
on account of existing judgment, 25,000.00 
To loss of physical value of orchard 
property in A.lnherst County, by rea-
son of failure to properly finance the 
normal operations and maintenance 
thereof because of such judgment be-
ing· docketed. (Property had a bid 
value of $75,000.00 in 1935 as against 
$36,000.00 as of this date), 39,000.00 
And the said defendant denies that the said D. Aronovitch 
has incurred as expenses or losses the above mentioned seven 
(7) alleged items of indebtedness. The said defendant de-
nies that it is liable by virtue of the insurance policy in 
question, for the foregoing seven (7) alleged items of in-
debtedness, because they are not contemplated by the tern1s 
of the insurance policy, because they are not covered by the 
terms of the insurance policy, because they are speculative, 
and because they are remote damages, if any, of any alleged 
breach of the insurance contract, and which breach is denied 
by the said defendant; that the policy in question provides 
insurance against loss by reason of the liability imposed 
upon the assured by law for damages on account of bodily 
injuries, andjor death accidentally sustained by any person 
or persons not hereafter excepted by reason of the owner-
ship, maintenance, and/or use of the motor vehicles described 
and the liability to one or all assureds in the policy in any 
accident is limited to Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, 
and that the claim of the losses referred to 'vould not come 
under the insuring clause set out. 
The said defendant further, and in addition to the reasonH 
heretofore set out, says that the claim for loss, suffered by 
David Aronovitch in connection with investigation, confer-
ences and consultations, in the amount of Twehre 
page 35 ~ Hundred ($1,200.00). Dollars, is improper for the 
additional reason that the policy by clause X of 
the By-Laws provides that the assured ''shall in all other 
respects, whenever requested by the Company, aid in effect-
ing settlements, secure information and evidence" and .. other-
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wise fully cooperate with the insurer without charg·e of any 
kind. 
The said defendant fu'rther, and in addition to the reasons 
heretofore set out, says that the itmns claiined as fee, due 
to R. Jester, Jr., Attorney, for services to date, Fifteen Hun-
dred ($1,500.00) Dollars, and expenses, Fifty-four Dollars 
and Sixty-Four .CBnts (54.64), is denied to be a reasonable 
charge for such services. . 
The said defendant further, and in addition to the·reasons 
heretofore set out, says that 'vhile it does not specifically 
deny that the other items of costs set out in the plaintiff's 
bill of particulars were incurred., it does not admit the same, 
but calls for strict proof thereof in the premises. 
The said defendant reserves the right to amend the grounds 
of defense at any time if and as it n1ay be so advised, to 
stril{e out the plaintiff's bill of particulars, or any part there-
of, as insufficient in law or for lack of evidence to support it. 
HARLEYSVILLE 1\IUTUAL CASUALTY 
COl\IPANY, 
By SINNOTT & MAY, 
Counsel. 
Filed in Clerk's Office Amherst Circuit Court May 5th, 
1938. 
Wl\L E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
page 36 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of A1nherst County. 
1\'Iarion Ayers, 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as J(ings Distributors, and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
Al\1:ENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL GROUNDS OF DE-
FENSE. 
Comes now the defendant, Harleysville lviutual Casualty 
Con1pany, and for its arnended and supplemental grounds of 
defense, says in addition to its grounds of defense, that 
1\!Iarion Ayers, the plaintiff herein, at the time he sustained 
the injuries complained of, recovered his judgment against -
D. Aronovitch, doing business as ICings Distributors, by rea-
son of obligation ~ssu1ned or imposed upon it by reason of 
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a workman's agreen1ent, plan or law, which is expressly ex-
cepted by clause (d) of the insurance policy in question. 
. 
I-IARLEYSVILLE lVIUTUAL CASUALTY 
CO~tfPANY, 
By SINNOTT & ~:lAY, 
Counsel. 
page 37 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia. 
lVIarion Ayers 
v. 
D .... 1\..ronovitch, doing business as ICings Distributors, and 
Harleysville ~futual Casualty Company. 
AGREEMENT. 
THIS .A.GREE~IENT by and between ~1arion Ayers, D. 
Aronovitch, doing· business as ICings Distributors, and Har-
leysville ~{utual Casualty Company: 
vVHEREAS, ~Iarion Ayers has recovered a judgment 
against D. Aronovitch, doing business as l{ings Distributors, 
in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, on November 
11, 1937, which judgn1ent has been entered as a judgment of 
the Circuit Court of An1herst County, Virginia, upon which 
executions have been issued; and 
WHEREAS, process of garnish1nent has been served by 
the said ~:I:arion Ayers upon D. Aronovitch, doing business 
as King·s Distributors, and Harleysville ~Iutual Casualty 
Con1pany, in the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, 
where said proceeding· of garnishment is now pending; and 
WHEREAS, said proceeding of garnishment is based upon 
a claim of indebtedness of the said Harleysville lVIutual Cas-
ualty Company to the said D. Aronovitch, doing business as 
Kings Distributors, by virtue of a policy of insurance is-
sued by the undersigned to the said D. Aronovitch, being 
Policy No. 228, which liability either to the said Ayers or to 
the said D .. Aronovitch, the Harleysville l\futual Casualty 
· Company denies ; and 
page 38 ~ WHEREAS, the said ~Iarion Ayers has filed a 
bill of particulars in the said garnishment pro-
~!arion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 55..;--
ceeding;, alleging indebtedness of the Harleysville ~{utual 
Casualty Cmnpany to the said D. Aronovitch, doing· business 
as I<ings Distributors, in the sum of Ninety-Four Thousand 
Five Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars and Seventy-two Cents 
($94,596.72), in addition to the Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) 
Dollars face liability of the policy; and 
WHEREAS, it is desired by all parties in the said garnish-
ment proceeding now pending in the Circuit Court of Am-
herst County, Virginia, to only litigate the liability of the 
said Harleysville 1\iutual Casualty Company to the Ten Thou-
sand ($10,000.00) Dollar face value of the policy, it is hereby 
mutually agreed that in the said garnishment proceeding no'v 
pending in the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, 
the amount to be adjudicated shall be limited to the named 
face value of the policy of insurance, namely, Ten Thousand 
Dollars, and that the evidence adduced by the parties, and 
that the judgn1ent of the Court, shall be lin1ited as to whether-
or not there is any liability upon the Harleysville ~Iutual 
1
. 
Casualty Company to the Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollar 
face value of the policy of insurance. It is further agreed { 
that in any suit, action or other proceeding that may here- j 
after be instituted by the said Marion Ayers or the said D. ! 
Aronovitch against the Harleysville Mutual .Casualty Com-
pany for t~1e purpose of asserting or recovering any other ad- \ 
ditional iten1s of dmnage or con1pensation upon the said policy \. 
of insurance, or for any alleged breach of any provisions 
thereof, that neither the said lVfarion Ayers nor 
page 39 ~ the said D. Aronovitch nor the said Harleysville 
:1_\Jf utual Casualty Company shall avail itself of any 
defense of res ad,i-ztdicata, estoppel by judgment, or splitting· ' 
of causes of action. It is further agreed that the ·period 
from the date of this agreement until final judgment be en-
tered in the said g-arnishn1ent proceeding, now pending in 
the Circuit Court of An1herst County, Virginia, (either by 
the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, or by the Su-
prCine Court of Appeals of Virginia, whichever shall be 
longer) shall not be included in the period of lin1itations in 
any subsequent actions by the .said ~!arion Ayers or the said 
D. Aronovitch ag·ainst the said Harleysville niutual Casualty 
Company on the said policy of insurance. 
It is further agTeed that this stipulation shall not be con- . 
sidered as an admission of liabilit)7' to any extent either un- j 
der its policy or otherwise, on the part of IIarleysville Mu- i 
tual Casualty Company nor concession by Ayers or Arono- j 
vitch of any defense on the part of the said Casualty Com.-( 
pany. 
'\ 
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Given under our hands this 16th day of May, 1938. 
D. ARONOVITCH 
T/ A l(ings Distributors. 
l\1ARION AYHES, 
By JNO. D. EASLEY and 
J. T. COLE:NIAN, JR., his Attys. 
HARLEYSVILLE ~IUTUAL 
CASUALTY CO. 
By JOHN G. KARST, Claim l\1anager. 
page 40 ~ And on this same day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
for the County of Amherst, continued and held at 
the Court I-Iouse thereof, on :Nlonday, the 16th day of l\1ay, 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty -eight. 
Marion .Ayres 
'V. 
D. Aronovitch, doing l)usiness as ICings Distributors, and 
Harleysville 1\Iutual Casualty Company 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys, and 
the defendant entered its g-eneral plea of Nil Debit in this 
case, to which the plaintiff replies generally. And the defend-
ant for further plea says that it is not guilty in manner and 
form as the plaintiff in his garnishn1ent proceedings herein 
against it -hath alleged, and of this it puts itself upon the 
count.ry and the plaintiff likewise. And thereupon came a 
jury, to-wit: Jerry T. 1\tiays, J. R. Hill, George \V. 1\tiays, 
Frank N. Beard, A. G. Fauber, \Valker S. Hudson, and Au-
. brey L. Watts, who having been selected, tried and empaneled 
in the manner d~rected by law from the veniremen regularly 
and duly summoned to this term, were duly sworn well and 
truly to try the issue joined and a true verdict to render ac-
cording to the law and the evidence. 
Upon the completion of the plaintiff's evidence the de-
fendant, Harleysville l\tiutual Casualty Company, by its at-
torney, moved the court to strike said evidence upon the fol-
lowing grounds, to-wit: · 
page 41 ~ "Because by that evidence, including the evi-
dence of the plaintiff,-and the plaintiff can cer-
tainly not ask that a case be made stronger than he himself 
made it-as a matter of law, that evidence established that 
this case comes under a well recognized exception of the policy, 
as follows: 'Providing· the Company shall not be liable un-
dP.r any policy issued for loss resulting or arising from any 
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of the following causes or while said motor vehicle is being 
used or maintained under any of the following conditions: 
'"Condition '' (d) " in part; '' * * * nor shall any policy cover 
injury to any en1ployee or employees of the insured while 
engaged in operating or caring for any of the automobiles 
covered by this policy, nor any obligations assumed or im-
posed upon the insured by any 'vorlnnen 's agreement, plan 
or law.'' To which n1otiol}., the plaintiff, by his attorney, ex-
cepted, and which motion the Court takes under advisement 
until the compl"etion of all the evidence. 
And the jury aforesaid having partly heard the evidence, 
was adjourned until tomorrow morning, ~lay 17th, 1938, at 
10 o'clock A. lVI. 
page 42· ~ And now on this day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
of the County of Amherst, continued and held at 
the Court :House thereof, on Tuesday, the 17th day of May, 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-eight. 
lVIarion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as l{ings Distributors, and 
llarleysville :a1:utual Casualty Con1pany. 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys, and the 
jury aforesaid, again can1e into Court, pursuant to adjourn-
ment. Whereupon, upon the completion of all of the testi-
mony offered in this case, the defendant, Harleysville lVIutual 
Casualty Company, renewed its motion to strike the plain-
tiff's evidence, upon the f<?llowing grounds : 
''That the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that 
the plaintiff herein, at the time he sustained his injuries, was 
an ''employee or employees of the insured while engaged 
in operating or caring- for any of the automobiles covered 
by this policy, and that this obligation was imposed upon 
the insured by the workmen's law". To which motion, the 
plaintiff, by his attorney excepted. And the Court having 
heard the a rg;uments of counsel, doth sustain said motion and 
the motion made on yesterday, and doth order that said evi-
dence of said plaintiff be stricken out, to which action of the 
Court in sustaining said motions of the defendant, Harleys-
ville Mutual Casualty Con1pany, and striking out said evi-
dence of the plaintiff, the plaintiff, by counsel, excepted. 
page 43 ~ Whereupon' the j"q.ry aforesaid retired to their 
room an~ after a short time spent therein, returned 
- ! 
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into Court and rendered the following verdict, to-wit: "We 
the jury :find that the I-Iarleysville J\IIutual Casualty Company 
owes D. Aronovitch, doing· business as ICing's Distributors, 
nothing. (Signed) J. T. ~fays, Foretnan.'' 
Whereupon the plaintiff, by his attorney, moved the Court 
to set aside the said verdict of the jury on the grounds that 
it is contrary to the law and the evidence, which motion the 
Court overruled, to which action of the Court, in overruling 
the said 1notion, the plaintiff, by his attorney, excepted. 
And the plaintiff, by his attorney, havil'1g· signified his in-
tention of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia for a writ of error and supersedeas to the judgment 
of this Court, the same is accordingly suspended for a period 
of sixty days fron1 this date. 
page 44 ~ Stenographic Report of testin1ony and other in-
cidents in tlw trial of the cause of lVIarion A vres 
v. D. Aronovitch, doing· business as J{ing 's Distributors,., and 
Harleysville ~[utual Casualty Con1pa.ny, in the Circuit Court 
for the County of Amherst, Virginia, before the Honorable 
Edward :Nieeks, Judge of said Court and a jury, which trial 
began on JYionday, lVIay 16th, 1938, and ended on Tuesday, 
lVIav 17th, 1938. 
The plaintiff was represented by ~fessrs. John D. Easley 
and J. Tinsley Coleman; the defendant, Harleysville 1Iutual 
Casualty C01npany, was represented by ~fr. John A. May, 
lVIr. V. P. Randolph, Jr., and l\{r. Irvin Bendiner. 
page 45 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court· of ~mherst County. 
]\{arion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as ICings Distributors, and 
the Harleysville l\tfutual Casualty Company 
AT LAW. 
Transcript of Evidence and other incidents of the trial of 
the above entitled cause, which commenced on 1\fonday, May 
16th, 1938, at 10 A. lVI., and was concluded on Tuesday, ]\fay 
17th, 1938, at Amherst courthouse, Amherst Virginia, before 
the Honorable Edward 1\{eeks, Judge of said Court, and a 
JUry. 
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Appearances : 1\fessrs. John D. Easley and J. Tinsley 
Colen1an, Counsel for Plaintiff. 
l\ticssrs. John G. lVfay and V. P. Randolph, Jr., of Messrs. 
Sinnott and ]\lay, and l\1r. Irvin Bendiner, Counsel for the 
defendant, Harleysville ~Iutual Casualty Con1pany. 
page 47 ~ By 1\ir. Easley: We have a stipulation to file, 
with the ·approval of 1\iir. 1\fay, that in this pro-
ceeding· it is sought to recover fr01n the Harleysville l\futual 
Casualty Company, under a policy of insurance issued to Mr. 
Aronovitch. ' 
VV e asked for parti.culars on a suggestion as to liability 
we have filed. 
By 1\iir. ~fay: \Ve had better discuss this n1atter in the ab-
sence of the jury. 
By 1\ir. Easley: All right. 
(The prospective jury here retired from the Courtroom, 
at the direction of the Court.) 
By l\iir. Easley: In filing our suggestion and the items of 
liability, we stated that the policy contains really two parts: 
One to pay for any liability unposed by law to the extent of 
$10,000 to any one person, and another part says, in addition 
to that, that the company undertakes to defend any suit in 
which it is alleged that the accident comes within the terms 
of the policy. Under that clause there was a suggestion .of 
son1e eighty odd thousand dollars damages that 've h~d In-
curred by reason of the breach of that contract. It was de-
sired to ·file this in this case in this trial to limit the issues 
sin1ply to the question of liability under the policy at all, if 
any. 
page 48 ~ By the Court: Under the policy1 
_ By Mr. Easley: Under any part of the policy. 
' There were certain exceptions listed in the policy. 
By the Court: I understand that you are 'vaiving the ex-
ceptions~ 
By l\Ir. Easley: We have agreed, without prejudice to the 
rights of 1\Ir . .Aronovitch or l\iir. Ayres, to bring another suit 
for these it01ns of damages. 
By the Court: And your issue is confined to what~ 
By 1\{r. Easley: It is confined to the defense of whether 
or not this accidP.nt con1es within the exceptions mentioned 
in that policy. There are two of tl1em. One of the1n is that 
the con1pany would not be liable in case of an injury to an 
employee while engaged in the care of or operation of the 
insured truck. They maintain that the injury to the plain-· 
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tiff was caused while he was engaged in the operation of or 
the care of that truck. That is one. 
There is another exception. 
By the Court: The exception is that, under the policy, he 
was -engaged in the operation and care of the truck, and the 
company is not liable~ 
By Mr. Easley: Yes, sir; and the other is that the company 
is not liable if the injured employee con1cs under any work-
men's agreement, plan, agreement or law. 
_pag·e 49 ~ By the Court: Such as the "VV orkman 's Compen-
sation Act? . 
By Mr. Easley: That is the issue of fact. \Ve contend 
that there was no such plan or law in this case, nor \vas any 
recovery based on such a plan or law. Those are the two 
issues. 
By the Court: And the insurance company says that, i_f 
a man comes within those exceptions, that they are not liable. 
By J\{r. Easley: Yes, and we are going to limit this~mat­
ter here to the $10,000, and leave bot\1 parties free to litigate 
. afterwards, in some other proceeding, as to the damages 
which we are claiming, aggregating· son1e $80,000 under other 
branches of the policy; but the defense they make shall be 
equally applicable to any other suit for any other items of 
damages, but to limit the issue and that we may. not take up 
the time of the Court and the jury in considering a vast 
amount of other testimony, along other lines, we have agreed 
to the thing·s that I have indicated. 
By the Court: Is everything that you have said contained 
in the stipulation, and are you just telling me what is in it 0l 
By !rir. Easley: Yes, sir, and we want to make it a part 
of the proceedings by an order. 
page 50 ~ By 1\fr. May: That. is right. 
By 1\IIr. Easley: These papers ]1ave already 
been filed-the bill of particulars and the grounds of de-
fense, and the additional grounds of defense filed this morn-
ing, which we do not object to. 
By the Court: The defense here is nil debit, I suppose, 
is it? 
By !rir. 1\rfay: I would like for the clerk to enter a plea of 
nil debit. · _ 
By the Court: All right, the clerk will enter a plea o~ 
nil debit. 
By ~{r. Easley: We might as well state our agreement as 
to the record, I presume. 
By Mr. May: Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Easley: There is just anothe1· point: The par-
ties have agreed that, without the necessity of introducing 
• I 
I 
I 
I --
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D. Aronovitch. 
the stenographer who took the evidence in the case of Marion 
Ayres v. D. Aronovitcb, etc., that the printed Court record 
and the evidence in that case, so far as such evidence may 
be pertinent, to any issues here, inay be read by either party 
and introduced in evidence, for the sole purpose of impeach-
ing any witness in this case. 
page 51 ~ By the Court:· For the sole purpose of impeach-
ing any witness? 
By ~Ir. May: For the sole purpose of impeaching any wit-
ness or contradicting any witness. 
By the Court: For the sole purpose of contradicting or 
impeaching any witness. 
By 1\fr. Easley: We are eliminating the necessity of put-
ting on the. shorthand reporter as to what these witnesses 
said. 
By the Court : Does that complete the preliminaries? 
By Mr. May: I think so. 
(The jury at this time returned into Court and sworn and 
examined on their voir dire; the selection of the jury was 
made without exception on ~ither side, the opening statements 
were duly 1nade, and the introduction of evidence proceeded 
as follows :) 
pag·e 52 ~ EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF. . 
By ~fr. Easley : 
D. ARONOVIT·CH, 
sworn for the Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
Q. You are D . .A.ronovitch and one of the parties defendant 
in this proceeding, referred to as trading as Kings Distribu-
tors, are you not? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Aronovitch, do you have a policy of insurance, is-
sued to you by the Harleysville J\.futual Casualty Company 
of Harleysville, Pennsylvania? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is this the policy that the issued to you Y (Handing paper 
to witness) ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
62 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
D. Aronov-itch. 
By Mr. Easley: I will read that presently, your Honor. 
I will not read it no,v. We want to introduce it in evidence, 
however. 
(The foregoing· paper is introduced in evidence as Exhibit 
No. A, on behalf of the Plaintiff, the san1e being in the follow-
ing 'vords and figures, to-wit:) · 
page 53 ~ CASH NON-ASSESSABI.JE POLICY 
AUTOl\1:0BILE LIABILITY 
AND 
PROPERTY DAl\1:AGE POLICY 
No. VA-228 
I-IARLEYSVILLE 
MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY 
Harleysville, Pa. 
Issued To 
J(ings Distributors andjor 
David Aronovitch 
2603 Fort A venue 
Lynchburg, Virginia 
Expires August 26th, 19366 
Cash Deposit Paid-
Property Damage, .. $ 175.27 
Liability ............ $ 305.68 
READ TIDS POLICY 
This Policy does not cover damage to your own car. 
In case of Accident notify at once Agent or Secretary of 
Company. 
Return your Policy to Ag·ent for renewal ten days before 
maturity. 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 63 
D. A-ronovitch. 
page 54}- ENDORSEMENT 
It is hereby understood and agreed that the word ''indem-
nify'' on tho within policy is changed to read "insure;'' other-
wise, the policy remains the same. 
Attached to and forming part of Policy No. VA-228 of the 
HARLEYSVILLE l\1:UTUAL CASUALTY COl\IIP ANY, of 
Harleysville, Pa., to l{ings Distributors and/or David Arono-
vitch. 
Date: September 4, 1935 
I. T. Holden1an 
President 
Alvin C. Alderfer 
Secretary 
page 55 r HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY 
HARLEYSVILLE, P A. 
NO. VA-228 
IN CONSIDERATION of the Premium -paid, the accept-
ance of the attached By-Laws as the tenns of this Policy, 
and the statements in respect of any motor vehicle mentioned 
and hereinafter described, and also subject to any conditions 
tha.t may be· endorsed hereon, the I-IARLEYSVILLE 
~1:UTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, of Harleysville, Penna., 
hereby agrees to indmnnify Iung·s Distributors and/or David 
NAME 
Aronovitch of 2603 Fort Avenue, Lynchburg, Virginia, 
STREET CITY COUNTY STATE 
from August 26 A. D. 1936 a.t noon, standard time, against 
loss by reason of the liability imposed upon the Assured by 
la'v for damages on account of 
(a) BODILY INJURIES, and/or death a,cciclently sus-
tained by any person or persons not hereinafter excepted by 
reason of ownership, maintenance, and/or use of the motor 
vehicle ( s) herein described and the liability to one or all 
Assureds in this policy in any one accident is limited to 
Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000), for one person and subject 
($5.000 or over on ·each motor vel1icle-
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to the same limit for each person; the Company's total liability 
from loss in one accident is limited to Twenty Thousand Dol-
. · · ($10,000 or over on 
lars ($20,0_QO), for which ·$305.68 premium is paid; 
each motor vehicle 
(b) PROPERTY DAlVIAGE-Damage to or de-
page 56 ~ struction of property of every description (except-
ing property of the insured or property of others 
used by or in charge of the insured or any of his employees, 
or carried in or upon the motor vehicle (s) herein described), 
caused by an accident, including loss of use of property so 
damaged or destroyed. 
" And the Company's liability to one or all Assured on ac-
count of any one accident is limited to the actual value of 
the property damaged or destroyed at the time of such dam-
age or destruction or the cost of its suitable repair or replace-
ment, and in no event shall such loss exceed Five Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000) irrespective 'vhether the property of one 
or more persons is damaged or destroyed, for which $175.27 
premium is paid; 
Providing that the insured herein shall be subject to the 
conditions set forth in the within By-La,vs, as well as any 
memorandum, if any, endorsed hereon in like manner as if 
the same were respectively repeated and incorporated therein 
and in compliance with such conditions and memorandum and 
each of them, shall be a condition precedent to the right of 
recovery hereunder. · 
The motor vehicles covered hereunder are described as fol-
lows: 
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NAME STYLE li;~Q. ~0. MFitS. NO. YEAR 
Chevrolet l?ick-up K5020553 14FB041128 1935 
Chevrolet Open Express T4987541 .14QD031328 1935 
Chevrolet Open Express T4976085 14QD031268 1935 
Dodge Open Express T27938 1935 
Dodge Tractor T15-186t 8617414 1935 
Black Diamond Semi-Trailer E5503 1935 
Ford Coupe 18-150432S 1935 
Plymouth Sedan PE13816 1934 
(Pleasure cars principally used & garaged at Monroe, Va. 
Total Premium 
Less 2.9% fleet discount 
Total 
CAPACI'I'Y 
,%-ton 
1~-ton 
1,%-ton 
1,%-ton 
1,%-ton 
3 -ton 
PREMIUM 
B. I. $46.00-P. D. $27.00 
B. I. $46.00-P. D. $27.00 
B. I. $46.00-P. D. $27.00 
B. I. $46.00-l?. D. $27.00 
B. I. $89.41-~. D. $62.50 
B. I. $20.70-P. D.$ 5.00 
B. I. $20.70•P. D.$ 5.00 
B. I. 314.81-P. D. 180.00 
$495.31 
14.36 
$480.95 
0 
.:0 
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IN TESTIM:ONY "\VHEREOF, the said Company has 
executed these presents by its proper officers and attached its 
Corporate Seal ,this Fourth day of Septen1ber A. D. 1935. 
I. T. Holdetnan ATTEST~ 
President 
Countersig·ned 
L. vV. Wells Agent 
Alving C. Alderfer 
Secretary 
page 58~ AUTO~IOBILE LI.A.BILITY AND PROPERTY 
DAMAGE POLICY. 
liARLEYSVILLE 1VIUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY. 
(Incorporate under Act of Pennsylvania, No. 285, May 17, 
1921, on June 1, 1922.) 
BY-LAWS GOVERNING TI-IE OPER.ATION OF SAID 
COl\fPANY. 
OBJECT 
I. The object of this Con1pany is the protection of- its mem-
bers for loss or~ clabn against personal injury and property 
damage while 1naintaining or operating· motor vehicles as 
provided by the By-Laws of this Company. 
OFFICE 
II. The office of the company shall be at Harleysville, Mont-
gomery County, Co'ttnty, Pennsylvania, where all general or 
special meetings of the men1bers of the company are to be 
held, but meetings of the Board may be held at such time and 
such places as may be deemed expedient. 
Special meetings of the members of the Company may be 
held at any time by order of the Board, upon notice in like 
manner as for the annual meeting. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
III. The affairs of the Oon1panv shall be conducted bv a 
Board of Directors, V{hich shall consist of not less than seven, 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 67 
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nor more than eighteen ~[embers of the Company, who shall 
be elected annually fr01n the 1nembership of the Company on 
the first Saturday of January (excepting in case 
page 59 ~ of said first Saturday of January falling on New 
Year's Day, \vhen said meeting shall be held on the 
soooncl Saturday), and thirty days public notice by posters, 
and also publication in at least two dailies or three weekly 
newspapers of such election to be given by the Secretary. 
The officers shall consist of a President, Vice-President, Secre-
tary and Treasurer, \vho shall be elected by the Board of 
Directors from their own number. Five Directors shall con-
stitute a quoru1n for the transaction of business. · 
DUTIES OF DIRECTORS 
IV. The Board of Directors shall have full power to fix 
all fees of its officers, appoint representatives and agents and 
fix their commissions, make rates of premiun1s, rules of pro-
cedure, and generally to do and to perform all acts necessary 
for the operation of the Company which do not conflict with 
the By-Laws thereof. 
DUTIES OF OFFICERS 
V. The· duties of the respective Officers shall be such as 
usually devolve upon officials in such capacity. The Presi-
dent shall preside at all n1eetings of the Board or the Vice- · 
President in his absence. The Secretary shall keep proper 
minutes of all n10etings and keep correct record of all in-
surance, and conduct the correspondence of the 
page 60 ~ Company. The Treasurer shall pay all bills upon 
vouchers issued to him, countersigned by the Presi-
dent and Secretary. The Secretary and Treasurer shall fur-
nish Bond with surety for such amount as shall be approved 
by the Board of Directors. The President and Secretary shall 
have full power on behalf of the said C01npany to effect 
insurance as set forth in Article I in these By-Laws, to make 
and execute policies thereof, under the supervision of the -
Board of Directors. No person unless duly authorized in 
writing shall be demned an Agent of this Company. 
VI. The Company agTees under any policy to indemnify 
the assured nan1ed therein ag-ainst loss by reason of the 
liability imposed upon him by law for damages on account 
of: 
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PERSONAL LIABILITY 
A. Bodily injuries and/or death accidently sustained by 
any person or persons not hereinafter excepted by reason of 
the ownership, maintenance, and/or use of the motor vehicle 
( s) described therein, including clahns for bodily injuries 
andjor death, through the loading or unloading of merchandise 
carried on motor vehicle ( s) covered hereunder and specified 
herein. 
LIJ\tiiTS OF LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
And the liability to one or all assured in any policy, due to 
any one accident, is limited to Five Thousand Dol- , 
page 61 ~ lars ( $5,000.00) to any one person, and subject to 
the same limit for each person, the Company's 
total liability from loss due to one accident is limited to 
Ten Thousand ($10,000.00), provided, however, higher limits 
are permitted according to the stipulations made in any policy 
issued. 
PROPERTY DA~1AGE 
B. Dam~ge to or destruction of property of every descrip-
tion (excepting property of the insured or property of others 
used by or in charge of the insured or any of :his employees, 
·or carried in or upon the motor ·vehicle (s) herein:~escribed) 
casused by an accident, including loss of use of propei·ty so 
damaged or destroyed ; 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY FOR PROPERTY DA!1:AGE 
The Company's liability to one or all assured on account 
of any one a~cident is limited to the actual value of the prop-
erty damaged or destroyed at the time of such damage or de-
struction or the cost of its suitable repair or replaGement, 
and in no event shall such loss exceed Five ~rhousand Doliai·s 
($5,000.00) irrespective ·of whether the property of one 'or 
more persons is damaged or destroyed. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Providing the Company shall not be liable under any policy 
issued for loss resulting or arising from any of the following 
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D. Aronovitch. 
causes or ~vhile said motor vehicle is being used 
page 62 ~ or Irl:aintained under any of the following condi-
tions: (a) while operated or manipulated in any 
race or speed test, (b) while driven by any person prohibited 
by law from driving any automobile, (c) while being used 
for towing· or propelling any trailer or other vehicle used 
as a trailer, (d) while being rented or being used to carry 
p~ssengers for consideration expressed or implied, nor $hall 
any policy cover injury to any e,mployee or mnployees of the 
insured while engaged in operating or caring for any of the 
automobiles covered by this policy, nor any obligations as-
sunled 01, imposed upon the insured by any workmen's agree-
ment, plan, or law, nor for accidents occurring while the 
motor vehic.Ie ( s) is being kept, maintained, or used beyond 
the limits of the United States or Canada and ·PROVIDED, 
also that the insured shall be subject to the conditions set 
forth in the within By-Laws as well as any memorandum~ 
if any, endorsed hereto, in like manner as if the san1e were 
respectively repeated and incorporated therein and compliance 
with such conditions and n1emorandum, and each of them 
shall be a condition precedent to the right of recovery there-
under. 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGE 
VII. The Company further agrees to indemnify the said 
insured in addition to the protection afforded in 
page 63 ~ .Article VI: (a) to defend in the name and on be-
half of the insured all claims or suits for damages, 
for such injuries for which damages the insured is, or is 
alleged to be, liable, to pay all costs and expenses incurred 
with the Con1pany 's written consent; (b) pay all taxed costs; 
(c) indemnify the insured for all interest accruing upon any 
;iuclgmHnt; and to repay the insured the expense incurred in 
providing such immediate surgical re1ief as is imperative at 
the time of the accident. 
ADDITIONAL VEHICLES 
VIII. When the assured is covered for one or more addi-
tional cars, and there is only one driver, the rate of premiun1 
for each additional car ~hall be one-fourth the original rate 
for that car; provided that the car requiring the highest rate 
of premium under the then prevailing rates of the Company 
be fixed as the :first car. In· cases where there is more than 
70 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
D. A·ronovitch. 
one driver, and as many drivers as cars, each car must be 
insured at the full rate, provided where there are additional 
cars, or more cars than drivers, such additional cars may also 
be covered by paying one-fourth rate, for which they would 
otherwise be covered. The policy shall not protect during 
such time as Assured has n1ore motoi· vehicles in use or 
operation than the nnn1ber of full premiums paid. 
page 64 ~ O~INIBUS COVERAGE 
IX. It is hereby understood and agreed, unless limited by 
endorsement attached hereto, that each policy is extended 
to cover as additional Assured, any person or persons while 
ric1ing in or legally operating any automobile described in 
the Declaration, and any person, fir1n or corporation, legally 
responsible for the operation thereof, (excepting always a 
public garage, autonwbile repair shop andjor sales agency 
andjor service station and agents and employees thereof), 
provided such usc or operation is with the permission of the 
named Assured, or if the named Assured is an individual, 
'vith the permission of an adult n1en1ber of the Assured's 
household other than a chauffeur or domestic servant. 
IN CASE OF AN ACCIDENT 
X. Upon the occurrence of an accident or loss covered by 
any policy, the Assured shall give b11mediate written notice 
thereof upon blanks furnished by the Company with the fullest 
information obtainable at the time, to the Secretary of the 
Co1npany, or to a duly authorized representative. If a claim 
for damages is made upon the .. A .. ssured on account of such 
accident, the Assured shall im111ediately forward all notices 
of all kinds with full particulars, to the Secretary of the 
Company, and shall in all other respects, whenever requested 
by the Company, aid in effecting settlmnents, ·secure infor-
- mation and evidence, but shall not voluntarily as-
page 65 }- sume any liability or interfere in any negotiations 
for settlement, or incur any expenses, or settle any 
-claim, except at the Assured's own costs, without the written 
consent of the Company previously given. 
BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE 
XI. The insolvency or bankruptcy of the Insured shall not 
release the Company from any payment for which it would 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 71 
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otherwise be liable under any policy, and if such insolvency 
or bankruptcy shall occur, and an execution on a judgment 
recovered in a suit against the Insured covered by any policy 
is returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor shall have a 
right of action to recover the amount of such judgment 
ag·ainst the Company to the same extent that the Insured 
would have had to recover against the Company had the In-
sured paid the said judgnl(~nt; but in no event shall the Com-
pany's liability exceed the limits expressed in the Policy. 
If the death,·~ insolvency or bankruptcy of the Insured shall 
occur during the policy period, the policy during the un-
expired portion of such period, shall cover the legal repre-
sentative of the assured. 
SUB.ROGATION OF RIGIITS 
XII. In case of payment of loss under any policy, the Com-
pany shall be subrogated to all rights of the As-
page 66 ~ sured against any person or corporation, as re-
spects such loss to the amount of such payment, 
and tho Assured shall execnte all papers required and shall 
co-operate with the Company to secure the Company such 
rights. 
CANCELLATION OF POLICY 
XIII. Any policy may be cancelled at any time by either 
party upon written notice stating when thereafter cancellation 
shall be effective; if cancelled by the Cmnpany the earned 
premium shall be adjusted upon a pro-rata basis; if can-
celled by the Insured, the earned pre1nium shall be calcu-
lated upon the basis of the short rate table. Notice of can-
cellation mailed to the Insured shall be sufficient notice and 
check, similarly mailed, a sufficient tender of unearned 
premium. 
CONCURRENT INSURANCE 
XIV. If the Insured named in the policy has any other 
concurrent insurance against a loss covered by any policy, 
he shall recover on the policy no greater proportion of the 
entire loss sustained than the sum hereby insured, in respect 
of such loss, bears to the total amount of valid and collectible 
concurrent insurance applicable thereto. ' 
If any of the terms or conditions of the Policy conflict 
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with the la:w of the State or Province, such conflicting terms 
and conditions shall be inoperative in such State or Province 
insofar as they are in conflict with such law. Any specific 
statutory provision in force in any State or Province shall 
supersede any condition of any Policy inconsistent therewith. 
ME~IBERSHIP 
·XV. The Insured, by .the acceptance of any policy, becomes 
a Member of the Company in Accordance with the Laws of the 
State of Pennsylvania and the By-La-ws of this Company from 
effective date of the policy. 
CHANGE OF BY-LA 'iVS 
XVI. These By-Laws may be altered or amended at any 
special or annual meeting of the Company called for that 
purpose and approved by two-thirds vote of the Members 
present at such meeting. No condition or provision shall be 
waived or altered except by endorsen1ent hereto attached 
and signed by the President and Secretary. 
page 67 ~ Harleysville, Pa., . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 .. 
IN CONSIDERATION of cash deposit of $ ........ paid, 
the within Policy No ....... is hereby renewed and continued 
in full force and effect from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 .. , at noon, 
to · .............. , ........ 193 .. ·at noon, for $ ..... .. 
$ ............ liability and $ ............ property damage. 
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL CASUALTY CO. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secretary. 
Harleysville, Pa., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 .. 
IN CONSIDER.ATION of cash deposit of$ ........ paid, 
the within Policy No. . ..... is hereby renewed and continued 
in full force and effect from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 .. , at noon, 
to ................... 193 .. at noon, for $ ..... · ... . 
$. . . . . . . . . . . . liability. and $ .............. property damage. 
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL CASUALTY CO . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secretary. 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 73 
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Harleysville, Pa., 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 o • o •• o 193 o o -
IN CONSIDERATION of cash deposit of $o •••••• o paid, 
the within Policy No ....... is hereby renewed and continued 
in full force and effect from ..... o o o • • • • • • 193 .. , at noon, 
to ..... 0 •••••• 193 .. at noon, for $ ... 0 0 ••• 
page 68 } $. o •••• o •••• o •• o. liability and$ .......... 0. prop-
erty damage. 
HARLEYS;viLLE MUTUAL CASUALTY CO. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secretary. 
Harleysville, Pa., .. ·-· .... o ••••• 193 .. 
IN CONSIDERATION of cash deposit of$ ...... o o paid, 
the within Policy No. . ..... is hereby renewed and continued 
in full force and effect from o •• o ••• o o • • • • • 193 .. , at noon, 
to ... o o. o o o o. o o o 0 o. o o 193.. at noon, for $ .... 0 ••• 0 
$ ...... o • • • • • liability and $. o o o •••• 0 0 • • prope-rty damage. 
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL CASUALTY CO . 
• o • 0 0 0 •• 0 0 • 0 0 ••••••••• 0 •• 0 •• 0 •• 0 • • Secretary. 
page 69 } SHORT RATE CANCELLATION TABLE- FOR 
TERM: OF ONE YEAR. 
Per Cent. of 
Annual Premium 
1 day ........ o.............. 2 
2 .da.ys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
3 '' ........... 0 •• 0 0. 0.... 5 
4 ,, 0 0 •••• 0 •••• 0 ••••• 0 0. 0. 6 
5 '' .... 0 0 •••••••••••••• 0 • 7 
6 '' 0 0. 0 ••••••••••• 0 •• 0.. • 8 
7 '' .. 0 •••••••• 0 •• 0. 0. 0 0. 9 
8 ,, .. 0 • 0 0. 0 •••••••• 0..... 9 
9 '' .... 0 0 0 0 •••• 0 •••• 0 • • • 10 
10 '' .... 0 0. 0 •• 0 ••• 0 ••• 0 •• 10· 
11 '' ............. 0 •••• 11 
12 ,, .... 0 0 ••• 0 0 • 0 0 ••• 0 ••• 12 
13 '' 0 ••• 0 • 0 •••• 0 •••• 0 • • • • 13 
14 '' 0 ••• 0 0 •••••••• 0. 0. 0 0 •• 13 
15 '' . . . . . 0 •••••••• 0 0 • 0 • • 14 
16 ,, ........... 0 0 ••• 0. 0. 0 14 
17 '' ...... 0 ••••••• 0 •••• 0 •• 15 
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18 '' ...................... 16 
19 '' ..................... 16 
20 '' ...................... 17 
25 '' ..................... 19 
30 '' or one month . . . . . . . . 20 
35 '' . . . . ................ '23 
40 ,, .............. "" ... 26 
45 '' ..................... 27 
50 '' ..................... 28 
55 '' . . . . ................ 29 
60 " or two 1nonths . . . . . . . . 30 
65 ,, . . . . ................ 33 
70 '' ..................... 36 
75 '' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
80 '' . . . . ................ 38 
85 '' ...................... 39 
90 '' or three months ..... 40 
105 ,, ...................... 45 
120 '' or four 1nonths . . . . . 50 
135 '' ...................... 55 
page 70 ~ 150 days or five months . . . . . . . . . 60 
165 '' ...................... 65 
180 '' or six 1nonths . . . . . . . . 70 
195 '' . . . . ................ 73 
210 '' or seven months . . . . . . 75 
225 ,, .................... 78 
240 '' or eig·ht months . . . . . . 80 
255 ,, ..................... 83 
270 '' or nine months. . . . . . . . 85 
285 '' .................... 88 
300 " or ten months ......... 90 
315 '' o o o o o o 0 o o o o o o o 0 I I 0 o o o 93 
330 '' or eleven months. . . . . . . 95 
360 '' or twelve months ...... 100 
page 71 ~ By !Ir., Easley : 
Q. Did you pay the premium which the com-
pany charged for this insurance 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vas this insurance in force at the time of the injury to 
the plaintiff, Marion Ayres? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you complied with all the provisions of the policy? 
A. So far as I know to the extent of my oblig·ation under 
the policy. 
l\farion Ayres v. Harleysville _Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 75 
D. Aronovitch. 
Q. I-Iad you violated any of those conditions 7 
A. No, sir, not any of them. 
Q. After the accident occurred and claim was made upon 
you by Marion Ayres, please state 'vhat action you took with 
respect to giving notice to the insurance company? 
A. On the date of the accident, I communicated the fact 
to the representative of the company, Mr. Wells. 
Q. At that time no claim had been made against you on 
behalf of ~iarion Ayres at all, had it 1 
A. No, sir. 
By the Court : You say you communicated to the insurance 
company and who else? 
A. To the representative of the insurance company, Mr. 
L. W. Wells, of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
page 72 ~ B.y lVIr. Easley: 
· Q. About how long after that was it before any 
claim against you was made by lVIarion Ayres? 
A. As well as I recollect, it was some 30 days before it 
was indicated to n1e that there 'vould be a claim. 
Q. Did you take any ac.tion with reference to notifying 
the company again when claim was made against you? 
A. Yes, sir, I submitted the particulars through my counsel 
to the Harleysville lVIutual Casualty Company. 
Q. Your counsel was :Mr. R.oyston Jester, Jr., of Lynchburg, 
Virginia, was he? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. After that, was any action or suit brought by lVIarion 
Ayres against you for the injuries? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With what result? 
A. '¥'ith the result of a judgment against me being entered 
in this Court for $20,607.00. • 
Q. Please state whether or not the insurance company was 
notified immediately and promptly of the institution of this 
suit against you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please state whether or not the insurance company was 
given the opportunity, and requested to defend that suit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With what result? 
page 73 r A. No participation on the part of the insurance 
company in the defense of the action whatever, 
until the matter had been taken to the Supreme Court of 
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Appeals, at which time I \Vas advised by Mr. Jester that coun-
sel for the insurance company had agreed to-
By :rvfr. 1\fay (Interrupting) : "\Ve don't think this is ad-
missible. If counsel insists upon it, we would like to argue 
it, in the absence of the jury. 
By ~Ir. Easley: We do not insist upon it, except to show 
that, under the provisions of the policy, that notice was given. 
By ~Ir. 1\rlay: We concede that proper notice ·was given. 
By Mr. Easley: And further that in all stages of the pro-
ceedings, your con1pany was kept notified of the conditions and 
request to them was reiterated at all times. 
By 1\IIr. May: Yes, sir. · 
By the Court: You are agreed on that, are you¥ 
By Mr. Easley: Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\tir. Aronovitch, please state whether or not the in-
juries for which this damage was recovered against you, was 
caused by any of the vehicles mentioned in this insurance 
policy, and if so, which one (handing paper to witness) 7 
A. The injuries were caused by Dodge tractor, 
page 7 4 ~ indicated on this policy as T15-1867; motor number 
8617414, and which was a part of a unit along with 
the Black Diamond semi-trailer, in this policy Manufacturers' 
No. E-5503, both of which were purchased by me in 1935. 
Q. You were not present at the time of the accident and 
have no personal knowledge as to 'vho was driving or oper-
ating your automobile at that time, have you? 
A. I was not present at the time of the accident. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. ~Ir. Aronovitch, when was 1\farion Ayres first employed 
byyouY 
A. As well as I recollect, it was possibly in ~lay, 1935. 
Q. What did he do 'vhen he first came with you 7 
By Mr. Easley (Interrupting): There was another thing 
that I overlooked.. I think we should have it in the record. 
B.y Mr. May: All right. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. Since this judgment was rendered, has any payment been 
made on the judgmentY 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 77 
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A. The amount of the s~/Jpersedeas bond, $8,500.00, has been 
paid. 
page 75 ~ Q. That was paid .by your surety on the bond, 
was it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And thero now remains. still due on the judgment more 
than $10,000, the limit mentioned in this policy, does itt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company didn't pay 
any part of that payment that was paid, did they 1 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
By Mr. Easley: You concede- that they paid no part of it, 
do you, :Nlr. May¥ 
By 1\fr. May: Yes, sir. 
By 1\tir. Easley: We just 'van ted to prove that as a matter 
of affirmative proof. 
C:a,OSS EXAl\tiiNATION (Continued). 
By Mr. May: 
Q. What was he employed to do when you first took him 
on? 
By 1\fr. Coleman: We object to this evidence as being im-
material to any issue in the case, and 'vish to state that the 
only material evidence along this line ·would be as to what 
duties ~fr. Ayres was engaged in at the time of the accident .. 
The insurance policy states, 'vith respect to these exceptions-
which is the only defense set up in the grounds 
page 76 ~ of defense-that he is not insuring against liability 
for injury to an ''employee or employees of the in-
sured while engaged in operating or caring for any of the 
automobiles covered by this policy". I take it that that means 
nothing more than what he was engaged in doing at the time 
of the accident, regardless of what his duties 'vere; regard-
less of what he was employed for and when he was employed, 
and I repeat, what duties were placed upon him at the time 
of his employment. This evidence must be confined to what 
he was engaged in at the time of the injury to him. That 
seems to be clear to me. 
By Mr. Easley: May I add this : There is a further reason 
why and that is that the insurer, having been given notice of · 
this suit, and, not only an opportunity to defend it, but an 
actual request to defend it, the issue as to what this mail's 
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duties were-if that is material at all-and what his position 
\vas and what the position and duty of Scruggs were, is con-
cluded as to that by the judgrnent rendered in this case, and 
we have here a copy of the opinion of the Suprmne Court of 
Appeals, which we want to introduce in evidence. 
By 1Ir. 1\{ay: I don't think that would be proper to go into 
before the jury. 
page 77 ~ By J\i[ r. Easley : I don't mean to do so ; if you 
want the jury to retire, of course, that is all right. 
Bv the Court: It seems to n1e that that can be taken care of 
latei· on. In all probability, I think what was in the con-
templation of the parties may throw some light on what took 
place at the tin1e. You may answer that. 
By lVIr. Easley: For the purpose of the record, may we 
have this understanding: Without taking up time to argue 
these objections, or to repeat them after each question, may 
it be understood, without our objections and exceptions, that 
they apply to all questions asked any witness along this line, 
just as if they were n1ade to each question. 
By the Court: Along which line? 
By lVIr. Easley: Along the line of ,·vhat his duties were, or 
what took place between the other parties at any other time; 
all evidence outside of evidence as to his actual occupation. 
By the Court: You had better make your objections as 
they arise. I will ask that the question be read. (The ques-
tion is read.) 
By the Court: Answer that. 
page 78 ~ By ::Mr. Easley: We except to the ruling of the 
Court for reasons stated. · 
A. l\fr. Ayres was engaged for the purpose of selling soft 
drinks in the City of Lynchburg. 
By ~{r. 1\Iay: 
Q. How n1any people were to be on the truck that he oper-
ated in the City of Lynchburg? 
A. Himself. 
Q. Just himself Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How was he~ paid then Y 
A. lie was paid a weekly wage; it was contemplated that 
he might develop sufficient business to justify a commission, 
but during that period of his employment, he was paid a 
we~kly 'vage. 
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Q. That was not then determined on a mileage basis at that 
time? 
A. No, sir. 
By the Court: Was he operating the truck himself then f 
A. In the City of Lynchburg; as a truck salesman, if I may 
supplement that. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. At that time what were the common duties incident to 
that jobf 
page 79 ~ By ~Ir. Easley: We object to that upon the addi-
tional grounds that it has nothing to do with the 
issues in this case. 
By the Court: I don't see any materiality in it. 
Q. That was in 1935, was it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the accident was when f 
A. This was in 1\{ay, 1935, and the accident was on the 16th 
day of October, 1935. 
By ~Ir. ~lay: I am going into the question purely to show 
that over a long period of time, Mr. Ayres was thoroughly 
familiar and understood his duties, quite irrespective of 
whether or not he is considered the actual driver or helper 
on the truck. For that reason, we think that the evidence 
has a bearing on the case, although, of course, the ultimate 
question to be decided is whether or not he was at the time 
engaged in the operation a.nd care of the truck. 
By the Court: It seems to me that that is the sole question. 
This other 1nay throw some light on it, but it seems to me 
·that that is the issue in the case. 
By Mr. Colmuan: Yes, sir; how could what he did in May, 
1935, throw any light on 'vhat he did in October? It was a 
different truck and in. a different capacity; he was employed 
altogether differently. 
page 80 ~ By the Court: I don't think that the question 
is proper-what l1e was doing on that truck in 
May, 1.935. 
By Mr. May: If I may, at a proper time, I would like 
later on to develop that feature of it. 
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By the Court: All right, sir. 
ByMr.May: . 
Q. After Mr. Ayres was taken off this truck, I 'vill ask you 
when he was taken off the job that you have just discussed Y 
A. There was an intern1ission; from the latter part of June 
until some time early in ;.T uly, he was not employed at all. 
Q. What was his next position? 
A. His next position was that of a long distance truck 
driver, on a truck of the trailer type. 
Q. Ho'v many men were on trips of that. kind~ 
A. Usually two. 
Q. Was the trip on which he was on-on which Ayres 
was on, was that one of those trips, that you speak of1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when he was on that job, what was expected of him-
'please st~te the common duties expected of him. 
By Mr. Easley: We object to the question. 
The objection was overruled and counsel for the Plaintiff 
excepts to the ruling of the Court for reasons heretofore 
stated. 
page 81 ~ By Mr. May: 
Q. What was expected of him f 
A. It was expected of him that he would-
By the Court (Interrupting) : In all probability that word 
· ''expected" is "rhat is objectionable. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. What were his obligations within the scope of his em-
ployment, a~cording to his contract? 
By Mr. Easley: We object to that, because it is not a ques-
tion of his obligations within the scope of his emplovment, 
but what he was actually doing. · 
The foregoing objection was overruled, and the Plaintiff 
excepted for reasons stated heretofore. 
By ~fr. May: 
Q. What was your underR_tanding with l\Ir. Ayres as to 
what he was to do 1 
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Counsel for the Plaintiff objects to the question for reasons 
stated. The objectjon is overruled and the Plaintiff excepts. 
A. My understanding as to his duties was that he was ·~~ 
be a driver with the other man on the truck for the purpose 
of driving the truck from Lynchburg to the point of destination . 
and back again. · 
By Mr. Ea.~ley: We object to that because it is not a cross 
examination as to anything asked on direct examination and 
he makes the witness his own witness on anything. 
page 82 r along this line and he is bound by his testimony 
along these lines. 
By l\1r. l\iay: Th~n I will call him as an adverse witness. In 
view of the different interests of the parties, I can do that, I 
think. 
By the Court: You haven't asked any leading questions 
as yet. · 
By 1\!Ir. Coleman: He is questioning him about matters that , 
we did not ask him about at all. 
By the Court: Yes, sir, and makes him his own witness. 
By Mr. l\1:ay: Not if he is adverse. 
By the Court: Do you call him as an· adverse witness as to 
new matters? 
By 1\Ir. ~lay: Yes, sir. 
Q. In making these trips from Lynchburg to Rochester, 
what had to be done to get the trip started? 
By Mr. Easley: We object to that as not being material. 
The foregoing objection was overruled and the Plaintiff ex-
cepted for reasons stated. 
A. I cannot answer that. What do you mean "what was 
to be done" ? 
page 83 ~ By Mr. )\!fay : 
thing? 
Q. Did the truck have to be loaded with any-
A. If there were containers to be taken, those containers 
were usually loaded on the truck. 
Q. On this particular trip in question, were there_ con-
tainers loaded on the truck? 
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A. They were supposed to be ; I was not present at the 
time the truck was loaded. 
Q. And the truck was supposed to take the1n to Rochester, 
was it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it supposed to bring anything back? 
A. Yes, sir; they had· an order for smne 400 cases. Our 
record will show 'Yhat it was, and the number of cases on the 
truck at the time it left Lynchburg. 
Q. 'Vho generally would load the trucks that 'vould have to 
. take the beer crates back to Rochester? 
/ .
. / A. It was generally loaded in the warehouse by such help 
/ as there was in the warehouse. It was assumed that the 
1 truck driver would assist in the loading. i' 
i 1 Counsel for Plaintiff objects to this statement for reasons 
stated heretofore. 
By Mr. lVfay: 
Q. Was that true as to lVIr. Ayres on this particular trip 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
pag·e 84 ~ By ~Ir. Easley: lVe object to that because it is 
not 1naterial to any issue in tl1is case. None of this 
is in the grounds of defense. Let us read the grounds of de-
fense and read the policy. 
By the Court: I will ask the jury to retire to their room. 
(The jury at this tin1e retired to their room.) 
By Mr. Coleman: The grounds of defense state "at the 
time of the injury''; and the policy says ''at the time of the 
injury". What he was doing· and what orders he w·as given, 
and what his contract was, could not affect the liability of the 
company under this policy. Suppose 1\Ir. Ayres, for example 
-say that on his way to work that morning that he had gotten 
to work and was lea·~ling the plant to get a1 drink of ''rater be-
fore he got on the truck and started out, but while getting 
a drink of water, Mr. Scruggs started the truck and ran into 
him and injured hin1. The question would be what he was 
engaged in at the time of the accident, but what he was sup-
posed to perform is not a part of this case at all. It should 
be confined and they have confined it in the grounds of de-
fense, to what he was doing at the time he received the in-
jury. If he received the injuries whi1e he was engaged in 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville 
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here. 
By the Court: I think that Cc: 
page 85 ~ of by proper instructions. ·what 
. · would certainly have probative value 
was doing, acting within the scope of his authorit 
of the accident. 
\ .. 
By ]\{r. Coleman: There is another point that we did not 
want to discuss in the presence of the jury. The Court of 
Appeals in deciding this case has decided positively by its 
opinion and judgment that Scruggs was solely caring for the 
truck at the time of the injury to ~fr. Ayres and that he 
· was operating the truck. There has been a judgment on that. 
By the Court: Do they use the word ''sole,.,~ \ 
By J\Ir. Easley: Yes, sir, they say "alone". ~ ) 
By Mr. Coleman: It says that upon him, alone-upon -. 
Scruggs alone-was placed the duty of caring for the truck. J J 
That is the judgment of the Court in this case. '/ 
By the Court: I think the questions are proper as a mat-
ter of evidence and we will get to the la.w at the proper time. 
The Plaintiff excepts to the ruling of the Court for reasons 
stated. 
page 86 ~ (The jury at this time returned into the Court 
room.) 
By J\fr. Easley: Shall we object to each question, your 
Honor~ 
By the Court: Yes, sir. 
By Mr. ~lay: 
Q. vVas ~Ir. Ayres a licensed driver for this kind of work? 
A. I understood that he had a driver's permit, yes, sir. 
. Q. Did he have to have any further authority to engage in 
the work of truck driving? 
A. I don't understand that he was required to have a 
chauffeur's license. 
Q. ~I1·. Aronovitch, did you insist on your drivers having 
only JJerhaps of the simple principles of automobile me-
chanics f 
A. I attempted to determine that they were competent. 
Q. Did that enter into their employment 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
dupreme Court of A ppea]s of Virginia 
D. A ronovitch . 
.
. ·r Q. Why did you want them to have a knowledge of at least 
. the simple forms of mechanics 1 
1 A. So that they could-well, iiJ. the first place, that they 
rcould be cautious in driving; so as to be able to perform the 
rordinary duties on the route, of checking- the tires; an~ put-
:ting in gasoline and checking the lubricating oil, and natu'rally 
. ·l ( to insure the economical and safe operation of the 
'j 1 page 87 ~ trucks. 
, \ Q. Did that anticipate the doing of sin1ple re-
pairs-such as repairs of a· blown out tire 1 
A. No-it did not anticipate the repair of blown out tires. 
Usually they ca·rried several tires-several spares to take care 
of any tire troubles on the road. 
Q. Say that an old tire went down, it would be replaced, 
would it-there would be a replacement made, 'vould there 
notY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who made a simple replacen1ent of that kind? 
A. I don't know except what I contemplated they might do. 
Q. \Vhat did you contemplate? 
By Mr. Easley: We object to what he contemplated. 
By the Court: The objection will be sustained. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. What were the duties of the drivers with reference to 
making simple repairs? Were they to take it to a garage 
man? 
A. It was understood to be the duty of the drivers that 
they would check and make sure. that the lug bolts on the 
wheels were at all times safe, and check the gasoline and oil 
on the route, and buy it as required, and if there were any 
repairs to the tires or anything of that kin.d, it was 
page 88 ~ anticipated that they would get such assistance 
en route as was available, or report immediatelv 
to the office the need of such repairs as could not be made 
on the road. Q. Such repairs as could be made by them Y 
A. Such repairs as could be made by them or such repairs 
as they could get on the road. Very often repairs were 
made on the road. 
Q. When two men were on that truck, was it entrusted to 
any particular one of them or both of them-,vere they both 
- supposed to take care of the truck? 
A. As a matter of fact, they were supposed to-
·I 
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Counsel for the Plaintiff objects to the question and the ob-
jection is sustained. 
Q. What was the basis of pay of the two men on this truck 
that were involved in this accident 1 
A. If I recollect correctly, there was an arbitrary basis of 
pay of $11.00 per round trip to· Rochester and return; $8.60 
was the arbitrary rate of pay for a round trip for each driver 
to Brooklyn and return. 
Q. And as to mileage, what is that per mile? 
A. It is approximately one cent a mile. 
Q. How much did Scruggs make with reference to so much 
a mile-did he make one cent a mile? . 
A. Yes, sir; as I recall it a c~nt a Inile for Scruggs and one 
cent a mile for Ayres, for the round trip. 
page 89 ~ Counsel for the Plaintiffs object to the question 
and 1nove to strike the answer from the record, 
whieh objection and motion is overruled and the Plaintiff~ 
except for reasons heretofore stated. 
. . 
Q. This cent a n1ile, did that include the mileage which 
·was made by the n1an when he was driving-actually under 
the control of the wheel--or when he was not driving aud 
did not have actual control of the wheel 1 
A. The pay of a cent a n1ile \Vas for the trip for each of the 
two drivers, and in particular we could not specifically state 
a.t the time that each or both, in starting on the trip, whether 
or not one might drive one mile or 10 miles or 50 miles, but 
our rate of pay was based on the trip. So much a trip for 
each driver. 
Q. Then I take it, if they, got $11.00 approximately, for the 
trip to Rochester and return, after a calculation, that it was a 
distance of 550 miles each way. Is that correct 1 
A. That is correct, approximately. 
Q. The drivers were paid for all the mileage made, whether 
or not they were under the wheel? 
A. They were paid by the trip. 
Q. So that there will be no misunderstanding, I will ask 
it over again and if you will answer it, I will appreciate it. 
In other 'vords, I am trying to get at whether or not the driver 
and the person with him-whether or not the driver 
page 90 ~ was actually under the wheel or sitting beside tho 
driver on .the trip, whether they get a cent a mile? 
A. If two men start on a. trip to Rochester and they both 
( 
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get back from the trip to Rochester, each of them is paid 
at the rate of a cent a mile for the trip. 
Q. For the entire trip~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 'Vhen they got to Rochester, would the men's duties re-
quire them to unload or load the trucks there? 
.A. As a matter of fact, Mr. lVIay, the report that I would 
get fron1 the men was that these people at the platform would 
usually unload and load their trucks while they were there 
resting or checking their trucks. 
Q. Checking with reference to the details that you men-
tioned awhile ago 1 
A. Yes, sir; the oil, the g-asoline, and the lug bolts, and so 
forth. 
Q. Did they, as a matter of fact and practice, ever take part 
in the unloading and loading of trucks at R.ochester ~ 
.A. I would not know that. 
Q. "\Vere these n1en, while on the trucks, on each trip, were 
they subject to call at all tin1es to perfonn services that you 
considered necessary for them to perform~ 
A. They were usually given notice in. advance that the trip 
was contemplated and, when things were ready, 
page 91 ~ they ·would take the trip. 
Q. And if one person was not driving, he was 
subject to call to take the wheel, I take it. In other words, 
they were subject to your call during the whole trip? 
.A. To my call~ · 
Q. Yes, in the event you wanted to call them. 
A. As to either or both of them f 
Q. As to both of them? 
A. It would be bupossible for me specifically to stipulate 
to each of them as to how they were to arrange about the 
times that each or both of the1n nlight drive while on the 
trip. In the event of an en1erg·ency, or if it should become 
necessary for either of them to cmmnunicate with me on the 
telephone at the office, it would usually be the man "rho had 
been in my employ the longest at the time; or the man who 
was in charge of the money. 
RE-DIRECT EXA!1INATION. 
·, By Mr. Easley: 
Q. On this particular trip on which this injury occurred, 
there were two drivers on the truck at the time, were there 
notY 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who 'vere they 1 
A .. Tom Scruggs and :Marion Ayres. 
Q. 'Vhich one of these men had charge of the 
page 92 ~ 1noney or was the longest in your employ on that 
trip? 
A. At that particular thne, Tom Scruggs was the longest. 
Q. On this truck you had two drivers usually on these 
round trips. Was there any provision made by you in the 
truck for a bed or a bunk? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. vVhat was that for~ 
A. This particular truck had what is called a sleeping cab, 
and it was provided so that either driver, when not actually 
driving, might rest, and it was to promote the reas.onable con-
tinuous driving of the truck, so that either driver might com-
fortably sleep while the other was driving. 
Q~ In other words, under your arrangen1ents with your 
drivers-with :n.rr. Ayres particularly, was that your drivers, 
when the n1en were not driving, that the man was free to go 
to sleep in his bunk, provided for tha.t purpose, or to do what-
ever he pleased? · 
A. That was a matter that they arranged between them-
selves, because it would be a matter of impossibility for me to 
say specifically that he was to drive for a certain time and 
that the other man was· to drive for a certain distance. 
Q. But the man that was not driving, 'vhmi he was not driv-
ing, he was free to go to sleep, wasn't he, if he 
page 93 ~ wanted to? 
A. So far as I kno,v, he was. 
Q. And you had no agreement to the contrary, did you~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't expect the man that was driving to go to 
sleep, did you 1 
A. Naturally not. 
Q. There is another question I want to ask you: I want 
to ask you this-in your business-the beer business-how 
many men at this time did you have regularly employed Y· 
A. 1Digl1t. . 
Q. JDight men? 
A. JDntirely,-eight employees altogether. 
Q. Eight employees altogether' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that the maximum number employed at any one 
time~ 
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A. That was the maximum number. 
Q. How many of these 8 were regularly employed Y 
A. Six. 
Q. In that business, I mean? 
A. Six. 
Q. Were you af that time operating your business under 
any Workmen's agreement, plan, or law? 
A. I don't quite understand what the vVorkmen's agree-
ment, plan, or law, might mean. 
page 94 ~ By 1\IIr. l\fay: Vl e object to that, because it is 
, entirely a n1atter of la\v, which the Court will deter-
. mine on the evidence before it. We think that the question 
askvd is pure]y a legal one. 
By the Court: How can the Court know anything about it 
unless it is stated that there was some agreement or plan? 
By Mr. Easley: I ·will frame it differently. Instead of using 
the very language of the policy, I will ask you: Did you have 
with Mr. Ayres any agreement for paying compensation for 
his injuries in this particular case? 
A. No, sir .. 
Q. Was there any plan formulated for the payment by you 
of any compensation for the injuries that he sustained 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Virginia, 
where the operator of a business comes under.that-----within the 
terms of that la\v-he is required to post with the Compeu-
f:iation Commission either a cmnpensation insurance or a bond. 
I will ask you if any such compensation insurance for your 
employees, or any such bond, was required or filed by you 
with the Compensation Com1nission 1 
A. Not at that time. 
page 95l By Mr. Easley: We want to also, your Honor, 
at this time, by agreement of counsel, to file as 
Exhibit "B" what we have heretofore mentioned as an ex-
tract-
By Mr. May (Interrupting) :· I have the original, if you 
wish it. . 
By Mr. Easley (Continuing) : -copy of the pleadings-all 
of the pleadings-the notice of motion, the Bill of Particu-
lars, and the grounds of defense, in a damage suit involved 
in this inquiry here, and in which judgment was obtained. 
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By the Court: The pleadings in which Ayres got his judg-
ment for $20,607.001 
By !fr. Easley: Yes, sir; as Exhibit No. B, with leave to 
read or refer to it as part of the evidenc~ in this case. 
(The foregoing papers are filed as Exhibit B, and are made· 
a part of this record, and are in the following words and 
:figures, to-wit:) 
page 96 ~ EXHIBIT "B'' FOR PLAINrr'IFF. 
"D . .Aronovitch v. Jill arion Ayres. 
VIRGINIA: 
PLEAS before the Honorable Edward 1feeks, Judge of the 
Circuit Court of the County of Amherst, at the Court House 
of the said County, on the 14th day or November, 1936. 
BE IT RE!fElVIBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: on the 
27th day of January, 1936, came Marion Ayers, and filed 
in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court for tlie County of 
Amherst, his notice of motion against D. Aronovitch, doing 
business under the name of I{ings Distributors, praying dam-
ages against the said defendant in the sum of Thirty Thousand 
Dollars, 'vhich said notice of motion was returnable to the 
1st day of the February Term, 1936, of the Circuit Court of 
Amherst County, and which went into the hands of the Sheriff 
of Amherst County and was duly returned duly executed; 
'vhich notice of motion is in the following words and figures, 
to-wit: 
TO D. ARONOVITCH, doing business under the name of 
KINGS DISTRIBUTORS: 
You are herepy notified that on the 1st day of the February 
Term, 1936, of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, 
(which by law is appointed to be held on the lOth day of ],eb-
rua.ry, 1936) at ten o'clock ..... ~. M., or as soon there-
page 97 ~ after as counsel can be heard, I the undersigned 
Marion Ayers, will move the said Court at the 
Court House of said County, for a judgement against you for 
the sum of TI-IIRTY ($30,000) THOUSAND DOLLARS, 
which sum I claim to be entitled to recover of and from you by 
reason of the facts set forth in the following two counts of 
this notice of motion, to-wit: 
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FIRST COUNT: That heretofore, to-wit, on the 16th day 
of October, 1935, yon were in the business of distributing· 
beer from your headquarters in the City of Lynchburg·, Vir-
ginia, to retail customers adjacent thereto, and in connection 
with the operation of your said business you owned and oper-
ated a number of auton10bile trucks by you used to transport 
beer from breweries in other States to your warehouse in 
Lynchburg and to deliver the same fron1 the said warehouse 
to your said customers ; and on the day aforesaid you sent 
one of your said trucks ineluding a trailer thereto attached 
from the said city of Lynchburg·, Virginia, to Rochester, New 
York, loaded with a large nu1nber of empty bottles to be re-
turned to the brewery in Rocl1ester and to bring back from 
the brewery. in Rochester a load of beer to your warehouse in 
Lynchburg, which said truck and trailer you put in charge 
and custody of one, II. T. Srruggs, as your agent and vice-
principal to operate, control and direct the moven1ents of the 
said truck and trailer, to drive the same and to 
page 98 ~ make any necessary repairs to the said truck and 
trailer including brakes thereon, and you also em-
ployed me to go along on the said truck under the control and 
direction and supervision of the said Scruggs, your \rice-prin-
cipal aforesaid, to relieve the said Scruggs as driver of the 
said truck 'vhen he should so direct n1e; that I had no choice 
or discretion as to the thnes o1· periods during which I should 
drive the said truck, nor any duty or responsibility in connec-
tion with the inspection, maintenance, repair or upkeep of the 
said truck and trailer, and during the periods when I \vas not 
driving the said truck I had no duty or work to perform 
and I was not engaged in any w·ork for you but I was a 
mere passenger in the said truck, being- transported by you 
under contract of hire with you, to the point of my actual em-
ployment, which transportation by you was a part of the con-
sideration for my services under n1y contract of employment 
and I was therefore at such periods a passenger for hire in 
your said truck; that while I 'vas such a passenger, as afore-
said, in your truck, being transported along U. S. Highway 
No. 29, near the Tow·n of 1\'Ionroe, in Amherst County, .Vir-
ginia, your said agent and vice-principal, to-wit~ the 
said Scruggs was driving the said truck for you in 
the course of his employment and unlawfully and neg:. 
ligently attempted to overtake and 1)ass another truck 
owned and operated by one Wood and hereinafter called the 
Wood truck, travelling along the said Highway in the same 
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direction and when the said Wood Truck undertook 
page 99 ~ to cut across the said highway to the left at about 
the time your truck, travelling at a greater ~·ate of 
speed than the vVood Truck, had gotten to a point to the left 
of tl1e Wood Truck and the front of your truck was even with 
or past the rea-r of the Wood truck thus making it impossible 
for your truck to complete the passing of the Wood truck 
and at the san1e time rendering the danger of collision with 
said truck imminent, your said agent and vice-principal im-
mediately applied the brakes on your said truck with 
fu1l force at the same time also cutting your said truck to 
the left to avoid a collision with the said Wood Truck, but be-
cause you had unlawfully, negligently and carelessly sent your 
said truck upon the said highway without properly equipped 
and adjusted brakes in plain violation of the statute laws of 
Virginia, without taking any precautions or 1naking any in-
spections to sPe to the safety of the brakes, and indeed with 
actual knowledge, through your said agent and vice-principal, 
Scruggs, that the said brakes 'vere in a wholly inadequate, 
dangerous and defective condition, the said truck could not be 
stopped and was run and operated by your said agent with 
the wheels on one side of the said. truck skidding for a dis-
tance of ninety-two feet and was caused to come and be pro-
pelled into violent collision with a large tree growing beside 
the said highway while I was sitting· as a passenger on the 
seat in the cab of the said truck, so that by force 
page 100 ~ of the collision of the said truck with the said tree 
I was violently thrown and hurled a great distance, 
to-wit, forty-two feet out of and over the front end of your 
said truck and thrown with great force and violence upon the 
ground so that by reason thereof I 'vas greatly broken, 
bruised, mangled and torn and became unconscious, and w:as 
rendered sick, sore, lame and disordered and disabled and 
whereby the 1Jones, flesh and the nerves in my body were 
broken, torn, bruised and injured and my right eye 'vas in-
jured and I was rendered and became paralyzed in my side, 
arm, hand and face and have so continued from thence hither-
to, and whereby I was caused to and did incur large expenses 
in endeavoring to be healed of my said injuries, to-wit, doctor's 
bills aggregating· $320.00, hospital bills aggregating $199.00, 
n1edical bills $23.00, nurses bills $65.00, aggreg·ating· $607.00, 
and whereby I will be caused and compelled to spend other 
large sums in medical, hospital and doctor's bills in endeavor-
ing to check, ameliorate and cure my said injuries, and where-
by I was rendered totally and wholly disabled from perform-
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ing any work or labor for hire from thence hitherto and 
will continue to be so disabled by reason of said injuries as 
long as I live; and thereby sustained a loss of at least $22.00 
per week during the total period of my disability past and 
future and will thereby sustain serious or total 
page 101· ~ loss of n1y earning- capacity duri1;1g· the rest of 
my life or a reasonable expectation of thirty-eight 
years and whereby I was caused great physical pain and 
mental anguish and will continue so to suffer permanently to 
my damage of $30,000.00. 
SECOND COUNT. And for this also, to-wit, that hereto-
fore on and before the 16th day of October, 1935, I was ein-
ployed by you as helper on one of your automobile trucks 
used by you in your business of l1auling beer and beer con-
tainers, which said truck was placed in the care, custody and 
control of your vice-principal one H. L. Scruggs, whom you 
charged with the duty of inspecting the said truck for needed 
repairs, including any repairs that might become necessary 
to -the brakes on the said truck, and "'ith the duty of reporting 
any defects and having the same corrected, and some days 
prior to the 16th day of October, 1935, while I was on a trip 
with the said truck with your said vice-principal, the said 
Scruggs, I called his attention to the facf that the brakes 
on the said truck had become and were defective and dan-
gerous and were in need of repairs and the said Scruggs on 
your behalf and in the line of his employment and duty as 
your agent and vice-principal in that behalf, promised that the 
said truck would receive the necessary inspection and repairs 
so as to make said bral{es reasonably safe and effective, as 
soon as it got back to the City of Lynchburg, Vir-
page 102 r ginia, from, said trip: that the said truck after re-
turning from the said trip remained in the City of 
Lynchburg in the care, custody and control of you and your 
said agent and vice-principal, Scruggs, for several days during 
which time I did not see or know anything about the said 
truck and assumed and believed (as I had a right to do) 
that the said brakes had been put in good repair and in a 
reasonably safe and effective condition as promised, and there-
after, on the 16th day of October, I was required to go to 
Rochester, New York, on the said truck with the said Scruggs, 
and while I was on the way and the said truck was being driven 
by the said Scruggs on U. S. Highway No. 29 near 1\tlonroe, 
Virginia, through an emergency created by the combined neg-
ligence of the said Scruggs, who was driving your truck and 
one Wood, the operator of a truck traveling ahead of us and 
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in the same direction on the said highway, it became necessary 
quickly to stop or materially check your said truck in order 
to avoid a collision with the said Wood truck and the' said 
Scruggs immediately applied the bral{es of the said truck but 
you and your agent had wholly failed to have the said brakes 
put in repair, but in plain violation of your duties and obli-
gations in the premises, and the criminal laws of· the State 
of Virginia, you had sent your said truck in charge of your 
said ag·ent and vice-principal Scruggs, out upon the hig·hways 
of the State of Virginia., with inadequate and de-
page 103 ~ fective brakes so that as a result thereof tlie said 
brakes, on account of their defective condition, as 
aforesaid, braked the wheels on one side only of the said truck, 
so that said truck could not be properly controlled or stopped 
within a reasonable distance by the driver thereof and so 
continued to travel being guided by the said Scruggs, in the 
only course that appeared to the said Scruggs to be fraught 
with the least danger under the surrounding circun1stances 
for a distance of ninetv-two feet after the said brakes were 
applied, skidding the ~vheels for that distance on one side 
of the truck only, and thereafter struck a tree growing on 
the side of the highway with great force and violence; where-
. as if your said truck had been equipped with reasonably safe 
and effective brakes it could and would have been stopped or 
its speed so greatly reduced as to avoid or render harmless 
its collision with said tree; so that as a result of your said 
negligence I was hurled and thrown from my seat in the 
said truck forward over the fr.ont end of your said truck for 
a distance of forty-two feet and thrown violently upon the 
ground, whereby I was greatly cut, wounded, bruised, n1angled 
and torn and becanw unconscious, and was rendered sick, sore, 
lame and disordered and disabled and whereby the bones, flesh 
and nerves in n1y body were broken, torn, bruised and in-
jured and I was rendered and became paralyzed in my right 
side, al'ln, hand and face and have so continued 
page 104 ~ fron1 thence hitherto and whereby I was caused 
to and did incur large expenses in endeavoring to 
be healed of my said injuries, to-wit, doctor's bills aggre-
gating $320.00, hospital bills aggregating $199.00, n1edical bills 
$23.00, nurses bills $65.00; aggregating $607.00 and whereby I 
will be caused and compelled to spend other large sums in 
medical hospital and doctor's bills in endeavoring to check, 
ameliorate and cure my said injuries and whereby I was 
rendered totally and wholly disabled from performing any 
work or labor for hire from thence hitherto and ·will continue 
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to be so disabled by reason of said injuries as long as I live; 
and thereby sustained a loss at least $22.00 per week during 
the total period of my disability past and future and will 
thereby sustain serious or total loss of my earning capacity 
during the rest of my life or a reasonable expectation of thirty-
eight years and 'vhereby I was caused great physical pain and 
mental an·guish and win continue so to suffer permanently 
to my damage $30,000.00. 
Wherefore at the time and place aforesaid I shall move the 
said Court for a judgment against you for the sum of THIRTY 
THOUSAND DOLLARS. 
JOHN D. EASLEY, p. q. 
John D. Easley, p. q. 
MARION AYERS, 
By Counsel. 
page 105 r Filed in Clerk's Office Amherst Circuit Court 
Jan. 27, 1936. 
W. ·E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
RETURN OF SHERIFF. 
D. Aronovitch, (doing business as l{ings Distributors) not 
being found at his usual place ·of abode in Amherst County, 
I served the within process on him by delivering a copy 
thereof in writing and giving information· of its purport to 
Ethel Aronovitch, who was found there, and who is a member 
of his family and above the age of sixteen years, in· Amherst 
County, on the 25th day of January, 1936. 
A. D. WATTS, S. A. C. 
By J. P. BEAR.D, D. S. A. C. 
And on another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court of the 
County of Amherst, continued and held at the Court House 
thereof, on Wednesday, the 12th day: of February, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred and ~hirty-six. 
Marion Ayres 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doin~ business as King's Distributors. 
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MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
This day came the plaintiff and asked leave to file an amend-
ment to his original notice of motion, which leave 
page 106 ~ is granted, and said amendment is ordered filed. 
Marion Ayers 
v. 
D. -Aronovitch. 
ADDITIONAL COUNT ADDED BY WAY OF AMEND-
MENT. 
By leave of court, I amend my original notice of motion 
by adding thereto another count to be attached to and con-
sidered as a part of my notice of motion for judgment, which 
additional count is as follows: 
And for this also, to-wit: that heretofore, to-wit; on and 
before the 16th day of Octob_er, 1935, I was employed by you 
as helper on one of your automobile trucks, used by you in 
your business of hauling beer and beer containers, which said 
truck you placed in the care, custody and control of your agent 
and vice-principal one, T. L. Scruggs, who was charged by you 
with the duty of driving or operating the said truck and the 
duty of inspecting the said truck at all proper times for needed 
repairs, and with the duty of having made all necessary and 
needed repairs to the said truck, including any necessary or 
proper repairs to the brakes on said truck; that in the course 
of my employment by you I was required to and did ride in 
and upon the aforesaid automobile truck in the care, custody 
and control of your said agent and vice-principal, Scruggs, 
and I assumed and believed, as I had a right to do, that the 
said Scruggs was a reasonably careful, prudent 
page 107 ~ and competent operator of the said truck, but as 
a n1atter of fact he was a careless and incom-
petent operator or driver and the fact of his incompetence and 
recklessness was known to you, or could and would have been 
known to you by the exercise of ordinary care on your part 
prior to the 16th day of October, 1935, but you wholly failed 
to exercise such care in your employment of the said Scruggs 
and kept him in your employment of in charge of your said 
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autonwbile truck, charged with the duty, among other things, 
o:f operating- the same, after the fact of such incon1petence 
and carelessness became known to you, or could and would 
have become known to you by the exercise of ordinary care 
on your part; that on the 16th day of October, 1935, I was 
employed as helper for the said Scruggs on one of your auto-
mobile trucks and sent along with hbn in the course of my 
employ1nent on a trip from Lynchburg, Virginia, to Roches-
ter, New York, with the said Scruggs in charge of and driving 
and operating the said truck; that in violation of the statute 
laws of Virginia and in violation of the duties you owed me 
you sent the said truck out on the said trip with defective, 
inadequate and unsafe brakes, with full knowledge through 
your said agent and vice-principal, Scruggs, of the fact that 
the brakes on the said truck were ineffective, inadequate and 
dangerous, but which fact was unknown to n1e because I had 
previously called attention of your said vice-principal Scruggs 
to the unsafe and dangerous condition of the said 
page 108 ~ brakes you promised n1e through your ~aid agent 
and vice-principal, Scrug·gs, that the same would 
be repaired and mnple time had elapsed for the repair of the 
same, and in reliance upon such promise I believed that the 
said brakes had been put in safe and effective condition in 
accordance with said promise; that on the 16th day of October, 
19~5, while I was riding in the said truck, sitting in the cab of 
the said truck where I "ras required and had a right to be, 
and which the said truck was being operated by your said 
agent and servant, Scruggs, as aforesaid, upon the public 
highway known and designated as U. S. Highway, No. 29, 
near :Monroe, Virginia, your said agent and vice-principal, 
Scruggs, recklessly and negligently undertook to drive and 
operate the said truck around and to pass another truck 
on the said l1ighway traveling· in the san1e direction at a 
point in the said highway at or near the brow of a hill and 
at a place where the said highway was marked or laned by 
a 'vhitc 1nark designating w·hich side of the said highway. 
northbound traffic was to occupy and your said operator of the 
said truck in atten1pting to pass t.hc aforesaid truck in front 
of hhn, both of which trucks were traveling in a northerly 
direction, pulled your said truck over on the left of the center 
of the said highway and on the wTong side of the highway 
as shown by the aforesaid markers, and carelessly operated 
the same at a reckless rate of speed and without 
page 109 ~ keeping the same under proper control, and hav-
ing gotten your said truck in this dangerous situ-
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ation or condition the other said truck pulled over to the left 
of the said highway in front of your said truck so as to render 
the danger of collision betwe~n the two trucks imminent, and 
the said Scruggs thereupon immediately applied the brakes 
on your said truck, but on account of their defective, ineffec-
tive and dangerous condition the said .brakes failed to stop 
or effectively to c11eck your said truck, and your said driver, 
Scruggs, after having negligently and unlawfully gotten your 
said truck into such dangerous condition, and finding himself 
unable to stop or appreciably to check the speed of said truck 
then guided and operated it sharply to the left and off of the 
said highway in order to avoid a collision with the said truck 
in front and ran and operated the same with great force and 
violence against a large tree growing beside the road and 
the impact of the collision with the said tree threw me with 
a great force and violence against the side or front of the 
cab of the truck and over the front end of your truck and 
with great force and violence upon the ground, whereby I 
was greatly cut, wounded, bruised, mangled and torn and 
became unconscious, and was rendered sick, sore, lame and 
disordered and disabled and whereby the bones, flesh and 
nerves in my body were broken, torn, bruised and 
page 110 ~ injured and I was rendered and became paralyzed 
in my right side, arm, hand and face, and have so 
· continued from thence hitherto and whereby I was caused to 
and did incur large expenses in ·endeavoring to be healed of 
my said injuries, to-wit, doctor's bills aggregating $320.00, 
hospital bills aggregating $199.00, medical bills $23.00, nurses 
bills $65.00; aggregating $607.00, and whereby I will be caused 
and compelled to spend other large sums in medical, hospital 
and doctor's bills in endeavoring to check, ameliorate and cure 
my said injuries and whereby I was rendered totally an_d 
wholly disabled froni performing any work or labor for hire 
from thence hitherto and will continue to be so disabled by 
reason of said injuries_ as long as I live; and thereby sustained 
a loss of at least $22.00 per week during the total period of 
my disability past and future and will thereby sustain serious 
or total loss of my earning capacity during the rest of my 
life or a reasonable expectation -of thirty-eight years ·and 
whereby I was caused great physical pain and mental anguish 
and will continue so to suffer permanently to my damage 
$30,000.00. 
Wherefore at the same time and place aforesaid I shall 
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ha11e the said court for a judgment against you for the sum 
of THIRTY ($30,000.00) TI-IOUSAND DOLLARS.. 
1YfARION AYERS,~ 
By Counsel. 
page 111 ~ JOHN D. EASLEY, p. q. 
John D. Easley, p. q. 
Filed by leave of Court, Feb. 12, 1936. 
W. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
Royston Jester, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
Peoples National Bank Building 
Lynchburg, Va. 
February 12, 1936. 
W. E. Sandidge, Esq., 
Clerk of the Circuit Court, 
Amherst, Virginia. 
Dear Sir: 
Re: :M~arion Ayers v. D. Aronovitch. 
Referring to the above, I hand you herewith a copy of a 
letter I an1 sending to J\ilr. John D. Easley, Attorney for the 
plaintiff, today, requesting a bill of particulars therein. 
You will please file the copy of such request to 1\IIr. Easley 
with the papers in this matter. 
Thanking you in advance for your attention to the above, 
I am, 
Yours very truly, 
ROYSTON JESTER, JR. 
page 112 ~ rj-y-
enclosure 
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Filed in the Clerk's Office, Amherst Circuit Court, Feb. 
13, 1936. 
W. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
Royston Jester Jr. 
Attorney a.t Law 
Peoples National Bank Bldg. 
John D. Easley, Esq., 
Attorney at Law, 
Krise Building, 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
Dear John: 
Lynchburg, 1Va. 
February 12, 1936. 
Receipt is acknowledged of a copy of your amendment to 
the notice of motion for judgment in the case of Ayers 
against Aronovitch, no·w pending in the Circuit Court of Am-
herst County. 
You will please furnish me with a bill of particulars, rela-
tive to the following matters that have been alleged and set up 
in your notice of motion for judgment and its amendment. 
(1) You alleged that the plaintiff was not required to per-
fornl any duty or work but was a mere passenger in the truck, 
being transported under his contract of hire, ''to 
page 113 ~ the point of my actual employment". 
We desire to know when and where the con-
tract of hire 1vas made and where was the ''point of his· 
actual employment". Also when did such employment com-
mence and end 1 
(2) How was the plaintiff paid for his service and by who1n 
was he paid? 
(3) In ''rhat manner did Scruggs, the driver of the truck 
mentioned in the notice of motion for judgment, attempt to 
unlawfully and negligently attempt to overtake and pass the 
Wood truck as alleged in the notice~ 
( 4) In what n1anner 1vere the brakes upon the truck de-
fective and improperly adjusted? 
( 5) You alleged also that the truck was not equipped with' 
proper brakes. In what respect were the brakes upon the 
truck improper equipment? 
-- ~ ---
I 
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· (6) At what rate of speed was the truck being operated by 
Scruggs just before and at the time of the accident Y -
(7) When and where did the plaintiff call to the attention 
of Scruggs that the brakes upon the truck were defective, 
. dangerous and not in proper repair and condition T 
Royston Jester, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
Peoples National Bank Bldg. 
Lynchburg, Va. 
John D. Easley, Esq. -2- February 12, 1936. 
page 114 ~ (8) When and where did Scruggs promise that 
the brakes upon the truck would receive the neces-
sary inspection and repairs ? · 
(9) What repairs 'vere needed to the brakes upon the 
truck? 
(10) You have alleged that the accident grew out of an 
emergency created by the combined negligence of the said 
Scruggs and one Wood. In what manner was Scruggs negli-
gent and when was he negligent? 
(11) You have alleged that Scruggs was a careless and in-
competent driver and that his incompetence and recklessness 
was known to the defendant. When did the plaintiff learn that 
Scruggs was a careless, incompetent and reckless driver and 
when and where was that information made known to the 
defendant? 
(12) You have alleged that Scruggs operated the truck at a 
reckless rate of speed in attempting to pass the truck ahead 
of him. At what rate of speed did he operate the truck in 
attempting to pass the truck in frorit of him Y 
{13) You have alleged that the plaintiff has suffered a loss 
of a least $22.00 per week. What was the plaintiff earning 
per week before and at the time of the accident Y 
(14) How much per week has the plaintiff earned since the 
accident? 
page 115 ~ (15) Has the plaintiff made any effort to obtain 
emploYJnent since the accident 1 
I shall thank you to let me have a bill of particulars cover~ 
ing the above promptly and upon receipt of same, we shall 
prepare our grounds of defense and a copy thereof will be 
:forwarded to yon. 
Since you sent me a copy of the· letter that you wrote Mr. 
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W. E. 8andidge, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Amherst 
County, enclosing a copy of your amended notice, I shall send 
him a copy of this letter with the request that the same be 
filed in the papers in this action. 
Yours very truly, 
ROYSTON JESTER, JR. 
rj-y-
cc: Mr. W. E. Sandidge. 
Filed in Clerk's Office; Amherst Circuit Court, Feb. 13. 
W. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
Law Offices 
John D. Easley 
Lynchburg, V a,. 
Mr. Royston Jester, Jr., 
Attorney-at-Law, 
Peoples National Bank Bldg., 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
page 116 ~ Dear Roy : 
February 21, 1936. 
Marion Ayers v. D. Aronovitch, Circuit Court of Amherst 
County. 
In reply to your letter of the 12th instant I beg leave to 
give you below the particulars of the plaintiff's claim relative 
to the matters set forth in your letter of the 12th. 
1. The plaintiff entered the employment of D. Aronovitch 
as helper and the contract of hire was made in the City of 
Lynchburg on or about the 7th of October, 1935. Under such 
contract of employment the plaintiff went, as helper, on the 
defendant's h·uck when it was sent on trips to New York or 
elsewhere for beer. On the 16th of October when the accident 
occurred the plaintiff got on the truck at Lynchburg, Va., and 
was to be transported as a passenger from that· place until he 
102 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
D. A t·onovitch. 
was called upon to drive which was expected to at Staunton, 
Virginia. 
2. The plaintiff was paid for his services by D . .Aronovitch 
by check. 
3. Scruggs, the driver of defendant's truck, was negligible 
in atternpting to overtake and pass the ''rood truck in that 
the said Scruggs was attempting to pass the said truck at 
or ncar the brow of a hill where. the road ahead 'vas not in 
plain view and at a curve; in not keeping the said truck under 
con1plete control; in operating· the said truck in a manner 
likely to endanger life, lin1b or property of other 
page 117 ~ persons; at a careless and reckless rate of speed, 
rnore than was reasonably and proper, having due 
reg·ard to the traffic, surface, width of tho highway, the topog·-
raphy of tho road and snrrouuding terrane, and the knowl-
edge of the said Scruggs that tho brakes on the said truck were 
in an inadequate and unsafe condition, which fact was un-
known to the plaintiff; in driving to the left of the center 
of the said highway where his view of approaching vehicles 
would be obstructed; in driving· on tho wrong side of the high-
way, as indicated by tho \vhitc lines or rnarkers placed in the 
said highway by tho State liighway Department. 
4. The brakes on the defendant's said truck 'vere defective 
and i1nproperly adjusted in that they did not brake or stop 
the wheels on but one side of the truck and ·were not adequate 
. to control the n1ovcrueuts of and to stop the said truck as re-
quired by law, and were not in good working condition as re-
quired by law. 
Nir. R. Jester, Jr., -2- Feb. 21, 1936. 
5. The brakes on the said truck were not proper equipment 
for the said truck because they did not comply 'vith the pro-
visions of the following sections of the code of Virginia, as at 
present an1endecl; (Sec. 2154-Sub-Sec. 129) (Sec. 2154-Sub-
Sec. 146). 
· 6. Scrugg·s, the driver and vice-principal for the defendant, 
Aronovitch,, states that he was driving the truck 
page 118 ~ at a rate of speed estimated at between twenty and 
thirty miles per hour just before and at the time 
of the accident. Plaintiff is unable to give the exact rate 
of speed of the said truck but avers that it was greater than 
was roasona ble in view of all the surrounding circumstances 
then and there existing. 
7. Plaintiff called attention of Scruggs to the defective and 
I • 
Marion .Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. 103 
D. A·ronovitch. 
dangerous condition of the brakes near Elkton, Maryland, 
on or about October 11th, 1935, and at or near Baltimore, 
:Wiaryland, on or about October 12th, 1935, while returning 
frmn a trip to B.roolclyn, New York. 
8. Scruggs promised on both of the occasions last above 
mentioned that the brakes would receive necessary inspection 
and repairs when they got back to Lynchburg. The truck got 
back to Lynchburg in charge of Scruggs on the afternoon of 
October 12th, 1935, and was not in use hut in the defendant's 
custody and control for three whole days, during which time 
the said brakes could and should have been repaired, and 
plaintiff believed that they had been so repaired in accord-
ance with the promise n1ade him. 
9. The brakes needed such repairs as were necessary to 
make then1 adequate to control the movements of and to stop 
the said truck within a reasonable distance after being ap-
plied and so as to brake the wheels on both sides of the said 
truck equally and evenly and to enable the driver 
page 119 ~ of the said truck to stop the same within the dis-
tances prescribed by law. 
(10) Scruggs w·as negligent in the particulars hereinbefore 
set forth and such negligence occurred imn10diately preceding 
the accident aud injury to plaintiff. 
( 11) Plaintiff did not learn that Scruggs 'vas a careless 
and incompetent driver until after he was injured, but the 
defendant had actual knowledge of the carelessness and in-
cmnpetence of the said Scruggs and with such kno·wledge re-
tained the said Scruggs in his en1p)oyment in charge of 'the 
said truck for at least two weeks prior to plaintiff's said 
injuries, and ho"~ much longer the defendant had such knowl-
edge the plaintiff is unable at this time to say. But plaintiff 
believes and avers that the defendant did not exercise due and 
reasonable care in en1ploying the said Scrug·gs as a driver . 
and putting hin1 in charge of the said truck 
(12) Refer to answer in Paragraph (6) above. 
J\fr. R. Jester, Jr., 
-3- Fe b. 21, 1936. 
(13) Plaintiff's earnings at the time of his injuries averaged 
twenty-two dollars per ·week. 
(14) Plaintiff has not earned and has been physically ua-
able to earn anything since his injuries. 
(15) Plaintiff has n1ade no effort to gain e1nployment since 
the accident because physically unable to do any 
page 120 ~ kind of work. 
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I am sending a copy of this letter to the Clerk at Am-
herst with request that he file the same as an informal state-
ment of the particulars of the plaintiff's claim and trust 
that you will let me have your grounds of defense as early 
as prac~icable. 
JDE:C 
Yours· very truly, 
JNO. D. EASLEY, 
Atton1ey for Marion Ayres. 
Copy to: W. E. Sandidge, Clerk, Amherst Circuit Court, Am-
herst, Virginia. 
NOTE: Wherever the work truck is used in referring to 
the truck of the defendant it is intended, in both the notice of . 
motion and the foregoing bill of pa-rticulars, to mean and in-
clude not only the motive vehicle but also the trailer thereto 
attached, either or both. 
JNO. D. EASLEY, 
Attorney for l\farion Ayres. 
Filed in Clerk's Office, Amherst Circuit Court, Feb. 25, 
1936. 
W. E. 8ANDIDGE, Clerk. 
page 121 ~ And on another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
of the County of Amherst, begun and held at the 
Court House of said Court, in said County, on l\fonday, the 
13th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine 
hundred and thirty-six, and in the 160th year of our Com-
monwealth. 
Marion Ayers 
'lJ. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Distributors. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and the de-
fendant for plea says tha.t he is not guilty in manner and 
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form as the plaintiff in his notice of motion against him 
hath alleged, and of this he puts himself upon the country 
and the plaintiff likewise. And the Defendant also .filed his .. 
plea of "Not Guilty" and his "Grounds of Defense", to which 
plea the plaintiff replied generally. And by consent of all 
parties it is ordered that this case be continued to the 12th 
day of May, 1936. · 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Amherst, Virginia. · 
Marion Ayers 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business under the name of Kings Dis;. 
tributors. 
PLEA OF· NOT GUILTY. 
page 122 ~ The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and 
says that he is not guilty of the premises in this 
action laid to his charge, in manner and form as the plaintiff 
hath complained. And of this the said defendant puts him- · 
self upon the country. 
ROYSTON JESTER, p. d. 
Filed by leave of Court, Apr. 13, 1936. 
' 
W. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
In the-Circuit Court of the County of Amherst, Virginia. 
Marion Ayers 
v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business under the name of lungs Dis-
tributors.' · . 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defendant, for grounds of defense, in the above styled 
action, sets out the following: 
(1) Defendant specifically denies each and every allegation 
of negligence as charged against him, including all such alle-
gations co~tained in the said plaintiff's additional count added 
by way of amendment. 
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(2) Defendant denies the following allegations which are 
set forth in either the said plaintiff's notice of motion for 
;judguwnt or the aforesaid additional count. 
(a) That H. T. Scrugg·s was his vice-principal. 
(b) That the truck and trailer 1nentioned and 
pag·e 123 ~ referred to in the aforesaid pleading·s of the said 
plaintiff were placed by the defendant in the 
charg-e and custody. of the said H. T. Scruggs as his agent 
and vice-principal to operate, control and direct the move-
ment thereof; to drive the smne and to n1ake any necessary 
inspections thereof and to nutke or have 1nade any necessary 
repairs thereto, including the brakes thereon. 
(c) That the said plaintiff was employed by the defendant 
-to go along on the said truck and trailer under the control, 
direction and supervision of the said Scrugg·s, to relieve the 
said Scruggs as driver of the said truck and trailer when the 
said Scruggs should direct hhn to drive the said truek and 
trailer. 
(d) That the said plaintiff had no choice or discretion as 
to tin1es or periods during whieh he should drive the said 
truck and trailer. 
(e) That there was no duty or responsibility on the said 
plaintiff in connection with the inspection, maintenance, repair 
and upkeep of the said truek and trailer. 
(f) That the said plaintiff was transported as a 1uere pas-
senger on the said truck and trailer and during the periods 
when he was not driving the said truck, he had no duty or 
work to perform. 
(g·) That the said plaintiff was being trans-
page 124 ~ ported on the said truck and trailer as a passenger 
as part of the consideration due hi1n or to become 
due hin1 for any services and that he was being transported 
to the point of his actual employn1ent . 
.. (h) That said truek and traile1· were equipped with im-
proper, inadequate and not adjusted brakes. 
(i) That no precautions had been taken by him or that he 
had failed to haYe the said brakes on the said truck and 
trailer inspected. 
(j) That he had any actual knowledge, through the said 
Scruggs, that the said brakes on the said truck and trailer 
were in a wholly inadequate, dangerous and defective condi-
tion. 
(k) That the duty of inspecting the said truek and trailer 
for needed repairs rested solely on the said Scruggs. 
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(l) That prior to October 16, 1935, the said plaintiff made 
any complaint to the said Scruggs about the said brakes on the 
said truck and trailer and that tht} said plaintiff called to 
the attention of the said ·Scruggs that the said brakes were 
defective and dangerous. 
( m) That any pron1ise was made by the said Scruggs to the 
said plaintiff to have the brakes repaired. 
(n) That the said Scruggs was an incompetent and reckless 
d1iver. 
page 125 ~ ( o) That it was known to the defendant that the 
said Scruggs was an incornpetent and reckless 
driver. 
(p) That the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care 
before employing the said Scruggs. 
( q) That the defendant kept the said Scruggs in his employ-
ment, with 1."11owledge that the said Scruggs was an incom-
petent and careless driver. 
( r) That the said plaintiff was en1ployed by him as a helper 
to the said Scruggs. · 
( s) That the said Scruggs was guilty of negligence as 
charged by the said plaintiff in his aforesaid pleadings. 
(3) Defendant alleges that the said plaintiff and the said 
Scruggs w·ere mnployed by hhn as employees and servants 
to drive, operate, control, n1anage and inspect the said truck 
and trailer on identically the san1e basis, each having the same 
authority, control and responsibility, under their mnployment 
'vith hiin, with reference to t.he said truck and trailer and 
duties to be perforn1ed by thmn while in joint charge nnd con-
trol of it as they were at the tin1e of the accident con1plained 
of; that they were employed by hin1 as aforesaid to take the 
trip 1nentionecl in plai11tiif's said pleadings; that their duties 
and responsibilities on the said trip, under their said mnploy-
ment with hin1, w·ere the same, no distinction being n1ade be-
tween them in n1anner whatever; that they were 
page 126 ~ fellow-servants upon the said truck and trailer 
with the smne duties to perform, one having no 
more authority and control over it than the other; that the 
said plaintiff assun1ed the risks and perils ineident to his 
service and mnploy1nent and likewise assumed the risk of neg-
ligence, if any, of his fellow-servant, the said Scruggs. 
( 4) Defendant also alleges that the aforesaid truck and 
trailer were practically new, having· been in use less than two 
111011ths priol' to the said accident con1plained of, and 'vere 
in good repair and condition, including the said brakes there-
on; that the said hrakes -had been inspected prior to the com-
•. 
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mencement of the aforesaid trip and were in good condition 
when the said truck and trailer were turned over to the said 
plaintiff and the said Scruggs to take the aforesaid trip. 
( 5) Defendant also alleges that prior to purchasing the 
aforesaid truck and trailer, he exercised ordinary care to ac-
quire a reasonably safe truck and trailer equipped with 
reasonably safe and efficient brakes. 
(6) Defendant also alleges that it was one of the duties 
of the said plaintiff, under his employ1nent, to report to him 
any defects in the said truck and trailer, including the said 
brakes thereon, if any were discovered or detected but at 
no time did the said plaintiff ..make any report to him or 
complain to him in any manner whatever about 
page 127 ~ the said truck and trailer as well as the said brakes 
thereon. 
(7) Defendant also alleges that he ext~rcised reasonable 
care for the safety of his employees and servants on the afore-
, said truck and trailer in that he furnished them with reason-
ably safe- equipment and had given them specific instructions 
to follow for their protection in connection with the use, 
control a.nd operation of the said truck and trailer, not only 
for their own safety and welfare but also for the proper care 
of the said truck and trailer and especially the said brakes 
thereon. 
(8) Defendant further alleges that the said pJaintiff 'vh~n 
he entered tlie aforesaid employment and service, not vnly 
assumed all of the usual risks of such service and employment 
but also assumed all of the risks from causes which were 
- known to him or which should have been readilv dh;cernible 
by him. · 
(9) Defendant ·also alleges that the said plaintiff who was 
a truck driver and operator of sufficient age and experience, 
assumed the risks of his employment and service and even 
though there had been negligence as alleged by the said plain-
tiff, in his said pleadings, it is not negligence that can be im-
puted to this defendant. 
(10) Defendant further alleges that the said plaintiff and 
the said Scruggs in the driving, operation and control of the 
. aforesaid truck and trailer on the aforesaid trip 
page 128 ~ were engaged in a joint enterprise and the negli-
gence, if any, of the said Scruggs, would be im-
puted to the said plaintiff. 
(11) Defendant further alleges that the said accident com-
plained of and the injuries alleged by the said plaintiff to have 
resulted therefrom, grew out of a sudden emergency in which 
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the said Scruggs was placed by the dl'iver of a truck ahead 
of him cutting or tu1ning the said truck sharply to the left 
side of the highway being used, without giving any signal of 
his intention so to do and the said Scruggs, in an effort to 
avoid a collision with the said truck ahead of him which had 
turned suddenly to the left as aforesaid turned the said truck 
suddenly to the left and in so. doing, struck a. slight embank-
ment and by reason of the impact of the said truck and trailer 
with the said embankment, the said Scruggs lost .temporary 
control of the said truck and trailer; and that the said Scruggs 
in such sudden emergency and sudden peril, exercised such 
care as a person of ordinary care would have exercised under 
the same or similar circumstances. 
(12) Defendant further alleges that the said plaintiff failed 
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and that he was 
guilty of contributory negligence since he failed to keep a 
proper lookout and to give any warning to the said Scruggs. 
(13) Defendant will rely upon his plea of "not 
page 129 ~ guilty''. 
(14) Defendant reserves the right and privi-
leg-e to change, Inodify, add to andjor amend these grounds 
of defense and to file additional grounds of defense if he 
· shall be so advised. 
D. ARONOVITCH, 
doing business under the name of l{ings 
Distributors. 
ROYSTON JESTER, JR., p. d. 
Filed by leave of Court, Apr. 13, 1936. 
W. JYI. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
By lYir. Easley: 1Ve· wish also to file the no-
pag·e 130 ~ tice of execution-we wish to file as Exhibit '' C" 
the notice of execution~ whicli was served on the 
Harleysville l\Iutual Casualty Company, of Hatleysville, 
Pennsylvania; in tliis case, with the return thereon. 
By Mr. l\fay: We may he· able to· stipulate on that. You 
may dictate the effect of it. 
By l\1r. Easley: It is agreed betwe-en counsel that the fol-
lowing. notice of execution was served on the Harleysville 
Mutual Casualty Company of Harleysville, Pennsylvania-
By the Court: Is if dated Y 
~10 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
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By l\'Ir. Easley: No, sir, I thought it was somewhere on 
the· folder, but the return does not sho'v the date of its serv-
ice. 
By the Court: It is agreed that Exhibit "C" may be filed 
us evidence in this case; that the notice of execution served 
on the IIarleysville Nlutual Casualty Con1pany is hereby, by 
agreement of counsel, introduced and filed as Exhibit C. It 
speaks for itself. 
By ::Mr. )\fay: As a necessary part of the formal proof, 
we will not dispute it on that score. 
page 131 ~ (The foregoing paper is marked as Exhibit No. 
"C ", and is in the following words and figures, 
to-wit:) 
''TO I-IAl=tLEYSVILLE ~1:UTUAL CASUALTY CO~f­
p ANY, HARLEYS.VILLE, PENNSYLVANIA., 
You are hereby notified that there is now in the hands of the 
Sergeant for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, an execution 
in favor of :-:Niarion Ayres v. D. Aronovitch, doing business 
as J{:ing's Distributors for $20,607.,00 with interest from the 
14th day of l\1ay, 1936, and $126.75 cost, subject to a credit 
of $8,500.75 as of .January 20, 1938, leaving a balance due 
as of January 20, 1938, of $14,209.07. 
Date Judgment was recovered is Novmnber 11, 1937. 
Date original execution was issued is November 27-, 19·37. 
Date of renewal or additional execution is January 25, 
1938~ 
Return date of renewal or additional execution is April 4, 
. 1938. 
Date execution was placed in hands of officer is January 
28, 1938. 
By virtue of the statutes this execution is a lien on any 
fund now in your hands belonging to said D. Aronovitch 
and/or K:ing's Distributors, or which may come into your 
hands during the life of this execution and upon any debt, 
liability or obligation owing by you to said Aronovitch or to 
said King's Distributors, and you are hereby notified not to 
pay said Aronovitch or l{ing's Distributors any--
page 132 ~ thing until the aforesaid execution has been sat-
isfied. 
Respectfully, 
(Signed) .JOHN D. EASLEY, 
Attorney for Plaintiff.'' 
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On the reverse side of said notice appears the following: 
'' l\1arion Ayres 
v. 
Harleysville l\1utual Casualty Company, garnishee of D. 
Aronovitch, etc. 
NOTICE. 
Executed in the City of Richmond, Va., J any 27, 1938, by 
delivering in duplicate a copy of notice to F. D. Young, the 
. acting- Secretary of the Comn1onwealth of Virginia, and the 
person in charge of said office and as such the statutory agent 
for Harleysville l\1utual Casualty Company, Harleysville 
Pennsylvania. Place of business and place of residence of 
said Young being in the City of Richmond, Virg-inia; •Fee of 
$2.50 paid Secty at time of service. 
H. HER.BERT 1\IERCER, 
Sheriff of the City of 
Richmond, Va. 
By S. G. 1\fEROER., 
Deputy Sheriff. 
Sheriffs fee $1.00 paid JHl\L 
2.50 Secty 
1.00 Paid. 
3.50 Paid'' 
page 133 ~ By 1\rfr. Easley: "\Ve wanted to show that as a 
Inatter of form in fixing the liability by evidence 
of the service of the notice, but they waived that. All right. 
By l\fr. ~Iay: If your Honor please, there were some other 
features of his testin1ony that I wanted generally for the 
record. I "\vill do that at such time as suits your convenience. 
By the Court: Let's see what you want generally. We 
will let the jury retire. 
(The jury at this tin1o retires from the Courtroom.) 
By 1\fr. ~Iay: I ·want to ag-ree to anything that you ·want 
to go into the record, but I believe that the Court will take 
judicial notice of the opinion. I don't want to encumber the 
record any more than necessary. 
.- . .: . 
·~~~ S~pren;le C.ourt ~of Appeals of Vh:ginia 
D. A.ro.no.1)itch. 
By -tl;l~ Co:urt : The Court will take judicial· notice of the 
opinion of the Supreme ·Court of the State of Virginia. What 
do you want g·enerally f 
By Mr. fi'Iay: I want generally from this witness the en-
tile e;mpJoyment of lVlr. Ayres, from May until the time of 
the accident-. the different capacities in which he may have 
worked. 
By the Court: Ask him such questions as you wish and 
show what you 'vant to go into the record. 
page 13~ ~ By Mr. fi'Iay: 
· Q. I believe, lVlr. Aronovitch, that l\{r. Ayres 
was ezp.ployed in l\{ay, 1935, and when was it that he first 
bega~ to do long distance hauling for you 1 
4. ln J"llly, 1935 . 
. Q. And he had worked -in that capacity as long distance 
hauler about how long whe.n he received his injuries 7 
.A. His employment in long distance hauling was not con-
tinuous from July. There were intermissions of several 
wee~ when he 'Va$ nof employed, as well as I remember. 
Prior to the 7th of October, 1935, there had possibly been 3 
weeks when he was not employed. 
Q. From July until October 16th there were about 3 weeks 
of that time when lVIr. Ayres was not employed? 
A. I think there was one 3-weeks period prior to that. I 
don't know specifically, but there were one or two intermis-
sions in between that he was not employed. -
Q. ·From the 7th of October until the 16th of October, 1935, 
he was ·continually employed, was he? 
A. At such times as trips were necessary. 
Q. Po you. ~.ow how many trips were necessary from Oc-
tober 7th to the 16th? 
--·A,~ I could· ].J.ot tell you that specifi~ally; possibly three. 
l;f I remember correctly, possibly-as I say, I am recalling 
this from me1llory-I believe just about the third trip from 
tb~ 7th o~ October, tba.t it wa~ they were on at the time of the 
accident. - · 
page 135 ~ -Q. State approximately how many long dis-
tance trips were made by l\1:r. Ayres from the 
time he went on duty as. a long distance man until October 
7ili! - . 
A. It wo-q.ld, be v:ery approximate. and from memory. We 
have re~ords of eaGh trip which were made in long distance 
l,J.a~11n2; in t;hat. period; it might be 10 or 12 or more or less. 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., etc. ll'->-. 
D. A ronovitch. 
Q. During the progress of this trial, will you secure your 
record on that point and bring it back here? 
A. Yes, I can give you the exact number of trips made by 
Mr. Ayres or any other driver, because \Ve have it on file,-
a statement made and a settlement with each driver at the 
time he was paid. .The man's name and the trip he took would 
be put down, and a check made in accordance with the money 
coming to him. 
Q. I will be grateful to you for that information.· 
A. vVe can get that information for yqu. . 
Q. We want the dates of the trips that were made and the 
returns. 
A. Yes, sir, I can get that information for you. 
By 1\fr. Easley: Between the 7th and the 16th. · 
By J\tir. May: You may just as well get all of the long dis-
tance trips·¥ 
-
A. Prior to October 16th, 1935. 
Q. Yes, sir. 
page 136 ~ A. You would not ·be·interestf!d in anything af-
ter that? 
Q. Subsequent to October 1935. 
A. It would be quite a volume. 
Q. He was not on the job except from July to October, was 
he? 
A. What you \vish me to do is to obtain the records of the 
trips made until the tin1e of the accident. 
Q. Yes sir. 
A. And you are not interested in trips subsequent to that¥ 
Q. No one else except Mr. Ayres. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did I make it clear-I just want a record of the long 
distance trips made by Thfr. Ayres. 
A. Not with whom but "just by him. 
Q. Yes, sir, just by hin1. That is all, sir. 
By the Court: Is there any objection to this. 
By J\tir. Easley: I don't see that it has any bearing on the 
n1atter. 
By the Court: \\That is your objection to it Y 
By Mr. Coleman: We objected to the introduction of ·evi-
dence at the time he was questioning him as to what he was 
doing in J\fay and the Court sustained the objection.- ··Now, 
<" 
,P·· 
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it in thP. record for the Court of Appeals ·when he 
gets there. . 
p o '137 ~ By ~fr. ~Iay: I had not anticipated that. 
By :Nir. Coleman: We objected at the time and 
the Court sustained the objection. 
By the Court: I sustained the objection as to what the 
man did in :Niay in loading the beer in the City of Lynchburg, 
but as to how many trips he made in J\Iay to October, I dicln 't 
hear any objection to it. 
By l\fr. Easley: I don't sec any necessity for encumbering 
the record with immaterial matters. 
By ~fr. J\'Iay: Do you 'vant that to go before the jury~ 
. By the Court : You Inay ask the question when we bring 
the jury back. 
(The jury at this tirne returns into the Courtroom.) 
By Nfr. ::May: I will ask the shorthand reporter to read 
to the jury the testiinony that l\Ir. Aronovitch just gave, and 
which the Court has held is proper· to consider. 
By the Court: "\Vill the reporter please read those· ques-
tions and answers? 
(The questions and answers asked and answered in the 
absence of the jury were at this tiine read to the jury.) 
page 138 ~ By l\Ir. l\'Iay: 
Q. You spoke of a bed being- in the truck it-
self. What did a trip, say to Rochester and return-how 
many days usually would that take? 
A. The round trh1 usually took most of three days. 
Q. During those two or three nights that came in those 
days, were the drivers to stay at a hotel, or were they con-
tinually to drive-one drive and one rest while the other 
was driving 1 
A. It was expected that they would l1ave sleeping accom-
n1odations in the truck during the trip. 
By the Court: One drive awl1ile and the other slept, and 
/then the other drove awhile? 
A. "Yes, sir. 
\ 
'By ~Ir. 1\fay: 
Q. You don't say that, when one was not driving, he 'vas 
always sleeping, do you 1 
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A. I don't know; I would not know. (J. Was it expected that the drivers would leave the truck 
at any tin1e, from the time it left until it got back 1 
A. You mean be away from the truck Y 
Q. Yes, sir. . 
A. That would be a matter over 'vhich I could have no con-
trol. 
Q. Did you give any instructions with reference to that? 
A. No, sir. 
page 139 ~ Q. Who paid the expenses of the tripY 
A. Their personal expenses were deducted from 
the one cent a mile which they were paid, except if there were 
any emergencies or any unusual delays in a trip, a part of 
thP.ir personal expenses would be paid by me. 
Q. So usually and normally, they would buy their own 
meals, would they 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
vVitness stands aside. 
By Ivfr. Easley: As a n1atter of form, to complete our rec-
ord, we want to get the Clerk of this Court to read the judg-
nlent of the Court, approving the judgment we referred to 
here. That is the best evidence and I would like to do that 
before we adjourn for lunch. We cannot complete the evi-
dence of this witness before then. 
By the Court : Isn't that already in the record you have 
there~ 
By :nfr. :nfay: I have no objection to its being read out of 
that, (indicating printed record). 
By lfr. Easley: No, we want the final judgment entered 
by this Court. It is not in the printed record. 
page 140 ~ (The Clerk of the ·Court here left the. Court-
romn and returned in a short while with the Or-
der Book requested.) 
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DIRECT EXA.:MIN.ATION. 
By ~Ir. Easley: • 
Q. ~Ir. Sandidge, you are the clerk of this Court, are you 
not? 
A. Yes, sir, 
Q·. Were you the Clerk of this Court at the time the final 
judgment was rendered in this case against :Mr. Aronovitch t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you g-ot there a final judgment entered-
A. (Interrupting): Did you ·want the order in which the 
jury found the verdict, or after it came back from the Court 
of A.p,Peals ! 
Q. No, I mean the final one from the Court of Appeals, 
when final judgment was entered. 
A. That order is-
Q. (Interrupting·) : Read the order where the jury found 
thP. verdict, too. 
By Mr. ~fay: We object to that as not being the final or-
der. 
page 141 ~ By Mr. Easley: All right, read the final judg-
ment. 
A. I believe I will have to get the other Order Book. 
By 1\'Ir. Coleman: We want to offer the notice of motion 
with the jury's verdict on it in the orig-inal papers. 
A. Yes, ·sir. 
By Mr. May: We object to that as being in1material. . 
By the Court: It is admitted that there was a $20,607.00 
verdict and that $8,500.00 was paid on it and that the bal-
ance is due. What is the materiality of having anything more 
in the record. 
By Mr. Coleman: Only this: One of their defenses is that 
this was under an agreement, plan, or compensation law. If 
. we show the verdict of the jury on the notice of motion, it 
shows 'vhat kind of a case it was and by what proceeding-
the verdict was rendered. That is the only materiality of it. 
By the ·Court: The verdict of the jury for that amount and 
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the judgment of the Court on the verdict...is already in here 
as Exhibit B. 
. By :Nlr. Miry: I do want to object to an original paper in 
the case being filed. I believe, if the notice of motion is in-
sisted upon with the verdict of the jury on it, it should be 
more proper to use a certified copy. I will not insist on a 
certification of the copy. . 
page 142 ~ By ~ir. Easley: I don't propose to file that 
decision, but to read from the record into the evi-
dence; I just want to read the verdict on the notice of mo-
tion. 
· By Mr. Colen1an: We have a copy of the notice introduced, 
and we 'vant to show the verdict of the jury. 
By the Court: Let the order of the Court show that the 
verdict of the jury was entered in the record. 
By J\tlr. J\.fay: Vve except to the ruling of the Court on the 
ground that the verdict of the jury is immaterial, because 
it was ·not ultimately followed, I believe. 
By 1\fr. Easley: It was ultimately followed. 
By the Court: Yes, sir, it was. 
By J\tir. J\tlay: I will withdraw the objection. 
By the Court: Do you want to read it (addressing l\1r. Cole. 
man)? · 
By ~ir. ColP.man: Yes, sir. That- is a verdict read from 
the original notice of motion (reading) : 
"~{arion Ayres v. D. Aronovitch: We, the jury find for 
the Plaintiff, ~farion Ayres, in the sum of $20,607.00 against 
the Defend_ant, D. Aronovitch, doing business in the name of 
Kings' Distributors." Signed, "R. C. J\.Iayo". 
page 143 ~ By Mr. Easley: Now, I want the final judg-
ment read. 
By the ·Court : Of the Supreme Court of Appeals f 
By :Mr. Easley: Yes, sir. ~{r. Sandidge, will you please 
read that. 
A. This is the final ordP.r in Law Order Book No. 20, page 
3: (Reading.) 
' 'Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the County of 
Amherst, on the 26th day of November, 1937. 
The following order· is certified by the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals at Richmond, V~rginia: 
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'Virg·inia: In tho Clerks Office of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia, at Staunton on Tuesday the 23rd day of November, 
1937. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia at Riclunond certifies the following order in words and 
:figures following, to-wit: 
Virginia: In the Supreme Court of Appeals held at the 
Library Building in the City of Hichmond on Tuesday the 
11th day of Noven1ber, 1937. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business under the nan1e of ICing's Dis-
tributors, Plaintiti in Error, 
Against 
l\Iarion Ayres, Defendant in Error, 
Upon a writ of error and S'ltpe1·sedeas to a judg·ment of 
the Circuit Court of Amherst County pronounced on the 14th 
day of N oven1ber, 1936. 
This 'cause, which is pending in this Court, at 
page 144 ~ its "place of session in Staunton, having been 
fully hoard but not dctennined at said place of 
session, this day came here the parties, by counsel, and the 
Court having- maturely considered the transcript of record 
of the judg11Hmt aforesaid, and argun1onts of counsel, is of 
opinion for reasons stated in writing and filed ·with the rec-
ord, that there is errol' in the· judgment con1plainecl of. It is 
therefore adjudg-ed and ordered that the jud6'1nent afore-
said be reversed and annulled, and that the defendant in er-
ror, as the party substantially prevailing, recover of the plain-
~iff in error his cost by hin1 expended about his defense here-
In. 
''And the Court proceeding to entet· such judgment as to 
it seen1s riglit and proper, cloth adjudge and order that tl1e 
verdict of the jury be reinstated and that the plaintiff re-
cover of the defendant the sun1 of twenty thousand, six hun-
dred and seven dollars ($20,607.00), ,·vith interest to be com-
puted after the rate of six per centun1 per annum from the 
14th day of 1\-Iay, 1936, until paid, and also his cost by hin1 
expended about the prosecution of his notice of motion for 
judgn1ent in the said circuit court. 
''Which is ordered to be entered in the order book here 
and forthwith certified, tog·ether with a certified copy of the 
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opinion in this case, to the Clerk of this ''Court 
page 145 ~ at Staunton, who will enter this order in the or-
. der book there and certify it to the said Circuit 
Court. 
A Copy, 
Teste: ~L B. WATTS, C. C. 
A Copy, 
Teste: H. H. WAYT, Clerk. 
Tax Atty. Fee $20.00 
Cost of brief of def. in er-
. .. -ror $60.00 Amount allowed 
as per Code Sec. 3528a 50.00 ~ 
$70.00 
A Copy teste: 
W!L E. SANDIDGE, Clerk." 
vVi tness stands aside. 
By ~fr. Easley: If your Honor please, I want to ask you 
something. -I don't think it will take long to dispose of it. 
By tho Court: Suppose the jury go on now and come back 
at two o'clock. 
(The jury at this time left the Courtroom.) 
Bv !\Ir. Col01nan: vVe want to make this staten1ent. The 
statement was made that this Court would take juclical notice 
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in this 
page 146 ~ case of Aronovitch v. Ayres, which is true; but it 
would not be evidence in this case unless it was 
introduced as evidence. Now, we want to introduce the opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals in this case as evidence in this 
pending- case. vVe do not have a certified copy, but I think 
they will agree (indicating opposing counsel) that this is a 
copy (indicating). 
By the Court: Haven't they held it improper that a wit-
ness should express his opinion? 
By ~fr. Coleman: Yes, sir, but they don't make that rule 
applicable to thmnselves. They have a right to express an 
opinion, and not only do they have a right, but they are re-
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quired .to do so, and put it in writing, and officially publish 
it. We want that opinion introduced as part of the evidence 
in this case. · 
By ~fr. J\IIay: We have no doubt that, if this is introduced 
in evidence in this case, that counsel may say: Here is the 
evidence and the opinion of the Supreme Court, and it says · 
that the care of this truck-or in effect in terms that the 
Supreme Court uses it-was in Scrug-gs alone, and that should 
end that controversy. 
I submit, your Honor, that, in that controversy concern-
ing which opinion the Harleysville Mutual Casualty Com-
pany was not a party to that action-that the terms used 
by the opinion mean the care of the truck generally. It would 
not mean such care as may have been delegated by· Scruggs 
to Ayres. 
page 147 ~ By the Court: This Court will take judieial 
"ilotice of the opinion of the Supreme Court and 
will be guided thereby, as far as applicable. I don't think 
that the opinion should be introduced as evidence, but as to 
the la'v in that case, concerning- the insurance policy, the 
jury will be instructed as to that. I will not allow it as evi-
dence. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs except for the reasons hereto-
fore assigned. 
My Mr. Easley: I think the same results may be accom-
plished by instructions, but we offer it. 
Court was at this time recessed until two o'clock P. ].II. on 
the same day. 
page 148 ~AFTERNOON SESSION-2 o'clock P. M. 
Monday, 1\fay 16th, 1938. 
1\fARION AYRES; 
Complainant-sworn in his own behalf. 
DIRECT EXAl\fiNATION. 
By ]/fr. Coleman: 
Q. Your name is Marion Ayres, is it not 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·You are the Plaintiff in this proceeding v. Mr. D. Arono-
·. 
I • 
! 
I 
! ~ 
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vitch, doing business as l(ing's Distributors, and the Har-
leysville :Ai utual Casualty Company, are you not! 
.A:. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And you were the plaintiff in the action v. D . .A.rono-
vitch, doing business under the name' of IGng's Distributors, 
were you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which resulted in a judgment in your favor for the 
sum of $20,607.00, were you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What \vas the date of the_ accident in which you were 
injured and for which you recovered that judgDJ.entY 
A. October 16th, 1935. 
Q. What were you engaged in doing at the time of the ac-
cident and injury to you? 
A. I was working for ~Ir. Aronovitch as a helper on his 
truck, under Tom Scruggs. 
page 149 ~ Q. As a helper under Tom Scruggs Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What were you engaged in doing at the time of the ac-
cident and injury? 
A . .I was just riding along. 
Q. Were you engaged in the operation of the truck~ 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. At that time? 
A. No, sir. 
By :Air. May: ·1.,Ve move that the answer be struck-that.the 
woFq ''operation" in this case has. a legal sginificance that 
this witness cannot give. 
By the Court: I think that question was leading. 
By :1\Ir. Coleman: They don't object to it on that ground. 
He objects because he said the word has a legal meaning. I 
don~t understand that it does. 
·By ::t\{r. May: He can say what he was doing. We don't 
object t9 that at all. 
By the Court: I think it is an objectionable question be-
cause it is leading. It directly puts in the niouth of the wit-
ness the very thing in controversy here. 
By 1fr. 1\:fay: We object to it on that ground, too. 
page 150 ~ By ~Ir. Coleman : 
Q. Who was, at the time of the accident, op-
erating the truck in which you were riding? 
A. Tom Scruggs. 
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Q. vVhere did you and Tom Scruggs start on your trip that 
day-fro1n what point1 
A. vVe started from l(ing· 's Distributors, in Lynchburg. 
Q. Who took charge of the truck at that point f 
A. :Mr. Scruggs. 
By the Court: 
Q. You left fron1 what place¥ 
A. 2603 Fort Avenue, Lynchburg·, Virginia-King's Dis-
tributors. 
By 1\llr. Colen1an: 
Q. I will ask you if anybody else had charge of that truck 
from that time until the t.in1e of the accident 1 
A. Nobody but l\fr. Scruggs. 
Q. Without waiving· our objections to the evidence intro-
duced with reference to the duties of 1\!Ir. Ayres, \Ve want 
to ask him this question: \Vhat were your duties in your 
employment by ~{r. Aronovitch ¥ 
A. l\{y duty was to relieve the driver, or helper on the truck, 
to drive under l\Ir. Scruggs. 
Q. Who had the care of the truck? 
By the Court (IntelTupting·): I want him to read that an-
swer.· (The answer is read.) 
page 151 ~ By ~Ir. Coleman: 
. Q. \Vhen was it your duty to drive, Mr. Ayres 1 
A. '\Vhenever he told me. 
Q. When who told you? 
A. Tom Scruggs. 
Q. Who bad the care of the truck~ 
A. 1fr. Scruggs 
By l\ir. l\Iay: We object to that and move that the last an-
swer be stricken out, because in this case the word "care" 
is subject to legal construction, and we don't think this wit-
ness is in a position to do that. We move that the answer 
be struck from the record. 
The foregoing· motion is overruled and the Defendant, by 
counsel, excepts to the ruling of the Court for reasons here-
tofore stated. 
By the Court: I think it is a proper answer. 
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Q. Had you been told at any time during that day to drive 
the truck by 1\fr. Scruggs 1 . 
A. 'Ve started out and I asked Scruggs who would drive . 
the first trick, he or I, and he said, "I will drive it". 
Q. Did you know when your time to drive·on that particu-
lar day \vas to arrive~ 
.A. The one who usually drove the first trick would drive 
to Harrisonburg or Winchester and the other would take it 
over then . 
. page 152 ~ By the Court : 
Q. Do you mean that your first ''trick", as you 
call it, was from Lynchburg to Harrisonburg? 
.A.. Yes, sir, or vVinchester, and then the other would take 
it. 
By :1\fr. Coleman: 
Q·. '\Vhat \vere your duties while :1\fr. Scruggs was driving 
the truck~ 
A. I didn't have any duties at all. I laid down and would 
go to sleep or I would read a n1agaziue or smoke a cigarette, 
or do anything I \Vanted. 
Q. '\Vhat were you actually doing at the time of this acci-
dent? · 
A. I was just sn1oking a cigarette ·and talking to Tom. 
Q. He was tl1e driver and you \Vere the helper T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vV as there any difference in the duties of the driver 
and the helper¥ 
A. Yes, sir, the driver is responsible for the truck .. He 
got the expense money and everything. 
Q. And the helper's duties were what? 
A. To drive whenever he told him or do whatever he told 
hin1 to do. 
Q. What truck was this that you were riding on that caused 
the injury? 
page 156 ~ A. A 2-ton Dodge tractor, with Black Diamond 
trailer hooked on to it. 
Q. Did you have any kind of W orlrman 's agreement or 
plan for your compensation for any injuries while employed 
bv ~Ir. Aronovitch f 
"'.A.. No, sir. 
-------
. - ' 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
-By ~Ir. ~fay: 
·Q. Mr. Ayres, how was your compensation for your serv-
. ices worked out? 
- A. It was worked out $11.00 for the trip -to Rochester and 
back. 
· Q. Was that $11.00 :fig·ured at so much permile? 
A. I don't know; we just arrived at that agreement-----$11.00 
to Rochester, and $8.50 to Brooldyn, and $2.50 to Richmond,, 
Virginia. 
Q. Were you paid on the basis of one cent a mile-550 miles 
to Rochester, 550 miles backY ~-- · 
A . .Ai3 a matter of fact, it is a little further to Rochester 
and back. 
Q. That is not shown by the road map that you went on, 
is it~ 
A. It does with the speedo1neter on the truck. 
Q. It does by the speedometer on the truck, but not on the 
road mapY . 
A. There is no road map that will give the mileage through 
the country and through the limits of the towns, 
page 157 ~·such as we had to go through, and we had a lot 
of that to do. 
Q. Tell his Honor and the jury whether or not you knew 
the basis of your compensation was figured at one cent a mile, 
as the basis on which that could be determined¥ 
.A. Well, I suppose it was. We arrived at an agreement 
of $11.00 to Rochester and back. I think ~ir. Aronovitch 
established it to be 1,100 miles. 
Q. You accepted his estimate of that· before, did you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. His amount on the 1,100 miles satisfied you all right, 
diditY 
A. Yes, sir, that is what we drew. 
Q. Did you understand that you were to be paid for the 
time that you were riding as wen as for the time that you 
were actually driving? 
A. He never did deduct anything while I was riding. along. 
Q. You tell the jury and his Honor whether or not you 
didn't know that you were to be paid for the mileage that you 
covered 'vhen you were not at the 'vheel, as well as for the 
mileage that you 'vere at the wheel Y 
A. I suppose he paid me for the time I was riding along 
on the trip. 
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Q. You know that, dont' you? 
A. No, sir, I knew that we drew $11.00. 
page 158 ~ Q. And you knew that you were paid for the 
mileage covered when you ·were not at the wheel 
• as well as for the mileage when you were at the wheel. You 
knew, that, didn't you ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
By 1ir. Easley: Ask him-when he was asleep in bed. 
By Mr. J\tiay: 
Q. You said you drove under Tom Scruggs, was it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How does he pronounce his name~ 
.A. Scr11ggs. 
Q. And you were the helper on the truck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vhat are some of the things that you have helped to 
. do with reference to the truck, when you speak of being a 
helper? 
A. I helped to load at Lynchburg-empties. 
Q. Did you help load empties on this particular trip 1 
A. Yes, sir, and when we got to Rochester, I helped un-· 
load empties, or rather ran them to the back end of the truck 
and the man at the brewery took them in, and when all the 
Pmpties were off, they put the cases on in the plant and we 
put them back in the truck. 
Q. You had some definite work to do at the start and finish, 
didn't you? 
page 159· ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you and J\.1 r. Scrugg·s would divide the 
driving time as much as you could on an even basis, would 
you? 
A. Well, I don't know about the even part. I just drive 
. whenever he told me, and when I got tired, he took the wheel 
-whenever he woke up and got ready to drive. 
Q. vVhenever one of you got tired, he always told the other 
one and he would relieve hin1? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you tried as evenly and as far as practicable to do 
the same amount of driving on the same trip; did you? 
A. Yes, sir, we would. · 
Q. \Vhen you started out on the first "trick"-the first 
driving, on the day of tl1is accident, was done by Mr. Scruggs, 
was it? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how far had you driven out of Lynchburg to the 
scene of this collision¥ 
A. I don't know how many miles it 'vas, but it was about 
at the top of the hill above 1\tionroe. 
Q. It was certainly less than 10 miles, wasn't it 1 
A. It was around 8 or 10 miles. 
Q. And all that you had earned, so far as this trip was con-
cerned, on that particular trip at the time of the accident, was 
about 8 or 10 cents, at a cent a 1nile ¥ Is that right~ 
A. Yes, sir. , 
page 160 ~ Q. You had been 'vorking for J\IIr. Aronovitch 
for quite awhile, had you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had worked for him, as you call it, both as a 
driver and a helper1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had there ever been, when you were either a driver or 
a helper any break-down in the equiipment that you were 
on' . 
A. Yes, sir; Jesse J\IIeaclows had a wreck in Pennsylvania; 
he had charg·e of the truck and I helped under him. 
Q. Have you ever had a break-clown that had to be re-
paired to son1e extent, or a flat tire f 
.A. No, I don't think \Ve had-other than that back there. 
Q. vVhat did you do when that wreck occurred-did you 
say it was Tom l\feadows ·y 
A. It was Jesse 1\tieaclows; he called nir. Aronovitch and 
got so1ne n1oney wired to him, I think. He got a car and went 
back to Harrisburg· and got a radiator. 
Q. Were you hurt in that accident 1 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. "\Vhat did you do? 
A. He told me to stay there and watch the truck until he 
went to Harrisburg and back. 
page 161 } Q. And while he went to Harrisburg, you 
cared for the truck while he was gone, did you' 
A. I watched the truck. 
Q. Did yon care for it? · · 
A. I didn't do any "caring" for it; all I had to do was to 
stay there and watch it. 
Q. Have you ever had any minor repairs that had to be 
made on the road of any kind? • 
A. Change the tires, sometimes 
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Q. When you are a helper, does that fall to your work tQ 
chang·e . the tires 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The days that he '\vent in charge of it, as you say, Mr. 
Scruggs-would he have anything to do 1Vith changing the 
tires? · 
A. He would help n1e, yes, sir; but he would tell me what 
to do-to g·et a jack and help, naturally. 
Q. Both of you, in the case of changing a tire, you all would ·. 
do that, wouldn't you T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you would do and perform any other little minor 
service or minor repair to the truck that appeared to be 
necessary, would you f 
A. As he seen fit, yes, sir. 
Q. As he saw fit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 162 ~ Q. And you would do those things, just as much 
as he would, would you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. S01nething· 'vas said with reference to checking· the 
lubrication and 'vhether or not the lugs, if I understood it 
correctly, were all right. Did you perform any of those 
duties 7 
A. I helped to check the lugs and tighten them up. 
Q. Did you do that when you were a helper 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At what time did you do this checking up? 
A. 'Vhenever he happened to stop, either at Lynchburg 0.1 
Rochester. He 'vould tell me to check the lugs. 
Q. This thing of checking the lugs, you possibly did that 
on several occasions on each trip, to be sure that the wheels 
were on all right, did you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And either you or l\1r. Scruggs would do that, depending 
on what the other was doing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. N o,,r, 'vhen you would have to get gas or things of that 
kind, 'vho would attend to that? 
·A. ~{r. Scrugg·s-he had the money. 
Q. And the lubrication-any examination that would have 
to be made as to whether or not lubrication would be neces-
sary? 
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A. When he was getting the oil-rather when 
page 163 ~ he was getting· the gas, the man would check the 
oil then. 
Q. The filling station man¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And neither you nor J\1r. Scruggs did that? 
~N~~~ . 
Q. When you told his Honor and the jury that you were 
not operating this truck, do I understand you to mean merely 
that you did not have control of the wheel at the tin1e? 
. A. I did not have cl~arge of the truck when I didn't have 
hold of the whP.el either. 
Q. You didn't have either one. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. But you were subject at that time to do what he told 
you.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRE·CT EXA.i.'\1INATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Mr. Ayres, you have been asked about checking the 
lugs, changing the tires, buying the gas, and so forth, and 
checking the oil. Were any of those things done or needed 
at the time of the accident or immediately before. 
A. The checking of the brakes and things was not needed; 
they was tightened up a week before. The brakes had not 
been fixed while I was with the truck at the time of the acci-
dent. 
page 164 ~ Q. Did yon have anything to do with looking 
after the fixing of the brakes 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q'. Were any of these things-the changing of the tire and 
the tightening· of the lugs and the buying of the gas and 
the oil-were any of those things done at the time of the ac-
cident or immediately before 1 
A. No, because when we started out-we gassed up before 
we left the plant. 
Q. That is at Lynchburg? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After you gassed up, was there anything else needed 
for the truck from that time until the time of the accident 1 
A. We needed a jack; we stopped at Barker-Jennings and 
got a jack. 
Q. That was at Lynchburg-. Who stopped for the jack? 
I i_ 
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A. lVir. Scruggs. 
Q. After you got the gas and the jack, was anything else 
needed for the truck at that time1 
A. What do you mean "needed"? 
Q. Was thete anything for you to do 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there anything for anybody to do at that time-at 
that particular time, at the time of the accident' 
page 165 ~ A. Nothing except to drive the truck. 
Q. And that was being ·done by Mr. Scruggs, 
was it' 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\{r. 1\{ay : 
Q. If you had not bP.en hurt at that time in the collision, 
at the time it occurred, but if a tire had been blown out at 
the san1e tiinP., and you were not hurt at all, would you and 
1\{r. Scruggs have fixed it and changed it on the equipment f 
A. Yes, sir, he would say, "Let's chang-e the tire", and 
went on and cha1ig·ed it. 
'Vitness stands aside. 
The plaintiff rests. 
page 162 ~ The jury at this time was excused from the 
Court room, and the following motions and pro-
ceedings were had in the absence of the jury. 
By Mr. May: If your Honor please, at any stage of the 
case, this question is going; to beco~e material, so we know 
of no better time to present it than just now: 
On behalf of the Defendnnt, the flarleysville :Niutual Cas-
ualty Company, we desire to moye the Court to strike out 
all the evidence in the ca~e, peca~1se, bv t.hat -~vidence, includ-
ing· the evidence of thP. Plaii1tiff--anci the Plaintiff can cei'-
ta.irtly not ask that his case be made any stronger th,ap. he 
has l1imself made it-that as a matter of 1aw, that evidence · 
establishes that this case comes under_ ~ 'veil-recognized ex-
ception to the policy, which 1 shall read (Reading): 
'~Providing the Company shall not be iiable under any. 
policy issued for loss resulting or arising from any of the 
following causes or while said motor vehicle is being used or 
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maintained under any of the following conditions: 'N * • (d) 
* • * nor shall any policy cover injury to any mnployee or 
ernployees of the insured while engaged in operating or car-
ing for any of the aut01nobiles covered by this policy, nor 
any obligations assu1ned or imposed upon the insured by 
any Workmen's .A.green1ent, plan, or law.'' 
page 163 ~ After argtuncnt of counsel on both sides on the 
above motion, the Court rendered the following 
decision: 
By the Court: I will defer action on the motion until the 
conclusion of the testin1ony. You may proceed with the evi-
dence. 
Court was at this tin1e adjourned until tomorrow morning 
at ten o'clock A. 1\L 
1\iORNING SESSION-10 O'CLOCJ( A. 1\L, TUESDAY, 
:MAY 17th, 1938. 
By 1\tfr. Easley: vVe have found the original of the notice 
of execution, which was actually served and shows the date of 
the service, and I would like to substitute that as the exhibit 
for the copy which was filed yesterday. It shows the actual 
return on it. 
By the Court: Just substitute that and1nark it Exhibit C, 
if there is no objection. 
By JVIr. Colmnan: \Ve want to recall Mr. Ayres for one 
question. 
page 164 ~ !\1:ARION AYRES, 
recalled by the Plaintiff (In his own behalf). 
By !\Ir. Coleman: 
Q. You were asked on yesterday by counsel on the other 
side what you had earned on the day of this accident. You 
travelled approximately 10 uriles and earned 10 cents. Did 
you collect anything-
By ~Ir. ~fay: vYe object to that; as to any collection, we 
object to that as being immaterial. If it is an outstanding 
obligation, it is imn1aterial whether or not it has been col-
lected. 
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By the Court : He was asked if he had earned it and he is 
now asked if he was paid. l-Ie may answer the question. 
By the 1Vi tness : No, sir. 
By ~fr. 1\tiay: We except to the ruling of the Court for 
reasons stated. 
By :Nir. Coleman : 
Q. Did you make any demand for compensation? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Was any compensation offered to you for it! 
.A. No, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q . .As I understand it, you were paid one cent a mile on 
these trips and back? 
page 165 ~ A. As I understand it, it -was $11.00 for the 
trip to Rochester and back; I don't know how it 
'vas figured. 
By 1\!Ir. May: • 
Q. You stated yesterday that was the way he figured it, 
didn't you f 
A. I may have; it was $11.00 to Rochester and back. 
Q. There has been no change in your knowledge on this 
subject yesterday or this n1orning, has there? 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Easley: He stated that yesterday. 
By l\ir. 1\tiay: 
Q. Did you. have a chauffeur's permit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that in addition to the regular driver's permit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \\Thy did you have a chauffeur's permit: 
A. Because the law requires it when you are under the 
wheel-to have a chauffeur's permit. 
Q. You held yourself out as a driver, did you? 
A. When I was driving, I had to have one. 
Q. You held yourself out as a competent driver, engaged in 
that kind of employment, did you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In fact, at this time, that was the way you 
page 166 ~ were earning your living, was it? 
A. I was engaged in driving. 
132 Supreme Coutt of Appeals of Virginia 
Marion Ayres. 
Q. You were engaged in dtiving 1 
A. _Yes; sir. 
Q. And you were engaged in operating; were you 1 
A. I was driving---'-'votldng on the truck and whatever they 
· told me to do. . 
Q. I asked you if you were engag~d in operation of it? 
A. When I was under the wheel, yes, sir. 
By ~Ir. Coleman: . . 
Q. "\Vere you engaged in di'iving or operating it at the time 
of the accident f 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. May: . 
Q. You simply did not have contl'ol of the wheel Y 
A. No, sir. 
Witness stands aside. 
page 167} 
By Mr. May: 
1IARION AYRES, 
tecalled by the Defendant. 
Q. Do you know Jesse ~ieadows? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you ever on any trips with him¥ 
A. I drove under him as a helper. 
Q. How much of a senior-·-who had been with Mr. Arono-
vitch the longer? 
A. I had been there lo.nger, but when he hired Jesse 
Meadows, he put him in charge of the truclt. 
Q. Were you ever in charge of the truck? 
A. Yes, sir, after he got rid of Jesse ~feadows. 
Q. Did you ever operate with anyone named Asa; Dowdy? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was in chai.'ge of the truck when you were wlth Asa 
Dowdy? · 
A. Iwas. 
Q. ~d with R. E. Pollard 1 
A. f!lhat must have been the CCC b~y. 
Q. I don't know about that. 
_A. I was in charge when he was working there, if that is 
the boy. . 
Q. And I. H. McBride? 
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A. I was in charge when he was there. 
. Q. And Thon1as Scrug·g·s-according to your view of this, 
you had acted in the capacity of \vhat you consider both 
a driver and a helper for l\ir. Aronovitch, prior to the date 
of this collision, wbirh orrnrred when you were 
page 168 ~ injured' 
- A. Yes, sir. 
Witness stands aside. 
D. ARONOVITCI-I, 
recalled by the Defendant. 
By l\ir. May: 
Q. At my request, which was made on yesterday, have you 
made up a list of the long-distance trips that had b~en taken 
by Marion Ayres prior to his injury? . 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is this the list that I hand you (handing paper to wit-
ness); is that the list of the trips that were made of a long-
distance nature by ~fr. l\1arion Ayres¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
By M:r. May: I will offer this in evidence as Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 1 for the I-Iarleysville Mutual Casualty Com-
·pany. 
(The foregoing paper is marked as Exhibit No. 1 for the 
Defendant, and is :filed as a part of this record, and is in the 
following words and figures, to-wit:) 
page 169 ~ r.l'rips. made by l\{arion ~1\yl·es for David Arono-
vitch, trading as l{ings Distributors fron1 July 
14th, 1935, to October 13th, 19-35l inclusive. 
7/14- 7 /17-Rochester, N cw York-with J. I-I. l\{eadows~ 
7/19- 7/23-Rochester, Ne"r York-with J. H. l\{eadows. 
7/25- 7/28-Rochester, New York-with Asa Dowdy. 
7/29- 8/ 1-Rochoster, New York-\Yith Asa Dowdy. 
8/ 2 Richmond, Virginia-with Asa Dody. 
8/ 5- 8/ 8-Rochester, New York-with Asa Dowdy. 
8/ 9- 8/11-Rochester, New York, with Asa Dowdy. 
8/16- 8/19-Rochester, New York-with R. E. Pollnrd. 
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8/19- 8/22-Rochester, New York--,Yith R. E. Pollard. 
8/27- 8/30-Rochester, New York, with I. H. ~fcBride. 
9/ 6- 9/ 9-Rochester, New York-with I. J. :McBride. 
9j10- 9/12-Brooldyn, New York-with I. H. :nicBride. 
9/13- Riclnnond, Virginia-with I. H. 1\{cBride. 
9/13- 9/16-Rochester, New York-with I. H. 1\icBride. 
9/17- 9/19-Rochester, New York, and Norristown, Pa., with 
I. II. 1\ticBride. 
9/20- 9/21-Berkley Springs, vVest, Va.-with I. H. 1\ic-
Bride. 
10/ 7-10/10-R.ochester, New York, with Thos. H. Scruggs. 
10/11-10 /13-Brooklyn, New York, with Thos. I-I. Scruggs. 
10/16/35 -To l{,ochester, New York, with Thos. H. Scruggs. 
Trip uncon1pleted on account of accident which 
occurred on this date (Oct. 16, 1935) resulting 
in injuries to lVIarion .Ayres. 
By 1\tlr. Easley: \Ve have no objection except that objection 
was made to other prior occurrences, some time prior to the 
date of the accident. 
By 1\tlr. l\Iay: 
Q. \Vill you read the date the trip waS; taken and concluded 
and where it went to and who accon1panied 1\Ir. Ayres; will 
you read this to the Court and the jury, sir, (handing· paper 
to witness) "l 
A. J\ilay I say that: this was prepared by the bookkeeper 
of the con1pany (indicating paper)? 
page 170 ~ Q. It was from your cmnpany's records, wasn't 
it~ 
A. Yes, sir; the trips were made by 1\tlr. Marion Ayres for 
David Aronovitch, trading as King's Distributors, from July 
14th, 1935, to October 13th, 1935, inclusive. (Reading) Fron1 
July 14th to July 17th, to Rochester, New York, with J. 1\[ 
Meadows; July lHtb to July 23rd, to Rochester, New York, 
with J. l\L lVIeadows; July 25th to July 28th, to Rochester, 
New York, with Asa Dowdy; July 29th-August 1st, to Roches-
ter, New York, with 1\.sa Do,vdy; August 2d to Richmond, 
Virginia, 'vith Asa Dowdy; August 5th to August 8th, Roches-
ter, New York, with Asa Dow·dy; August 9th to August 11th, 
to Rochester, New York, with Asa Dowdy; .August 16th to Au-
gust 19th, to Rochester, N e'v York, with R. E. Pollard; Au-
gust 19th to August 22c1, Rochester, N e'v York, with R. E. 
Pollard; August 27th to August 30th, to R.ochester, New York, 
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with I. H. ~feB ride; September 6th to September 9th, to 
Rochester, New York, with I. H. 1vfcBride; September lOth, 
to Septen1ber 12th, to Brooklyn, N e·w York, with I. I-I. Mc-
Bride; Septen1ber 13th to Riclnnond, Virg·inia, with I. I-I. Mc-
Bride; September 13th to September 16th, to R-ochester, New 
York, with I. H. M:c.Bride; September 17th to September 19th, 
Rochester, New York, and Norristown, Pennsylvania, with 
I. II. l\fcBride; Septen1ber 20th and 21st, to Berkeley Springs, 
West Virginia, with I. H. 1\.fcBride; October 7th to October 
lOth, Rochester, N evv York, with Thomas H. Scruggs; October 
10th to 13th, Brooklyn, New York, with Thomas .H. Scruggs; 
October 16th, 1935, to Rochester, New York, with 
page 171 ~ Thomas H. Scruggs; trip uncompleted on account 
of accident which occurred on this date, October 
16th, 1935, resulting in injuries to ]\{arion Ayres 
Q. How did the base of pay of 1\fr. Ayres compare with 
the base of pa.y of all of those men who drove¥ · 
A. To be exact, I will have to refer to the records. There 
'vere son1e occasions when they were unequal, but I don't know 
fron1 n1en1ory, when these occasions were. 
Q. Are you now operating as I\::ing's Distributors? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many en1ployees do you have now~ 
A. I believe it is 14; I cannot say from memory, but I 
think it is 14. 
Q. Are you now working under the \Vorkman 's Com pen-
sa tion Act of Virginia~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A.nd yon carry \VorJnnan 's Compensation insurance on 
these men now, do you' 
A. Yes, sir, covering all employees. 
Q. Do you now have an aut01nobile policy which you un-
derstand covers them, too ·f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why do you carry automobile insurance? 
A. I don't believe I understand that. 
Q. Do you have anton1obile insurance now that covers these 
employees, too? 
page 172 ~ A. Do I have automobile insurance covering 
these employees? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I carry standard automobile insurance. 
Q. Does that cover the employees? 
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A. So far as I understp.nd it, it covers them under certain 
conditions. 
Q. So now; you have two insurance policies, do you so far 
as your e1nployees are. co.ncerned f 
By Nlr. Easley: We object to that as immaterial and irrele-
vant. · 
By the Court: I \vill sustain the objection; I believe it is 
well taken . 
. By Mr. May: All right. 
Witn~ss stands aside. 
By 1\{r. May: .. At this tilne, I desire to offer in evidence as 
formal proof without reading then1, all of the given instruc-
tions in the case that your Honor tried of D. Aronovitch 
doing "Qusiness-or rather of ~!arion Ayres v. D .. A.ronovitch, 
doing business under the name of K:ing 's Distributors, and 
for the benefit of counsel a.nd the reporter, I would like to 
have ypu note an appropriate exhibit number at this time, 
~nd they will be found in the record in this case. 
page 173 ~ By the Court~ You are asking for the instruc-
tions that were actually given to the jury on both 
sides¥ 
By Mr. 1\iay: Yes, sir, on both sides. 
By Mr. Coleman: Is that any more relevant or material 
thari the opinion of the Court ,vhich was given in this case, and 
which we offered yesterday in this case and we were refused 
. it, after objection. 
By the Court : Gentlemen of the jury (addressing the 
jury )-for fear that I may say something that is improper, 
I will ask you to retire from the Court room. 
(The jury at this time retired from the Court room.) 
By the Court: Now, 1\ir. Coleman, in answer to your ques-
tion, in the absence of the jury, I think that there would be in 
this case a decided difference. In the first place, as to the 
opinion of the Suprmne Court in the Aronovitch case on 
the other branch, that Jays down the law in thi~ State, and is 
to be considered i1). this cnse so far as applicable, which can 
be reached by proper instructions. I think it would be 
eroneous and misleading· to put the whole of the 
page 17 4 ~ opinion of the Court in evidence, but, as I un-
derstand the purpose of the introduction of these 
instructions, it is for the purpose of tending to sho'v whether 
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or not you have brought yourself within the terms of the sec-
ond phase of your exception (D), which is as to the Work~ 
man's agreement, plan, or law, and, if I am correct, I think 
that it will be material. 
By Mr. Coleman: The Court of A.ppeals said that some 
of these instructions were erroneous. 
By the Court: That n1ay be true, ~{r. Colen1an, but ~:;till 
it deals with the question of whether or not there was a work-
man's agreement, plan, or law, within the contemplation of 
this policy. That is ti1e purpose of it. 
By ~{r. J\tlay: Yes, sir, that is the only purpose for which 
it is offered. 
By Mr. Easley • Another objection that we have is this: 
That they have used terms in this policy which are unknown to 
the law, in this State certain. There is no such tern1 as "a 
workman's law" in this State, other than the Workman's 
Compensation Act, which might be designated a Workman's 
Law. That is the only law 've have in this State. 
By the Court: That is a matter of terminology, ~ncl I 
know it makes some impression on n1y 1nind, but wouldn't 
the Fellow Servants' Law be a Workman's Law? 
By ].:fr. Easley: No, sir, because it does not ap-
page 175 ~ ply to all workn1en. The policy refers to a ''work-
men's law", but it is unknown in this State. I 
want to call your attention to the fact that the insurance 
policy in this case, differing from a great many others, does 
not provide that it is issued or that the contract is made in 
the State of Pennsylvania, to be construed according to the 
laws of that State, of course. It has no reference to that 
State at all, but it shows here that it was issued to pro-
tect a man in the State of Virginia. It was between a citizen 
of Pennsylvania and a citizen of Virginia-issued in Virginia 
and to be performed in Virginia. Under the rules o£ con-
struction, we must construe the policy under the laws of 
,Virginia, there being no provision in the contract to the con.,. 
trary. 
So, I say, that there being in this State no such thing known 
to the law-I cannot find it in any dictionary or in any 
digest-there is no such term as ~'vVorkmen's Law"~I say 
that the nearest thing coming to that and the thing that the 
parties must have had in mind when they entered into that 
contract-the only ''Workn1en 's Law" of ~ny kind in this 
State is the Workmen's Compensation Act, so called. And 
that being true, and it having been shown in evidence here that 
this judgment was not rendered under the "\i\7 orkmen 's Com-
138 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
pensation .. Act or any "workmen's law", that the 
pag·e 176 ~ instructions that werE' given in that case are inad-
tnissible here and are apt to be misleading. 
If it is desired to have in the record a con1plete state-
tnent of ·what law was applicable and upon what basis that 
judgtuent was rendered, we subn1it that the law was deter-
mined in the opinion of the Supren1c Court much n1ore fully 
than it would be in the instructions, some of which the Suprmne 
Court said were erroneous. 
By the Court: The Court said that one instruction should 
have been given, but that it was harrnless error-that was as 
to passing on the right-hand side of the road when there 
was no traffic. That was the only one, for which they did not 
reverse the case. 
By ~Ir. Easley: The difficulty is that the insurance com-
pany is cOining here with its policy which it wrote and issued 
in Virginia, 'vi.th no provision that it is to be construed ac-
cording to any other law, and using the term that we know 
nothing about. 
By the Court: Let me see those instructions and the policy. 
(The papers requested are handed to the Court.) 
By ~ir. Colen1an: I have this thought in n1ind in connection 
with these instructions. Of course, the construction of that 
policy and what is Incant by that clause, 've will discuss later, 
but can the Court detennine the meaning of it, 
page 177 r 01' the jury determine the nwaning of it, by the in-
troduction of instructions dealing with the law of 
another case, and at the same tin1e conclude that the jury 
cannot determine the nwaning of that phrase by the law of 
that smne case, laid down by the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals of this Conunonwealth. The instructions embody the 
law of the case and so does th(\ opinion. Can the jury have 
it mnbodied in these instructions and not in the opinion 1 
All of it is the law. These instructions cannot be construed 
any n1ore as law or ns evidence than the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals, which says that the law is so and so. If one is 
acln1issible, the other certainly is. They are not offering them 
as law, but as evidence, and 've offer the opinion as evidence. 
Both have the san1e applicability. 
By the Court : Do you have anything further to say? 
By ~Ir. Easley: No, sir. 
By the Court: The instructions may be introduced. 
(To which action of the Court, the Plaintiff, by counsel, ex. 
cepted, for reasons heretofore stated.) 
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By Mr. ]\fay: Those instructions begin on page 240 of the 
printed record, and they end on page 247 of that record. 
By the Court : Those instructions were actually 
page 178 ~ given, were they? 
By 1\'Ir. 1\fa.y: Yes, sir, for both sides. On he-
half of the Defendant, the IIarleysville ~Iutual Casualty Com-
pany, I take it that it will be unnecessary for us to intro-
ducP. another one of the policies, but I do desire to state that 
the policy introduced by the Plaintiff is this Defendant's 
policy in fact. 
By the Court: 'rhat has been already introduced, hasn't 
it~ 
By ~Ir. ]\fay: Yes, sir. 
The instructions so introduced in evidence by the Defend-
ant, Harleysville l\!utual Casualty Company, are in the fol-
lowing words and :figures, to-wit: 
page 179 ~ *INSTRUC'].IONS. 
Instructions Given for the Plaintiff. 
i . No. l-(An1ended) Given for plaintiff-Defendant excepts. 
~ 
The Co.urt instructs tl1e jury that the driver of an auto-
mobile or truck, is required to have it under control at all 
times, to operate it at a reasonable rate of speed on the right-
hand side of the highway, and, if he desires to pass a vehicle 
that he is approaching, going in the same direction, shall 
give audible warning with his horn before passing or attempt-
ing to pass it, and if 'the left side of the highway is clearly 
visible and free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance 
ahead to penuit such overtaking and passing to be made in 
safety, shall proceed to do so; and if the jury believe from 
the evidence that the accident and resulting injuries to the 
plaintiff were caused by the failure on the part of the driver, 
H. T. Scrugg·s, to observe said duties, or any of them, and that 
he was the agent or servant of the defendant, acting within 
the scope of his en1ployn1ent at the thne of the accident and 
injury, then they should find for the plaintiff, unless the 
plaintiff had assun1ed the risk of the negligence of said 
Scruggs as a fellow-servant as oi1tlined in other instructions. 
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371 * •N o. 2-.Amended-Given for plaintiff-Defendant ex-
cepts. 
The Court instructs the jury that a servant or agent never 
assumes the risk of the 1nasters' negligence in 
page 180 ~ failing to exercise ordinary care to furnish the 
- agent or servant with reasonably safe and suit-
able machinery, properly inspected and in proper repair; 
therefore, if the jury: believe from the evidenre that the acci-
dent and resulting injuries to the plaintiff in this case \Vas 
due to the combined negligence of the defendant to exercise 
ordinary care in failing to ftu11ish the plaintiff with reason-
ably safe and suitable machinery, properly inspected and in 
proper repair, and the negligence of a fellow-servant in the 
operation of the truck, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, un:-
less he himself was guilty of contributory negligence pro-
ducing the accident and resultant injury. -
No. 5-Amended-Given for Plaintiff. Defendant excepts. 
The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that it was the duty of Scruggs to see that· the 
· brakes on the defendant's truck were properly ad-
372• justed and in a reasonably safe working *condition 
and that Scruggs' attention was called to the fact that 
the brakes were not in such ~afe working condition and the 
said Scruggs promised to have the same adjusted and re-
paired, the ·plaintiff had a right to rely upon such promise; 
and if the jury further believe from the evidence that the 
accident and resulting injuries to the plaintiff were due to 
there being· improper brakea on said truck or in part to there 
being improper brakes, which resulted from failure of said 
. Scruggs to exercise ordinary care to repai:c, and 
page 181 ~ in part to the negligent operation of the same by 
the said Scruggs, the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover, even though they may believe from the evidence that 
the plaintiff and Scruggs were fellow-servants, provided tho 
said plaintiff exercised ordinary care to avoid being injured 
on account of such in1proper brakes, if such, and was not .guilty 
of contributory negligence which caused the accident and his 
injud~s. · 
No. 6-Amended.,-Given for Plaintiff, No except_ion. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the plain-
tiff, they shall fix the damages at such sum as will compen-
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sate him for all expenses, including doctors' and hospital bills, 
incurred by him on account of the *injuries sustained 
373* and the loss by him of his earnings, past and future; 
and in addition thereto, such sum as will compensate 
him for the bodily pain and mental anguish which he )1as 
suffered, and for the ·pain and suffering, if any, which they 
may believe from the evidence he will suffer in th,e future 
by reason of the inju.ries rc.ceiv.ed, not to exceed the amount 
sued for. 
! No. 8-Amended-Given for plaintiff. D.efendant ·excepts. 
( 
Tbe Cou:r;t further instructs the jury that it was the duty 
of the defendant to exercise ordinary and r.easonable care 
to employ reasonably careful and competent fellow 
page 182 ~ servants to 'vork ·with the plaintiff; and if the 
jury believe from the evidence that the defendant 
failed to exercise such care in employing Scruggs to work with 
the plaintiff and the said Scruggs 'vas an incon1petent and 
careless driver, on account of whicl1 resulted such negligence 
in the operation of the defendant's truck and trailer that 
proximately caused or contributed to the wreck and plaintiff's 
injuries, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, unless they 
further believe that the plaintiff himself was guilty of 
374f.' contributory negligence resulting in said accident *and 
injuries to him, in however slight degree, which would 
defeat his recovery. 
No. 9-Amended-Given for plaintiff, Defendant excepts. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence th~t the accident and resulting injury t.o the plaintiff 
was due to the combined negligenee of two or more persons, 
the plaintiff is entitled to sue and recover against either for 
the entire .damage suffered, if he establishes his case ~.ccord­
ing to law. 
375* *Instructions Given for the Defe:ndamt. 
''A' '-Givcn-n.o exception. 
The Court instructs the jury that this is an action based 
upon the charge of negHgcnce and that neglig.ence on the 
p.art of fhe defendant cannot be assumed merely 
page 183 ~ because the plaintiff was injured while on the de-
! - fendant 's truck. .The burden is upon the plain.. -
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tiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant was guilty of negligence as charged in the plain-
tiff's notice of n1otion for judgment and the an1endrnent there-
to and that this negligence was the sole proximate cause of the 
~u~ . . 
The plaintiff cannot recover if it is just as probable that 
the injury complainecl of, resulted fron1 some cause for which 
the defendant was not responsible as for some cause for which 
he was responsible. 
'' B ''-.1\.1uencled-Given-N o exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that 'vhen the plain-
tiff entered the serviee of the defendant as an employee, be 
assumed, while working witl1 and as a fellow servant, all 
the risks incident to such *service and among such 
366* risks are those arising out of the negligence of his 
fellow servants engaged in the san1e work; the hazard-
ous character of the work itself and the risks incident to 
the use of public highways. 
'' C ''-Given-No exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that all employees 
serving a common mnployer, working under the same con-
trol, deriving compensation and authority fron1 
page 184 ~ the same source and engaged in the sa1ne general 
business, although in different grades or depart-
ments, are fellow servants, and take the risk of each other's 
negligence. And if the jury believe from the evidence that 
the injury to the plaintiff was caused by the negligent act 
of a fellow-servant, then the plaintiff, is not entitled to re-
cover and the jury should find for the defendant unless 
they should further believe from the evidence that the de-
fendant failed to exercise ordinary care to provide a reason-
ably safe truck and trailer for the use of the plaintiff. 
367* *D-Amended-Given-N o exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that no matter how 
dangerous the work in which a· servant ma.y be engaged, the 
duty imposed by la.w on the employer is to exercise ordinary 
care for the employee's safety. And by ordinary care is 
meant such care as a. man of ordinary prudence would exer-
cise under_ like circu1nstances. And if the jury shall believe 
from the evidence that the defendant, his agents and servants, 
I 
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provided such authority was given to others as agents and 
servants by the defendant, exercised ordinary care to provide 
for the safety of the plaintiff, then the defendant would not 
be responsible for the injuries of the plaintiff, and the jury 
must find for the defendant. 
page 185 ~ "E "-A1nended-Given-N o exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that the defenda:iJ.t 
was not an insurer of the safety of the plaintiff, Ayers, 
and was not required by la'v to adopt the safest and best 
means of providing for his safety. The law requires the 
defendant to exercise ordinary care for the safety of his 
drivers in providing the truck and trailer and «'equip-
Inent thereon which were used by them, to be kept in a reason-
ably safe and suitable condition for their customary use, 
and also to exercise ordinary care to have the same inspected 
to keep them in repair and in such reasonably safe and suit-
able condition for such continued purpose, and if the jury shall 
believe from the evidence that the defendant exercised such 
care, then he is not liable so far as such appliances and equip-
ment are concerned, even though they may believe the brakes 
on the truck and trailer were defective at the time of the 
accident complained of. 
· '' F ''-An1ended-Given-N o exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that the defendant 
was not required in law to g·narantee the absolute cmnpetency 
and fitness of his driver, Scruggs. The defendant was only 
required to exercise ordinary care-that is, such care as a 
man of ordinary prudence would exercise under like cir-
cumstances in the selection and retention of Sc-ruggs as a 
driver. And if the jury shall believe from the e·vidence that 
the defendant did exercise such care in the selec-
page 186 ~ tion and retention of Scruggs as a driver, then the 
defendant would not be *responsible for tlre in-
juries complained .of by the plaintiff to .. the extent they may 
have been caused l?Y the incompetency or· unfitness of 
369* the said Scrugg·s as a truck driver. 
"G"-Given-No exception. 
The Court ful'ther instructs the jury that the happening of 
the accident by 'vhich the plaintiff was injured, cannot be 
considered by the jury as evidence tending to prove that the 
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defendant lmew or should have known of the incompetency 
of Scruggs as a truck driver if such incompetency existed. 
The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that Scruggs was an 
incompetent and unfit driver and likewise to prove that the 
accident 'vas caused by his incompetency or unfitness and that 
the defendant knew or should have known of the alleged in-
competency or unfitness prior to the time the accident oc~ 
cur red. 
370* *" H "-An1enclccl-Given-No exception. 
The Gourt further instructs the jury that it was the duty 
of the plaintiff to be reasonably observant of the truck and 
trailer he was using; to report any defects discovered there-
in to those under whom he worked; to exercise ordinary eare 
to avoid injuries to himself; to obey rules of the defendant 
· which w.ere l>rought to his knowledge .or given him 
page 187 ~ in charge, if any, and to inform himself as far as 
he reasonably could, respecting the dangers as 
well as the duties incident to this service with the defendant, 
for the defendant wa.s under no g1·eater oblig·ation to care for 
his safety than he himself was. Therefore, if the jury shall 
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff failed to discharge 
any one or more of his aforesaid duties and that such failure 
on his part proximately contributed to the accident, he is not 
. entitled to recover in this action. 
371 * "I "-Amended-.Given-No exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that if they shall be-
lieve from the evidence that the brakes on the truck and 
trailer of the defendant were defective ..at any time and shall 
also believe that the plaintiff had la1owledgc of their defective 
condition, then it was the duty of the plaintiff to report there-
of, and, with such Imowledge, continued to 'vork on such truck 
and trailer, without any promise on the part of those in au-
thority to do anything to then1, the la'v presumes that the 
plaintiff intended to ass1nne s:ach risk and he cannot recover 
from the defendant ,o~ .account of such defecti:v:e condition. 
"J "-Amendecl-Given-N o exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that it is their duty. 
to try this case without being influenced by sympathy from· 
the mere fact tha,t the plaintiff was injured and has suffer.ed, 
I :. 
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for the jury, as well as the Court, are under the 
page 188 ~ solemn obligation of an oath to decide according 
to the la,v and the facts, for without *negligence 
by the defendant, as the proxin1ate cause of the plain-
372* tiff's injuries, the defendant cannot be held liable in 
damages. 
''I\':' '-Given-No exception. 
The Court further instruets the jury that where a person, 
without fault, is suddenly placed by the negligence of another 
in such a position that he is con1pelled to choose instantly in 
the face of grave and apparent imminent peril between two 
or more hazards, or two or 1nore rneans of attempting to 
escape the peril ·with which he is confronted, the law does 
not require of him the exercise of all the presence of mind 
and care of a reasonably prudent person under ordinary cir-
uumstances or even of an that which a reasonably prudent 
man would ordinarily show in the face of danger. It makes 
allowances for the circumstances under which he is forced to 
act and the effect of the real or apparent impending peril on 
his mind and his nervous and muscular reactions. If he acts 
under a reasonable apprehension of grave, imminent 
373* danger, in the •honest exercise of his judgment, and 
makes such a choice as a person of ordinary prudence 
might perhaps make under the circuinstances, he is in law not 
responsible for any injury resulting therefrom. 
page 189 ~ Therefore, if the jury shall believe from the evi-
dence in this case that H. T. Scruggs was driving 
the truck of the defendant just prior to the accident com-
plained of; that the plaintiff was in the truck with him; that 
they had followed the "Tood truck for some distance; th~t the 
said Scruggs had reached a point in the highway being used 
where he could see a sufficient distance ahead of1 him to enable 
him to pass the Wood truck on its left; that he had given a sig-
nal of his intention to pass the 'Vood truck, the latter turned 
suddenly to the left side of the said highway and that reason 
thereof, the said Scrug·gs, without fault on his part, was placed 
in a perilous position and confronted with the necessity of 
making an immediate choice or decision of avoiding a. col-
lision with the said Wood truck and in an effort to avoid 
colliding with the said vVood truck, the said Scruggs suddenly 
turned the defendant's truck to the extreme left of the high-
way and in so doing, came into contact with a. slight embank-
ment, thereby causing him to ten1porarily lose control -of the 
defendant's truck and by reason thereof, the defendant's truck 
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collided with a tree, causing the *plaintiff to be injured, 
374$ the said Scruggs was not guilty of neglig·ence unless 
the jury shall further believe from the evidence that 
the act of the said Scruggs was so reckless and wanton that 
it cannot, reasonably be said that a man of ordinary prudence 
might, under the snn1e conditions and circumstances, make 
such a choice or so pet. 
page 190 }- '' L' '-An1ended-Given-N o exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that if they shall be-
lieve from the evidence that the plaintiff knew or that by 
the exercise of ordinary eare on his part could have ascer-
tained that the defendant's equipment or any part thereof 
was not sufficiently heavy to carry the load that was placed 
thereon or that the brakes on such equipment were inade-
quate to enable the said equipnwnt with a. heavy load there-
on to be eontrolled properly and shall further believe that the 
plaintiff with knowledge or con1prehension of the danger of 
using such equipment with a heavy load thereon, voluntarily 
accepted the same by continuing in the service of the defend-
ant, without complaint about the same to the defendant, 
375* then he assumed the risk thereof and cannot *recover 
in this action, if they believe such condition caused 
or contributed to the accident and resultant injuries to the 
plaintiff. 
'' l\I' '-Atnendod-Gi ven-N o exception. 
The Court further instructs the jury that the testimoiiy in 
this case as to the con1petency and incompetency of Scruggs 
as driver is no evidence that this eollision was caused by neg-
ligence on the part of Scruggs and should not be considered 
for this purpose. 
This testimony was adn1itted for the purpose of determining 
whether or not the said Scruggs was a competent or in-
cmnpetent fellow servant or driver. 
page 191 } (In the presence of the jury.) 
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H. T. SCRUGGS, · , 
sworn for the Defendant. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Nir. ~lay: 
Q. I believe you were driving Mr. Aronovitch 's truck on 
the day that ~fr. Ayres received certain injuries, were you 
not1 · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. V\There were you going' 
A. To Rochester, New York. . 
Q. Ho,v far out of Lynchburg was it that this accident oc-
curred 1 
A. About 8 or 9 miles, or 7 or 8 miles-it was less than 
10 miles. 
Q. vVhat was your wageY 
A. One cent a mile. 
Q. Do you kno'v what l\1:r. Ayres' wage was' 
ll.. The same as mine. 
Q. With reference to the work that was to be done on the 
truck-especially the actual driving and handling of the 
'vheel-how did you all endeavor to parcel that out, with re-
spect to making it so that each party would drive about 
half of the time~ 
A. He had just as much to do with it as I did, and just 
as n1uch responsibility as I had for the whole outfit. 
Q. 1Vith reference to the trip-the amount of 
page 192 ~ 1nileage each of you were actually behind the 
wheel-how did your work in that respect com-
pare with the work of Mr. Ayres~ 
A. Sometimes we drove 100 miles apiece, and sometimes 
200 n1iles, depending on how we felt about it. 
Q. On the trip, did you finally try to average it out, so 
that both of vou drove about the same amount? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you also paid as well for the time that you were 
not actually behind the wheel as well as for the time that 
you actually drove tlw truck yourself~ 
A. V\T e got one cent a mile for every mile covered. 
Q. Whether or not you were driving Y 
A. Whether we were driving or not; whether or not you 
were walking, or not. 
Q. And was 1\fr. Ayres paid the same wayY 
A. The same thing, yes, sir. 
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Q. flad anything been said that morning as to wh_ere you 
expected to stop driving and where ~Ir. Ayres ·would begin f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Nothing had been said about that at all¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you kno·w where you expected to change¥ 
A. I didn't have no idea. 
Q. Now, when one of you were driving, did the 
pag·e 193 ~ other stand I'eady to drive at any time? 
A. Yes, sir, he wa.s supposed to. 
Q. Did he also stand i.·eady to ca~·e for the ear-
By Mr. Easley: We object to the leading form of the ques-
tions. 
By the Court: The objection will be sustained. They are 
right much leading. 
By ~Ir. May:: I will try to put it in another form. I kno'v 
that some questions are leading jn effect, but son1etimes under 
the evidence, the only way that a question can be asked is in 
the form of a leading question. 
By. the Court : I believe the witness has already answered 
your· question. 
By 11:r. J\IIay: I will ask the shorthand reporter to 
read the preceding question and answer. (The question and 
answer requested were read.) 
·Q. Did he stand ready to care for the truck at all times? 
By Mr. Easley: If they want to examine him along this 
line, a question could very readily be put in the form of what 
their duties were-their respective duties and obligations and 
rights, under the instructions or under his contract of em-
ployment, if he knows it. 
page 194 ~ By the Court: See if you can cover that in 
your questions, Mr. :May. 
By J.\IIr. Easley: None of the questions as to his duties have 
anything to do with this case at all. 
By the Court: Whose duties f _ 
By Mr. Easley: Anybody's duties. The question is what 
he was doing at the time of the accident. 
By Mr. ~fay: 
Q. What was the duty of the one of you that was not driving 
at any particular time, with reference to being ready at all 
times to take care of the truck? 
I. 
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By 1\ir. Easley: vVe object to that. He has already an-
swered that once. 
By the Witness : He was just supposed to be on the truck 
with me; that was all, and be ready whenever I got ready for 
him to drive or when he got ready for me; it made no difference 
which .. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. Was he also ready to assist in the changing of the 
tires~ 
By 1\tfr. Easley: We object to that as being leading. 
By the Court : 
Q. Was he there for the purpose of doing anything el~e 
other than driving~ 
page 195 ~ A.· He was there to do anything that was sup-
posed to be done. . 
Q. vVas he there for the purpose of doing anything else other 
than driving? If so, what? 
A. He was supposed to help do anything that was supposed 
to be done; it made no difference what it was. 
Q. What do you nwan, "doing anything"-you mean In 
regard to handling the truck 1 
A. If anything happened to it, he was supposed to help 
fix it. 
By ~Ir. May: 
Q. With reference to assisting in the loading and unload-
~ng, did he assist in that' 
A. Yes, sir, he was supposed to; and so far as me telling 
him what to do, I never told him to do-nothing and I never 
had no right to tell hiln. I never did it, because I felt that 
he had as much to do with it as I did and ·was as responsible 
for it as I was. 
By Mr. Easley: We object to the statement of the witness 
as to how he felt about it. 
By the Court: 
Q. Why do you say that you felt that way? 
A. Because nobody has never told me to tell him to do any-
thing. l\IIr. Aronovitch never gave me no order to 
page 196 } give Marion .Ayres no orders. 
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By ~[r. 1\'Iay: 
Q. Ilow did you detern1inc when you were to drive or he 
was to drive, or ho"r did you both determine that? 
A. \Vhenever I got tired of driving or whenever he got 
tired. 
Q. You asked the other to take the wheel, did you? 
A. vV e asked each other to take it. 
Q. Did· it work the other way around-when one was not 
driving that he would state to the- other that he would drive 
a\vhile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It \vorked both ways. 
By the Court: 
Q. Did you have any particular rule or system by which 
you and 1\'Ir. Ayres drove ·this truck or these trucks or did you 
do that just as you 'van ted to do after you left Lynchburg Y 
.A. vVe just dia as we wanted to do. 
By 1\'Ir. Coleman: 
Q. vVho had the money on this trip on the day of the acci-
dent to pay expenses Y 
A. I did. 
Q. Who \Vas operating the truck at the time of the acci-
dent¥ 
A. I was. 
Q. 'Vho repaired the truck after the wreck? 
page 197 ~ A. The John P. I-Iughes 1\Iotor Company, I 
think. 
Q. Did you, or 1\Ir. Ayres, have anything to do \vith re-
pairing it or doing- anything to the truck at the time the ac-
cident happened~ 
A. I carried it by John P. Hughes Company had it checked. 
Q. I nwan after the accident? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Neither you nor 1\{r. Ayres did anything to the truck 
or about the truck after the accident about having it fixed 
up? 
A. No, sir, I never did. 
Q. 1\fr. Ayres didn't either, did heY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was anything done to the truck by you or Mr. Ayres 
after you left the .John~- Hughes 1\fotor Company in Lynch-
burg, and before the accident? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. And you say you got what co1npensation? 
.A.. One cent a mile. 
Q. Was that con1pensation fixed at so much per trip to 
Rochester and return? 
A. So much per trip at the rate of one cent a mile. 
Q. Did you g·et anything for the part of the trip that you 
rnade on the day of the accident~ 
A. No, sir, because we hadn't got far enough 
page 198 ~ and I didn't look for anything. 
Q. You didn't get far enough. If you ever 
looked for anything, you never asked for anything and Mr. 
Aronovitch never offered you anything, did he? 
A. No, sir; I never asked him for anything. 
By l\fr. l\fay: 
Q. Do you know whether or not ~Ir. Ayres knew that he 
was being paid one cent a mile 1 
A. He absolutely did. 
Q. Did you ever discuss with him what you all were mak-
ing f 
A. l\fore than once: 
Q. What was said between you and 1\tir. Ayres with refer-
ence to what you were making and how it was calculated 7 
A. I have talked to hin1 more than once about dragging a 
big- truck over the hig·hway at one cent a mile. -
Q. "'\Yhat did he say about it' 
A. He didn't have notl1ing to say about it. 
Q. Did he think it was right small. 
By.l\Ir. Easley: We object to that. The witness is not a 
mind reader. 
By l\fr. l\fay: I don't know about that, fron1 the 'vay you 
construe this policy. 
Q. Have you ever discussed with Mi. Ayres whether or 
not this "ras a fair rate, or whether or not you 
page 199 ~ should get n1ore' 
By Mr. Easley: We object to that as being immaterial and 
irrelevant-this discussion as to whether or not thev were 
paid enoug-h money. · 
By the Court: I will sustain the objection. I don't see the 
materiality of it. 
By 1\ir. ·May: One of the witnesses has in some way indi-
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cated that he didn't know how his pay was based, if I under-
stood him correctly. 
By the Court: Which witness was that¥ 
By J\ir. ~fay: ~fr. Ayres-he talked about it as so much 
a trip. . 
By the Court: flis evidence is in the record as to what · 
he made, on yesterday. 
By ~fr:- J\iay : Very well. 
vVitness stands aside. 
The defendant rests. 
page 200 ~ REBUTTAL EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAIN-
TIFF. 
By Mr. Easley: 
I. H .. McillRIDE, 
sworn for the Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Q. Mr. McBride, are you the same I. H. McBride who is 
referred to in this list of en1ployees of J\ir. Aronovitch, who 
made trips hauling beer from Rochester to Lynchburg? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You made some of these trips with 1\!Iarion Ayres, didn't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know what your duties were-yours and 1\llr. 
Ayres, under instruction from Mr. Aronovitch 1 · 
By Mr. J\iay: We object to any further examination of 
this witness, for the reason that counsel is not confining him-
self to the trip. and that the relation may not have been the_ 
same between this witness and the witness Scruggs. 
By the Court : What is that? 
By Mr. EaslP-y: It has been testified that ·on these trips 
the driver and helper, or both drivers, as they have been 
variously designated, had equal care and responsibility for 
the truck, and I want to show that that is not true. 
page 201 ~ By the Court: You can ask that. 
By 1\ir. 1\!Iay : We except to the ruling of the 
Court for reasons stated. 
By Mr. Easley: I will change the question. 
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By ~fr. l\Iay: I don't object to the form of it. 
By Mr-. Easley: 
Q. It has been testified here by l\1:r. H. T. Scruggs that 
-on these trips, the driver and helper or both parties had the 
same duties and responsibilities, and they were exactly equal. 
Is that true or not¥ -
By Mr. May: In order to keep the record straight, I de-
sire to make the same objection made to the previous ques-
&a , 
The above objection was overruled and the Defendant ex-
cepted to the ruling of the Court for reasons heretofore 
stated. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. I will ask that the question be read. (The question is 
read). With respect to the care and operation of the truck 
-is that true f 
A. Well, my impression of it-
By lVIr. ]\fay: We object to this witness' impression. 
By the Court: Just answer the question~ 
page 202 ~ A. There is a difference. 
By l\fr. Easley: 
Q. State what the difference is and what the respective 
.. positions of the parites were. 
A. It is not a gTeat deal of difference, but one man car-
ried the expense money and he is given the orders to go to the 
destination we are sent to, and he has got a little the best 
job. The pay is the same, I think. 
Q. How about the duty of responsibility for the truck? 
By the Court: You were asked as to the operation and _ 
repair· of the truck as to these men. Answer that part of it. 
A. The man in charge of the truck at that time was sup~ 
posed to be in charge of what was being done with reference 
to repairs. I was a help~r when I worked with Ayres and 
I would do whatever he told me to do, and he likewise worked 
right along with me. 
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By l\ir. Easley: 
Q. \Vho had control as to when each was to drive¥ 
A. VV e worked that out muong ourselves. The man in 
char:ge of the truck could have made me-if he was over me-
he could have 1nade n1e drive if I hadn't wanted to, but as a 
g·eneral thing·, 've worked it out a1nong ourselves. I felt like 
he could-the head man. 
page 203 ~ Q. He was in authority, was he? 
A. I took one trip-I made that trip and I was 
in authority, and the boy that worked under n1e, I made him 
drive when I said drive, and he was not a very good driver, 
and I didn't let him drive very n1uch, but when two men are 
'vorking together and g·etting along nicely, they can work 
those things out without one having· to tell the other anything. 
Q. When a driver was not. driving, did he have anything 
to do at all-any responsibility or anything to do¥ 
A. He was ,:;ubject to call from the driver of the truck. 
Q. Until he was called, did he have any duty to perfrom 
at all¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In the care of the truck or operating the truck at alU 
A. No, sir, he would have been a back-seat driver, if he had 
done that. He just sat there. 
CROSS EXA:NIINATION. 
By :Nir. :Niay : 
Q. Suppose the truck would break down, would both men 
on it endeavor to fix it as best they could, if they could and 
knew what to do f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 204 ~ Q. And if a tire had to be changed, would both 
assist in that? 
A. Yes, sir, both 'vould fix it. 
Q. The man who was riding sat there subject to call at all 
times to operate the truck and care for it to whatever extent 
it was necessary to care for it, did he¥ 
A. Yes, sir, that is rig·ht. If he was riding along or if he 
should go to sleep, I would have had to wake him up and 
say, ''Come on, there is something to do'', but if everything 
was going on smooth, you were free to do whatever you liked. 
Q. But you were subject to call at all times Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
vVitness stands aside. 
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page 205 r 
By l\Ir. Easley : 
JESSE L. ~IEADOWS, 
sworn for the Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Q. You ·were employed by 1Ir. Aronovitch on these long 
distance hauls. Did you ever make any trips with ~Ir. Ayres Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On these trips, were you under him or over him or vice 
versa? 
A. I was over him. 
Q. "VYhat was your destination 7 
A. R.ochester. 
Q Did you differentiate between driver and helper-did 
you call them different positions~ 
A. When I had charge of the truck, he worked under me 
as a helper. 
Q. And you were the driver? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As a helper, did he have equal authority with you Y 
By 1\tir. l\fay: 'Ve 1nake the same objection to tins witness' 
testimony as we made to the previous one. 
The foregoing objection is overruled and the Defendant 
excepts. 
By l\I r. Easley : . 
Q. As your helper, did he have equal authority with youY 
A. VVhat do you mean? 
page 206 } Q. I n1ean as to who was to drive and when 7 
A. It was not any set time for either one of us 
to drivP.. At any time \Ve g·ot tired or wanted to be relieved, 
we would switch. 
Q. If there was any disagreement, whose word controlled-
the driver's or the helper's 1 · 
A. The driver's. 
Q. When the driver of the truck 'vas operating the truck 
and driving· the truck, was there anything-any duty to be 
perforn1ed by the helper at that time 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. None whatever 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. State ·whether or not there was a bunk in which you 
could go to sleep, if you wanted to? 
~-~--
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A. We had a little cot in the back trailer that we could 
sleep on. 
Q. And when you were not driving, you could be slapping, 
could you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS ~XAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. ~lay: 
Q. The helper was always subject to call to operate the 
truck, was he? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was he always subject to call to care for it~ 
A. Anytin1e he was needed, yes, sir. 
page 207 ~ Q. Does it sometimes occure that they are 
needed¥ 
A. Very often. 
Q. Very often? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In what capacities are they called f How do you hap-
pen to call them, for instance, when you are the driver and 
have somebody else as a helper? 
A. We would have a flat tire or a break-down; or anything, 
where you mig·ht want assistance. 
Q. In other words, he also served who sat and waited~ 
A. What is that¥ 
Q. That is all right. That is all. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. Do I understand that it was only in the event that some-
thing happened to the truck, where you had to make repairs, 
such as chang-ing a tire, or something of that sort, that you 
called on the helper to assist? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he had no other duty to perform¥ 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. May: 
Q. Does the helper ever assist the driver to the extent of 
telling him about this or that or the other thing that he sees 
and \vhich he doesn' think the driver has seen Y 
page 208 ~ A. If there is anything that the driver didn't 
understand clearly, we would talk it over together 
and get each other's viewpoint on it. 
Q. What were some of the things like that-wh~re he wo-qld 
give his viewpoint on it? 
L___ 
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A. In case of an accident or something o~ that kind. 
Q. Did the helper ever call the driver's attention to traffic 
that he thinks the driver had not possibly seen f 
A. Not as I remember; it might have happened. 
Q. Does the helper pretend to exercise some lookout on 
the road when both are in the cab? 
A. Not exactly. · 
Q. Does ,he often do it? 
A. That all depends 
Q. Depends on what? 
A. Well, the way \Ve are working then with the bunk in 
the back trailer, if a man was asleep or resting back there, it 
would be impossible for him to say anything at all. 
Q. When he was in the bunk? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But be was not in the bunk all the time when he was 
not driving, was he 1 · 
A. What time we drove, when we was not driving, most of 
tl1e time we were in there, yes, sir. 
Witness stands aside. 
page 209 ~ By 1\:lr. l\{ay: I desire to recall Mr. Marion 
Ayres for one question. 
By 1\ir. l\{ay: 
1\:lARION AYRES, 
recalled by the Defendant. 
Q. J\.fr. Ayres, as I und~rstand it, on these heavy trucks, 
didn't you have to carry a block along with you so when the 
truck would stall on hills and the brakes could not hold it, 
somebody would get out and put a block under the wheel? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Describ~ that operation fully to the Court and jury. 
A. Whenever you put the block under the wheel was when 
the ·motor would die on you, and you-there was something . 
probably wrong and the motor \Vould stop~ '\Ve had a vacuum 
brake and we had to have something to put under the wheel. 
Q. Would the man at the wheel fix this block or the man 
in the seat with him fix the block behind the wheel? 
A .. If his helper was asleep, he would wake him up and tell 
him to put the block out. 
Q. You could not stay at the wheel and fix the block both, 
could yonf 
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lliarion Ayres . 
.A. No, sir. 
pag-e 210 ~ Q. This operation required the services of two 
men, did it? 
A. Yes, sir, it required the services of the other man who 
'vas asleep, whoever it was. ~ . 
Q. Did you at that ti1ne run over 111any hills of that sort, 
when that operation would have to be indulged in? 
A. Not with that truck; not with that truck 've were driv-
ing. 
Q. Not with that equipn1ent? 
A. No, sir. 
ay 1\Ir. Easley: . 
Q. On the morning- of tlus accident, did anything of that 
sort occur? 
.A. No, sir. 
Witness stands aside. 
Both sides rest. 
End of all evidence. 
page 211 ~ Counsel for the Defendant, Harleysville IV[utual 
Casualty Company, indicating a desire to make 
a motion, the jury was excused frmn the Courtroom. 
By 1\{r. '1\Iay: .At the close of the entire evidence in the 
case, the Defendant, Harleysville 1\{utual Casualty Company, 
moves the Court to strike all the evidence that has been in-
troduced in the case, on the ground that that evidence estab-
lishes, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiff herein, at the 
time he sustained his injuries, was ''an en1ployee or em-
ployees of the insured while enagaged in operating or caring 
for any of the automobiles covered by this policy", and that 
this obligation was imposed upon the insured by a 'vorkmen's 
law. 
If your Honor please, I do desire to engage your attention 
only for a moment. On the arg-uments on this motion now, 
your Honor has already indulged us fully and no good pur-
pose can be served by again reviewing- those authorities. The 
same question is now presented as ·was pres en ted on the first 
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motion to strike at the close of the Plaintiff's case. I wish, 
however, to make this observation to your Honor and make 
it frankly. 
I wish that I were in a position to 1nake this matter easier, 
but the way I understand it, if I do understand the case cor-
rectly, your IIonor should by appropriate instructions di-
rect that a verdict be returned in favor of the Plaintiff for 
$10,000 or the evidence should be struck out en-
pag·e 212 ~ tirely. It is not a case where the jury has any-
thing to consider. They have no right to construe 
the language used in this policy. That is a primary function 
of the Court, and in no way, I think, can it be equitably placed 
at the disposal of someone other than the ·Court itself. 
'\Vhich motion counsel for the Plaintiff resisted, and, after 
argun1ent of counsel, the Court gave the following· decision: 
By the Court : This is typically an action on an insurance 
policy and the issues here have been made very narrow. . The 
question is whether or not this plaintiff can recover $10,000 
under this policy issued to ~Ir. D. Aronovitch, trading as 
ICing-'s Distributors, by the Harleysville ~Iutual Casualty 
C01npany, and the issue is further confined as to whether or 
not that recovery can be had in view of the exceptions em-
braced in the policy. 
Reading that part of the policy under the exceptions with 
which we are here deal~ng; we find this language : '' Provid-
ing the Company shall not be liable under any policy issued 
for loss resulting· or arising from any of these following 
causes or while said motor vehicle is being used or maintained 
under any of the following conditions". 
page 213 ~ Now, mnitting (a) and (b) and (c), and in (d) 
down to beginning with "nor shall any policy 
covm· injury to any employee or employees of the insured 
while eng-aged in operating or caring for any of the automo-
biles covered by this policy, no1: any obligations assumed or 
imposed upon.the insured by any workmen's ag·reement, plan, 
or law,'' and, etc. 
Now, g-entlemen, 'vhat is the evidence~ That is the lan-
g·uage of the contract. The contract must be, where it is un-
anlbiguous, interpreted by the Court, by the language used 
within its four corners. Common language must be inter-
preted as common language, unless there is some good reason 
shown to the contrary, and technical language construed as 
technical lang11age. With that proposition before us, what 
is the evidence here-taking the staten1ent of the plaintiff? 
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The contract, or understanding, shows here that this .Mr. 
Ayres was employed by Mr. Aronovitch to use his truck, go-
ing to various places over the continent, I n1ay say, to bring 
back to Lynchburg beer purchased by him to be sold in the 
conduct of his business. His employment had changed at 
variol.ls times frmn th&t of a hP-lper to a driver, or the main 
person, we may say, in charge of the truck, and back to helper-
again, which position he occupied at the time of the accident. 
Jie says himself that his duties on the truck 'vere to drive 
whP.n hiR tiiue cameto drive it: to help repair it 
page 214 ~ when it needed repairs, and to assist in -doiilg any-
thing to the truck if his services were needed, in 
the event something happened on the journey. There was 
no particular time for him to drive. He could be called at 
allY tin1e that the ma11 under whom he was working on the 
trur.k 'vith him wanted hhn. He could be called to help re-
pair a tire or anything else in the course of his employment. 
lie was paid a compens&tion which 'vas the same as the other 
m~rn, fixed at a cent a mile for the miles covered from Roches-
ter to Lynchburg and return, or from Lynchburg to Rochester 
a~1d return. That is his evidence and, as shown by other wit-
nesses for the defendant, the Harleysville Mutual Casualty 
Company. 
Can we say here that this man was not engaged in operat-
ing and caring for this truck? 
Suppose, for example, he had been driving the truck and 
it had beP.n broug-ht momentarily. to a standstill, and he 
stepped out, for instance, and something happened and he 
was injured. Could we say that his courP. of employment or 
the things that demanded his servicP.s for the operation an.d 
taking carP. of the true}{, had ceased and the insurance com-
pany would be responsible if he was injured at that particular 
instant. · 
Take an ordinary example : take a railroad train composed 
of a crew of the engineer, the fireman, the conductor, and 
the brakeman, running up and down the track. 
page 215 ~ Tal\:e a local train. ~{aybe it wiU have to sit here 
for 30 minutes. The engineer and the fireman 
are idle as long as the bl·akeinan are unloading; but when the 
t~·ain pulls out, the eng·ineer goes into action, and he controls 
the throttle and the ateam and the brake, and the fireman 
pitches in the coal, as is demanded by travel on a railroad. 
The condtwtor is baclr in his caboose. Can we say that these 
men are not opert\ting the train? 
It looks like to IUe that it would be ordinary common sense 
to say that the 'vhole crew is operating the train and engaged 
Marion Ayres v. Harleysville 1'Iut. Cas.- Co., etc. 161 
in the course of their employment as employees of the rail.: 
road company. 
It looks li~e to me that this young man ·was engaged in 
the course of his employment, while he was on the truck-that 
be was operating and taking care of the truck. His services 
could be called at any time. I think he is covered by the ex-
ception in the policy, and I don't think that the Harleysville 
J.\IIutual :Casualty Company is liable, and the motion to strike 
will have to be respectfully sustained. 
By J\1:r. Easley: vVe except to the ruling of the Court for 
reasons stated. 
By the Court: This verdict 'vould not apply to anybody 
but the Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. Let the jury 
come back into the Courtroom. 
page 216 ~ By J\tir. Coleman: It would be on what is due. 
by the insurance company to 1\tir. Aronovitch. 
(The jury at this time returns into the Courtroom.) 
By the Court: (Addressing the jury) Gentlemen of the 
jury, at the conclusion of the evidence, a motion was made 
to strike the evidence in this case, which you have not known 
anything about, because the evidence did not bring this case 
within the conte~nplation of the policy sued on. The Court 
feels that it is bound to sustain that motion to strike the evi-
dence, as it does not feel that this policy covers his kind of 
accident, and you will return a verdict that the Harleysville 
1\'Iutual Casualty C01npany does not owe J\tir. Aronovitch any-
thing·. You pass on it as if no evidence was introduced in this 
case at all. Just write it: We, the jury, find that the Har-
leysville lVIutual Casualty Company does not owe D. Arono-
vitch, trading· as King's Distributors, anything; or you can 
just write it: We, the jury, find that the Harleysville Mutual 
Casualty Company owes D. Aronovitch, trading· as King's 
Distributors, nothing. 
By 1\Ir. Coleman: Put the Judge's opinion in the record 
(addressing the shorthand reporter). 
By the Court: No, it will not do anybody any harm or 
any good either. 
By 1\fr. May: I would like to have a copy of that. 
page 217 r The jury at this time retired from the Court-
room, and after a short time, again returned into 
Court with the following verdict: 
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"We,the jury, find that the Harleysville Mutual Casualty 
Company owes D. Aronovitch, doing business as King's Dis-
tributors, nothing. J. T. l\1ays, Foreman." 
By l\rfr. Colen1an : We move to set aside the verdict as 
contrary to the law and the evidence, and to enter up a judg·-
ment against the Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company, the 
Defendant, in the sum of $10,000.00, in accordance with the 
stipulation of counsel filed with the papers, showing that 
this amount was all that was involved in this particular 
litigation. 
Which motion was overruled by the Court, to which ac-
tion of the Court, the Plaintiff excepted, for reasons above 
stated. 
page 218 ~ I, Edward ~feeks, Judge of the Circuit Court 
for the County of Amherst, Virginia, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing is a true and a correct stenographic 
copy or report of all the testin1ony that was introduced, and 
other incidents of the trial therein, all exhibits or other writ-
ings introduced in evidence or presented to the Trial Court., 
all questions raised and all rulings thereon, in the case of 
Marion Ayres, as Plaintiff v. D. Aronovitch, doing business 
as King's Distributors, and Harleysville ~Iutual Casualty 
Company, as Defendants, tried in the Circuit Court of Am-
herts County, Virginia, on l\1onday and Tuesday, the 16th 
and 17th days of 1\rfay, 1938, and it appears in writing that 
the Plaintiff's attorneys have had reasonable notice of the 
time and place when this report of the testimony and other 
incidents of the trial would be tendered and presented to the 
undersigned for certification, which is certified within sixty 
( 60) days after final judgment. 
Given under my hand this the 6th day of June, 1938. 
EDWARD 1\fEEl{S, Judge. 
page 219 ~ I, vVilliam E. Sandidge, Clerk of the Circuit 
Court for the County of Amherst, Virginia, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing stenographic copy or re-
port of testimony and other incidents in the trial of the case 
of ~{arion Ayres v. D. Aronovitch, doing· business as l{ing's 
' Distributors, and Harleysville l\£utual Casualty Company, 
was filed with me as Clerk of said Court on the 6th day of June, 
1938. 
WM:. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
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page 220 ~ And again on this day, to-wit: At a Circuit 
;Court of the County of .Amherst, continued and 
h~ld at the Court House thereof, on Thursday, the 28th day 
of July, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and thirty-
eight. 
Marion Ayres, 
v. 
D . .A.ronovitch, doing business as l{ing·s Distributors, and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company. 
This day came again the . parties to the above entitled 
garnishment action and, it being shown to the Court that 
there has been no order of judgment upon the verdict of the 
jury heretofore rendered in this proceeding in favor of the 
defendants, D. Aronovitch, doirig business as Kings Dis-
tributors, and I-Iarleysville Mutual Casualty Company, it is 
now considered by the Court that the plaintiff take nothing a~ 
to the said garnishment proceeding, either against the prin-
cipal defendant, D . .Aronovitch, doing buisness as Kings Dis-
tributors, or the garnishee, Harleysville Mutual Casualty 
Company, herein, but that the said defendants do recover of 
the plaintiff their costs by them about this defense in this 
proceeding; to which action of the Court the plaintiff, by 
counsel, excepted. 
page 221 ~ County of Amherst, to-wit: 
I, Wm. E. Sandidge, Clerk of the Circuit Court . of the 
County of Amherst, in the State of 'Tirginia, do hereby cer-
tify that the foregoing is a full and complete transcript of the 
record in the garnishment proce·edings of Marion Ayres v. 
D. Aronovitch, doing business as Kings Distributors, and 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company, Ga-rnishee, lately 
depending in said Court. 
· Given under n1y hand this 28th day of July, 1938. 
Wl\L E. SANDipGE, Clerk. 
County _of Amherst, to-wit: 
I, Wm. E. Sandidge, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Amherst, in the State of 'Tirginia, do hereby cer-
tify that it appears by a paper writing filed with the record 
in the above mentioned ~ase that the notice of the application 
for the foregoing transcript of the record of said case, re-
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quired by Section 6339, of the Code of Virginia, was dnly 
given. 
Given under my hand this 28th day of July, 1938. 
WJ\L E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
~Clerk's fee for Transcript, $19.80 
A Copy-Teste: 
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